Foreign
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ANNIVERSARY
1941 - 1991

Daily Report
Supplement

Soviet Union

National Affairs

FBIS-SOV-91-051-S
Friday
15 March 1991

Soviet Union
SUPPLEMENT
National Affairs

FBIS-SOV-91-051-S CONTENTS *15 March 1991*

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Communist Party Affairs

Party Officials Address Leading Cadres Course

PM0603121591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 91 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Party Cadre Training"]

[Text] A study course for chiefs of organizational departments of union republic communist party central committees and republic, kray, and oblast party committees has been held at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences Institute for improving the skills of leading cadres.

Students were addressed by A.S. Dzasokhov, G.V. Semenova, and O.S. Shenin, members of the Politburo and secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee; I.K. Polozkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee; A.N. Girenko, V.A. Kuptsov, and Yu.A. Manayenkov, secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee; I.I. Melnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, Ye.N. Makhov, acting chairman of the CPSU Central Control Commission; V.M. Zyukin, first secretary of the Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee; V.I. Shcherbakov, USSR deputy prime minister; A.S. Sokolov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee; V.S. Babichev, V.A. Mikhaylov, and I.I. Skiba; chiefs of CPSU Central Committee departments; N.Ye. Kruchina, administrator of affairs of the CPSU Central Committee; N.I. Shlyaga, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; R.G. Yanovskiy, rector of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; senior officials of the CPSU Central Committee, people's deputies, scientists, and journalists.

Kuptsov on Relations With Other Parties

PM0103124391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Feb 91 Second Edition p 2

[I. Podsvirov report: "In Search of Dialogue; Meeting at CPSU Central Committee Press Center"]

[Text] V.A. Kuptsov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and head of the Department for Relations with Sociopolitical Organizations, gave a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists at the CPSU Central Committee Press Center yesterday. A topical subject was discussed: "The CPSU in search of a dialogue and cooperation with new public forces."

V.A. Kuptsov pointed out that the most noticeable phenomenon of perestroyka was the assertion of glasnost in our country and the creation of new parties and public movements. Approximately 20 parties are now operating at union level alone, with more than 500 at republic level, and 16 blocs have been formed. Does the CPSU, which has proclaimed a multiparty system, intend to share power with them?... Last year was characterized by a splurge of political activeness and a wide range of opinions. However, taking advantage of the crisis situation in society and of the masses' discontent with the deterioration of life, certain political parties and their leaders have recently developed overt anticommunist hysteria, discredited the socialist system, and mounted attacks on Communists. There is essentially a power struggle going on, and voices are being heard increasingly often speaking about the CPSU's removal from the political arena, the USSR president's resignation, and the replacement of legally elected organs of power.

It was declared at the news conference that until the beginning of this year the Communist Party had not taken a single step that could have elicited resistance from opposition forces. But they themselves are imposing a tactic of confrontation.

Under these conditions the CPSU and every party member must more clearly define their position in relations with sociopolitical movements. Replying to numerous questions, sometimes very pointed ones, the Central Committee secretary emphasized the need for closer cooperation and quest for dialogue and contacts with new parties and organizations which recognize the socialist choice and advocate civic peace.

Despite the sharp intensification of the political struggle, our party's Central Committee expresses sincere readiness to cooperate with all parties and blocs which champion the country's integrity and the implementation of economic reform and which are involved in protecting the environment. At the same time it is necessary to counter the activities of destructive and extremist forces. A respectful attitude toward the laws must be displayed at this difficult time.

The party's policy and tactics under the present conditions must be based on regard for the grim realities of life. It should be recognized that the atmosphere of social tension and confrontation which is being fueled harbors a threat to the renewal of society. For example, the leaders of "Democratic Russia" are complicating in the extreme an already difficult situation by openly calling for the president's resignation.

The following question was also put at the news conference:

"How do you evaluate the activities of individuals and organizations demanding a trial of the CPSU?"

"We resolutely reject any claims for reprisals against the party which, having acknowledged the mistakes made earlier, began perestroyka on its own initiative and is implementing it now," V.A. Kuptsov declared. "Such claims are nothing but a political game calculated for further confrontation with the CPSU. Our task consists in a constructive dialogue with opponents. Such cooperation will undoubtedly be based on joint work to make the switch to a socially geared market economy and to elaborate and conclude the Union Treaty."

Reasons To Quit Communist Party Expounded

PM2702165891 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 6, 10 Feb 91 p 14

["Letter to Editor" by Igor Vinogradov: "If Mind, Honor, and Conscience Are Not Lost"]

[Text] I immediately want to give a warning: I do not intend to and indeed cannot foist anything on anyone. Everyone acts as *his own* conscience dictates, but my own relations with the CPSU, which began 40 years ago when I was young and, ideologically speaking, did not know any better, then passed through a period of difficult tests in the sixties when I was working on A. Tvardovskiy's NOVYY MIR, and through a time of deep despair in the "stagnant" years—these relations I brought to a close six months ago, after the 28th Congress.

But until now I have made no public pronouncements in connection with the matter, since I saw no need to. Today, however, the situation has undergone a radical change. And therefore it does not seem to me at all superfluous to make use of the opportunity which I did not demand earlier to part openly with the CPSU, in order to say everything that I feel about it now. I see a real point in this specifically because although the CPSU appears today before the country and the whole world in a quite new capacity from before, the novelty of this capacity is still far from always understood, in my view, with proper clarity. And first and foremost by those party members who consider themselves honest people, but up to now have still not parted with their party cards on which it is written that the party is the mind, honor, and conscience of our era. It seems to me that many of them are still controlled by the inertia of old habit: Not sharing what the party nomenklatura does, they reassure themselves with the fact that they personally conduct themselves honorably and in their heart they are committed to the ideals for the sake of which they entered this party.

However, it was very difficult to justify oneself by logic of this sort even 20 and 30 years ago, when we knew too little about things, too little really depended on our own personal choice, and even the freedom of civil self-determination was not safe. Even today, despite the demagoguery of some writers, it is still not quite safe. But nevertheless today there are and can be no illusions in respect of the role which the party has currently taken upon itself. The situation has been simplified to the utmost.

It would even be an understatement to say that the party facing us today has finally turned into an instrument of the party nomenklatura, which is defending its power, interests, and the so-called party property that it has acquired over many decades of lording it over the country in an uncontrolled manner. Today there stands before us a party that is prepared to protect these interests and this property from the people even with bullets.

It would even be an understatement to say that the party facing us today, wishing to stop democratic development, eradicate freethinking, and impose the former barrack regulation order in the country, is doing everything possible to achieve this. In order to achieve this it is already doing today what is forbidden, what is constitutionally forbidden. Its advance detachments in the Baltic are setting up underground "national salvation committees" which are announcing the deposition of legitimately elected parliaments and governments, making appeals to troops, and directing them to storm republic government institutions, sowing death all around.

So it is not the entire party as yet, but only its regional and very small detachments? But the first step is the hardest. And what could happen next, when CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, having absolved himself, as president, of responsibility for the fratricidal war in the Baltic, has not even condemned as *illegal* the activity of the Baltic subunits of his party, whose appeal brought the troops into action? Nor was this done, as we know, either by the Politburo, which in a corresponding statement fully excused in essence its Baltic volunteers, or by the recent CPSU Central Committee plenum.

But all this may just mean—and let us not beat around the bush—that today the party is openly and unequivocally following the path of preparing, implementing, and giving a propagandist justification for direct action to overthrow the legitimate organs of power by force. In other words, it has turned into a *criminal* organization, the sort of organization that should be prosecuted in accordance with the law. This is the essence of the situation today, and this is why the question of remaining in the party is today exclusively a question of your human decency, a purely moral question. If you believe in communist ideals and uphold the socialist choice or the unity of the USSR, nobody is preventing you from joining with like-minded people to fight for your convictions by legitimate methods. But do your mind, honor, and conscience allow you to remain members of today's party and take upon yourself the blood of people who were killed and wounded on its initiative in the Baltic?

That is a question which, by the law of simple human conscience, neither A. Yakovlev, nor E. Shevardnadze, nor V. Bakatin, nor S. Shatalin, nor N. Petrakov, nor any worker, soldier, officer, intellectual, or peasant for whom being a decent person is not just an empty sound, can avoid asking himself today.

I repeat: I am not foisting anything on anybody. I am simply stating my own personal viewpoint. But I am stating it with the directness that the party's new status makes necessary, the reality of which cannot today in my view be denied by anybody.

Military Philosopher on Party Resignation

PM0503171091 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 7, 17-24 Feb 91 p 6

[Interview with Colonel Viktor Kuznetsov, chair of philosophy at the V.I. Lenin Military Political Academy, by MN political analyst Dmitriy Kazutin; date, place not given; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction: "Armed Forces of the CPSU"]

[Text] In early January Viktor Kuznetsov, chair of Philosophy at the V.I. Lenin Military Political Academy, announced his withdrawal from the CPSU. Among his reasons for this he also cited the following to the Academy's communists: "I am convinced that in its activities the army must be guided by the law and carry out the state's policy instead of the policy of one political party."

MN's political analyst Dmitriy Kazutin spoke with Colonal Viktor Kuznetsov.

D.K.: At the recent Joint Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission N. Moiseyev, chief of the Political Department of the Ground Forces, claimed that the army allegedly subscribed to the view that "the CPSU alone is capable of extricating the country from its crisis". Are there any grounds for such a claim?

V.K.: I believe that no one can be objective in judging this. I haven't heard anything about seriously studying public opinion in the army, which is why I presume that as usual N. Moiseyev is engaging in wishful thinking.

D.K.: A reform of political bodies in the army is being carried out under the President's Decree. What does it look like in practice?

V.K.: Regarding the concept of the reform, about what has been declared, it's definitely a reasonable measure. Political bodies must be instrumental in implementing the state's military policy. What there is in fact, however, is that simultaneously with the provision about the reform, instructions are issued to party organizations in the army. As before, they speak of implementing the party's policy. What is the purpose of this "dual-track book-keeping"? If the state and the party's policies are identical, there is a need to say so without beating about the bush. But evidently, it's not quite convenient to say so, given the repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution. As a matter of fact, one must remember that even now the Army Regulations require fidelity to "the party's ideas". Only quite recently Lieutenent-General A. Sitnikov, chief of the Academy's Political Department, instructed the secretaries of party organizations in the following way: "Many laws are being adopted, but not all of them are being fulfilled. So allow us as well to not comply with this law, because we don't consider it to be right. I also call upon you to consider this law to be incorrect." Don't think that the issue is about some of Russia's laws. What the general has in mind is the Law of the USSR "On Public Associations".

D.K.: But if the army doesn't reckon with the laws of the state, it thereby insults the state as such as well. So what exactly is it called upon to defend?

V.K.: It looks as if it must stand up for the "socialist idea", the "socialist choice" and "socialism". But if even Ivan Polozkov, the leader of Russia's communists, has admitted that he doesn't know what "socialism" means, what specific notion of socialism can then be expected from a soldier or even an officer? What we have here is the manipulation of public awareness, a manipulation which the party-state bureaucracy promotes in pursuit of its own interests.

D.K.: It appears that the army is an armed force not at the hands of the state, but of the CPSU's leadership, doesn't it?

V.K.: The leadership of the CPSU is reluctant to let the army slip out of its hands. It suffices to recall the close cooperation between army subunits and party structures in the Baltics. An absurd situation has taken shape. We're told that the democrats - and that word is used only in quotes in army circles - are a handful of hysterical people who do not deserve to be taken in real earnest. On the other hand, we've been addressed by Comrade Ivashko, Deputy General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who said that depoliticization was impossible in the army because in actual fact there would occur "repoliticization": suppose we remove the CPSU, but then its place would be taken by another party.

D.K.: Does that mean that the army is doomed to be the bulwark of dogmatism and conservatism?

V.K.: No, it doesn't. I've already said that the spectrum of opinions is very broad within the army. It's a different matter that many people have tied their lives very closely to the army and are afraid to speak their minds, so as not to be left outside it. Newspapers featured a letter denouncing Boris Yeltsin. It was signed by a large group - about 300, it seems - of our Academy's lecturers and officer students. I know that not everyone accepts this point of view. Ideological myths have been destroyed in army mentality as well. A vacuum of values has arisen and hence growing cynicism. And this is perhaps the most dangerous thing. A cynic knows no moral impediments.

Postcript. An attempt to apply "depoliticization" individually, so to speak, became the reason for harrassment against Colonel Viktor Kuznetsov. At first, a meeting of the Chair's officers was convened and an attempt was made to foist up on it a decision regarding political and professional distrust of Kuznetsov. Following this, the Academy's Learned Council held a meeting, to which the Colonel was invited after the decision had already been passed to dismiss Kuznetsov from the Academy. Then the Certifying Commission got together and agreed that the Colonel must no longer lecture at the Academy.

The Academy's chiefs were absolutely unperturbed by the fact that, in accordance with the Law of the USSR

"On Public Associations", both a person's entry into any such association (including the CPSU) and his withdrawal from it "cannot serve as the basis of restricting his rights and liberties, or as the condition for holding a post in a state-run organization". In this way, what we have here is a plain case of unlawful interdiction from holding a job (equivalent to German "Berufsverbot") based on ideological reasons.

Political Affairs

Nationalists 'Afraid' of Referendum Result

PM2002145391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Feb 91 Second Edition p 1

[Political observer Viktor Shirokov article under the rubric "Urgent Topic: Our Position": "On the Referendum, and Not Only That"]

[Text] Whichever newspaper you open now, you will be sure to find material on the holding of the referendum. Some mass media support the Congress of People's Deputies decision, while others frankly oppose it. But I believe that only the people themselves must express their opinion on whether we are to preserve the unified power as a renewed federation.

At difficult times for the country there have always been people who have assumed and borne the titanic burden of saving the people and the homeland. Today too there are many people, united by common labor and by the desire to serve mankind, who are capable in the name of lofty aims of breaking the shell of ethnic bias and overcoming a one-sided world outlook. But there are also leaders who talk about the wisdoms of global geopolitics and, at the same time, do not give a damn for their people's historical destiny. They are not geopoliticians but Herostratos-like politicians who ruthlessly burn down age-old temples in the name of personal ambition, career, and lunatic vainglory.

Themselves infected with political AIDS, they not only knock together around themselves "risk groups" comprised of nationalists and separatists but also introduce—sometimes successfully at first—this virus into the consciousness of ordinary people. And the latter, under stupefying political anesthesia, build barricades with their own hands, while the architects sit things out behind their backs, continuing their card games of chance in which the stakes are the fates of those very people. And the latter sometimes do not realize that these barricades pass through their hearts...

However, common sense and also considerable experience of living and working among Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Dungans, Uighurs, Uzbeks, Estonians, and people of dozens of other nationalities suggest to me (is it only to me?) that the stirred-up silt and sediment must soon settle. The peoples' mutual attraction—particularly at an hour of severe misfortune—has always been a characteristic, especially in our country, where for many centuries neighborly and everyday mutual assistance and support have been in evidence far more frequently than squabbling.

The misfortune lies elsewhere. When the time comes to sober up, it is the peoples themselves who will have the severe hangover, not those who have used the hammers of the political piano to deliberately and ruthlessly hit at sickly and vulnerable national strings.

"They promised us," a milkmaid acquaintance of mine said at the 21st Estonian Communist Party Congress, "that we would be hungry but free, and we really have become poor. But why, then, is it that many people have appeared who have become sated, rich, and free?"

No one is lining up for the milkmaid's job, unlike that of the parliamentary phrase-mongers who are ready to scramble over heads to the microphones and ministerial seats. They have opened all the dampers in order to poison society with the fumes of total nationalism, but the overwhelming majority of working people have remained healthy in mind. True, far from everyone has the opportunity to speak openly in the present atmosphere of ethnic hullabaloo—it is simply unsafe for themselves and for their families. And it takes time for people to cool down from the ardor of passions stoked by enthusiasts for the national idea. Incidentally, it is no accident that the national radicals in Lithuania have made haste with a snap poll which, incidentally, was concluded yesterday. They are simply afraid—what if the wave of the people's justifiable indignation, caused by the Vilnius events, subsides once all the culprits have received their just desserts? And what if people start analyzing their feverish, fruitless, and sometimes simply provocative activity again?

I remember that on that terrible, bloody night of 12-13 January in Vilnius, photocorrespondent M. Skurikhina and I were being driven around by a volunteer driver. He was called Zenon and by profession he was alternately a chauffeur and a car mechanic. He said straight out that, just before the events, the popularity of V. Landsbergis and his company had been declining with every passing day—both among the republic's workers and among its intelligentsia. It would not have taken much more for them to all roll off the political stage like ninepins that had been knocked over, and yet...

Well, it is exactly because of people like Zenon, who are seeing things more clearly every day, that the creators of national euphoria in the republics are so afraid of the all-Union referendum on the preservation of the USSR as a renewed federation. Voting will be direct and secret, and everyone will be free to express their innermost wishes. Although of course you can imagine what excesses will start in order to halt the referendum and to prevent the citizens from expressing their will. But since a law on this has been adopted by the country's Congress of People's Deputies, it must be rigorously carried out. This is a prime concern for the authorities and the relevant organs, ministries, and departments. As far as the inevitable political struggle is concerned--then it is up to the communists and all the country's democratic parties and movements that support the unity of the Union. And it is no easy fight that awaits us. However, even the stakes are extremely high here—either we will be together and strong, or we will be separate and weak. However, even if it is not worth making early predictions, you can assume that the battle will be won. The first express sociological poll carried out by serious experts has shown that the level of activeness among the country's population in the ballot will be quite high—around 80 percent.

It stands to reason that this does not mean that the result of the referendum is predetermined everywhere. The parliaments of some republics have already expressed their opposition to participation in it. However, the people and the parliaments are not the same thing, even if the parliaments in some places have monopolized the right to speak on the people's behalf. But even if the majority of the population in a certain place expresses its desire to leave the Union, this does not mean that the republic will break off that very second, like an ice flow floating at top speed to the other side of the ocean or even to the other side of the Baltic. First of all, there are specific legal procedures on withdrawal—you even have to disagree in an intelligent way, without smashing things that have been acquired together; and second, who knows, it is possible that a joint search for some different type of union ties will begin, for instance, in the economic sphere.

This year is perhaps the most critical since perestroyka began. We must finally achieve a balance of interests, mutual accord, a truce, the possibility of working peacefully and fruitfully, supporting and relying on one another. We must achieve this regardless of what may happen. The spring of the people's patience has been compressed as far as it will go. And now it depends on all of us whether it will snap or whether it will serve the clockwork mechanism that is moving the hand of time forward toward our common, dependable, and prosperous future.

Panel Discusses Union Treaty

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[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian at 1851 GMT on 15 February broadcasts the 58-minute live studio "Direct Conversation" program hosted by Andrey Maslennikov. The discussion panel consists of Vladimir Borisovich Isakov, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR, Supreme Soviet; Sultan Sartayevich Sartayev, authorized representative of the Kazakhstan Soviet Socialist Republic and correspondent member of the republican Academy of Sciences; Anatoliy Mikhailovich Stepanov, authorized representative of the Mari Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and head of the legislation and law and order department of the republic's Supreme Soviet; and Georgiy Stanislavovich Tarazevich, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities Commission on Interethnic Relations of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Maslennikov begins the program by saying that authorized representatives of the Union and autonomous republics have been discussing the new Union treaty—more specifically, the second section, the question of the division of powers between Union and republics—In Moscow this week. The work is reflected in a small document, a protocol of the results of the development of the draft Union treaty. He then introduces the discussion panel.

Isakov begins the discussion by saying that the Union that is being created will no longer depend to a great extent on the RSFSR. This is more difficult than having one leader which all the other republics follow. Progress has been made in the concept of what the new Union treaty should look like. Isakov's main worry is that the treaty will remain the secret of a narrow circle of people.

Sartayev says that his president, Nazarbayev, is calling for the treaty to be signed as soon as possible, given the crisis situation in the country. Much depends on the position of the Russian Federation. This week, Articles 5 through 9 have beenw orked out. These articles are reflected in the protocol which will be discused by the Federation Council, perhaps tomorrow. The Union's powers have been listed in one block and joint republican-Union power in another, in contrast to the previous presidential edition where the two were mixed.

Stepanov says that the former autonomous republics categorically want to participate in the new Union treaty. This is a reflection of their people's will.

Sartayev then says that the specific member formations of republics can sign the new Union treaty, or they can authorize the republic they belong to do this for them. This must be elucidated, to avoid confusion.

Tarazevich agrees that the treaty process has really begun. He imagines that many television viewers under whether the subjects of the Union could reach agreement. The results of the past few days is that agreement can be reached.

Maslennikov reads out the telephone number for viewers' questions. He reads out the first questions. How were the representatives of the republics elected? Is the Ukraine just an observer at the talks?

Tarazevich says that the Ukrainians are just observers since the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has yet to appoint a representative, but they have taken an active part in the process. What was signed today is just a working copy, not the end result. Isakov urges the Ukraine to work out its position on this. Sartayev adds that no republic should be hurried to sign this protocol, but then adds that haste is necessary, since time is pressing.

Maslennikov then asks what the economic cost of delay to the new Union treaty will be? Tarazevich says that the Center is playing a passive role in the treaty process.

Sartayev confirms that the Center is just an observer in the process. He adds that different republics are starting from different positions. Sartayev turns to the issue of taxes and levies and says: "I would simply like to read this part of the proposal. This is the new thing that we, the authorized representatives of all the republics, have entered. This article now reads: The republics independently fix the taxes and levies and fix their budget. To implement the power of the USSR, Union taxes and levies are established to sums set in agreement with the republics, as well as deductions from all-Union programs the volume and designation of which are regulated by an annual agreement between the Union and the republics, taking into account figures of their socioeconomic development."

Isakov reads out a question condemning him for delaying the signing of the new Union treaty. Sartayev then defends him.

Maslennikov cites yesterday's Moscow television appearance by Popov, saying that this treaty cannot be signed given the situation that has arisen in the apparatus dealing with the new Union treaty. Isakov says that initially there was concern that the Center would push itself on the republics. This has not happened. Sartayev says that the president's draft Union treaty is based on the proposals by the republics. However, Articles 5-9 have been thoroughly rehashed by the authorized representatives.

A question is asked: why not a confederation? Stepanov replies that the absolute majority of republican representatives were for a federation. He thinks this is the requisite formula for the given moment.

Maslennikov says that a viewer is suspicious of the unit of the representatives, having signed a protocol. Stepanov says that of course there are individual positions on foreign policy, on the delimination of powers, and so forth. Tarazevich says that there were many discords: on former Union property, on defense, and so on.

Maslennikov says that there is a general body of the protocol's text that has met universal agreement and addenda of disputed issues. "I ask your forgiveness. I again illustrate this with your document. So, you have 11 pages of agreed text, very dense. This is 11 full pages, and four or five half-pages where individual positions are recorded."

Sartayev says that it has proven possible to separate Union powers from Union-republican powers. "I would like to draw the television viewers' attention to the seventh article of this draft. It concerns property. Well, everyone knows that property is the bedrock of everything. The world is based on property. And therefore, we have attempted here to take into account all the republics which form the Union and the interests of the Union, since the Union is a sovereign state which will represent the interests of all the republics."

He says five days were spent rewriting this. "Here we wrote that Union property is used and increased exclusively in the common interests of the republics, including smoothing out the levels of socioeconomic development. And, further, in the last part of this article we wrote, clearly and precisely, from the juridical point of view, the use of the earth, its depths, and other natural resources for the realization of the powers of the Union is only implemented within the framework of the republics' legislation, which sets up the necessary conditions for the activity of the USSR."

Isakov says that the battle of laws between the republics and the Union has been sorted out by elucidation of rights and obligations in the protocol. "I quote: The laws of the USSR on matters of its jurisdiction have supremacy and obligatory fulfillment on the territory of all the republics, within the framework of the competence of the Union and the supremacy of the Union. Secondly, the laws of the republics have supremacy on its territory on all questions, excluding those which are under the jurisdiction of the Union. The second point. And finally, a dispute is possible even in this situation. A dispute is possible. The article even has an answer for this situation. The republics have the right to protest a USSR law if it infringes the Union treaty, contradicts the republic's constitution and also its laws, adopted within the limits of its powers. The USSR also has the right to protest the law of a republic if these laws infringe on the Union treaty, contradict the USSR Constitution—and moreover, the constitution is, without question, adopted with the participation of the republics. I add that this is written in another article—as well as USSR laws adopted within the limits of its powers. Disputes in both cases are resolved by means of conciliatory procedures, or are submitted to the USSR Constitutional Court."

Maslennikov asks what is the status of the Armed Forces in republics which do not sign the new Union treaty? Isakov says that no one will be kept in the Union by force. However, this must be resolved in a cultured manner.

Maslennikov asks why the republican governments that do not want to join the Union do not say whether accounts with the Union will be in hard currency or rubles. He adds the president has formed a delegation to hold negotiations on this and other issues with the Baltic governments.

Asked what is new about the Union treaty, Tarazevich says that representatives of the republics can call in legal experts to help them.

On the question of when the Union treaty will be signed, Sartayev says that they are not creating a unitarian state, even with some features of confederation. The republics will be sovereign. It is difficult to say when the Union treaty will be signed. But better sooner than later. The authorized representatives will meet on Wednesday. Hopefully the draft will be ready by the end of February, if not before. But it is not the business of the authorized representatives as to when the new Union treaty will be signed.

Maslennikov asks what the attitude of the republics participated in the new Union treaty is to those that are not.

Tazarevich responds: "Well, as far as the Caucasian republics are concerned, there has not been such a categorical refusal to participate in the work of the Union treaty. They are simply, well—I understand it like this—thinking and elucidating their positions. As far as the Baltic republics are concerned, yes. There is a refusal. There is such an opinion. And I have already answered this question. For work with the Baltic republics and for the elucidation of relations with them special commissions have been set up under the leadership of the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers."

In response to questions from Kiev as to why the Baltic states are being kept in the Union by force, Tarazevich says: "No one is keeping either Lithuania or the Baltic as a whole within the Union under threat of a submachine gun or by force. One must simply clarify relations by civilized methods, on the basis of the law. Relations, both in the sphere of, literally, economics and the human rights of ethnic minorities, must be elucidated, and if the will of the peoples of the respective republics is to secede from the Union, then, in accordance with legislation, this can always be realized."

The finished text of the new Union treaty will shed light on the referendum, says Maslennikov.

Tarazevich says the referendum results will be counted according to each republic separately. There is a dispute on the wording of the referendum, on the name of the Union, on the formulas. This is a question for the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Isakov says that Russia is for the Union treaty, no matter what Russia's Radio or individual Russian deputies say.

On the question of what happens if there is a negative response to the referendum, Maslennikov says, dismissing a Sergey Parkhomenko article in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, that objective information in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA shows that the majority of Moscow inhabitants are for a union. Isakov adds that problem is that no one knows what sort of a Union they will be voting for. Taraezevich criticizes the media, except TASS, for not covering the work of the republican representatives.

Stepanov says that if the Ukraine opts out of the Union then the Crimea would have to decide separately, according to the constitution.

Maslennikov ends by thanking the panel for their participation.

Moscow TV Carries Interview With Lukyanov

LD0803183191

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian at 1320 GMT on 8 March, in its "Good Evening Moscow!—Politician Outside Politics" program, broadcasts an interview with Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by correspondent Merkulova.

The program begins with Lukyanov recalling the 7 March sessions of the Supreme Soviet and the Federation Council during which the Supreme Soviet adopted the law on the militia and the Federation Council endorsed a draft of the new Union treaty. He goes on to describe his experience of chairing the Supreme Soviet. He says it is an illusion to think that he can always insist on his position carrying the day. Pluralism, he says, is not just a difference of opinons; it is a broader concept which implies that different views can be compared and common ground arrived at to take the decisions which are needed and awaited by the people.

Asked if his work as a politician clashes with his love of poetry, Lukyanov replies that he is more a lover of poetry than a poet. He goes on to talk about his book of poetry. He says that when he gets home after a hard day he likes to read poetry, and this, coupled with his interest in history, makes him a good citizen. "In principle," he says, "I think that a person should do his job professionally and at the same time he should be a good citizen. I think that at present, in our very difficult times—times when there is tension everywhere, when there is great alarm in society—this civic feeling, this feeling of being a citizen, a patriot, a feeling for one's land may be the most important. And if we in politics, in economics , and in journalism, on radio and television are able to support this feeling among people, perhaps this may be the most important thing that we can do now in our country."

Lukyanov then considers the nature of the Russian spirit by reference to the history of his home town of Smolensk. He goes on to describe his early life, giving particular praise to his mother.

Merkulova turns to the recently imposed five percent sales tax which, she says, has caused dismay among the people who are calling it the president's tax. Lukyanov says it should more properly be called the parliament's five percent. He goes on to recall how the tax was conceived as being included in the price and not as an addition to be charged to each customer but notes that it is not being charged in this way everywhere. Comrades in Moscow have told me, and I have seen it for myself, he says, that it is being charged as "the president's tax" and even television, it seems, has shown that it is being presented in this way. I think that certain people would like to profit by presenting the sales tax in this, he says."

Merkulova suggests that in view of all the political meandering of recent times, politicians should talk more openly with people more often. Lukyanov says he is in favor of open conversation and recalls a recent meeting in Moscow in which he received more than 700 written questions, which resulted in absolutely open and frank conversation about both misfortunes and mistakes.

He goes on: "I am not ashamed to admit that over the six years of perestroyka we have made enough mistakes, to put it mildly. And this is understandable because we, too, were learning, working, acting, and searching in the process of perestroyka. After all, we did not know what politicial struggle was. It is quite a sophisticated idea in the conditions of a one-party system. So we had to learn political struggle. One has to study most subtle nuances of economics and the market from the beginning, for we did not know this, either. At the same time we imagined the friendship of peoples to be something that was there from the start, so to speak, something we had inherited, and did not see any problems. But it has proved to be a much more complicated matter—interethnic relations. And we have to master all this now. So, there are mistakes, and we should speak about them directly." finds useful.

Lukyanov goes on to stress the need to move toward a market economy, for which there is no alternative, he says. There is a need to stabilize the situation and this is seen by some as backsliding. But the state leadership is committed to moving only forward, he says, and there can be no backsliding.

The interview ends with Lukyanov describing his relationship with Gorbachev, with whom he gets along very well as he does with the prime minister and with all the comrades. He concludes by expressing some philosophical thoughts about the meaning of democracy and ends by reading a poem devoted to International Women's Day.

Ethics Chairman on Official's Trips Abroad

91UN0985A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 1 Mar 91 pp 1-3

[Interview with Anatoliy Denisov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Ethics, by Aleksandr Nadzharov, in the column "Interview on a Sensitive Topic"; place and date not given: "The Ethical Aspect"]

[Text]**The ethical aspect—Aleksandr Denisov, chairman of the Commission for Ethics of the USSR Supreme Soviet, discusses what it amounts to in the operation of the commission.**

Briefly about our interlocutor. He was born in 1934. He is a Leningrader. He has worked all his life at a technical institute; he was retained there as an instructor after his graduation. Technical cybernetics is his specialty, specifically, formalism of dialectical logic and dialectics of control.

[Nadzharov] Anatoliy Alekseyevich, interpretations of ethics differ frequently. What does it mean for you?

[Denisov] It represents teachings on good and evil. In essence, interpersonal relations may only be good if they acknowledge that the truth is specifically relative. Otherwise everyone will posture and say: "I am right, and this is it!" An unconquerable belief in being right brings about not only intractability but also insults, crimes, and what have you...

[Nadzharov] Naturally. After all, a man who has no notion of ethics, as a rule, takes a lot of liberties.

[Denisov] Precisely. This is why it is very important to nurture the inner sense of culture. Unfortunately, many of our deputies lack this trait, which is to say that they lack tolerance. Sometimes it is believed for some reason that culture is somehow associated with education. This is a profound error. One may be a cad with a university degree, and one may be a cultured person having graduated from a vocational school.

[Nadzharov] How long has your commission existed? What is it guided by in its activities?

[Denisov] Our commission appeared about a year ago. Since then, we have developed Commission Regulations and Rules of Ethics for the Deputies. This is a crib note of sorts on good manners. In all honesty, we were a little bit ashamed to put it together. After all, we had to explain to our colleagues virtually in sign language how they are to behave decently. As far as the commission itself is concerned, it is unique in a way: There are no other commissions like this in our country. It is simultaneously a commission of the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Nadzharov] What powers does the commission have? Of course, discussing methods of commendation is risky, but there ought to be some methods of punishment in your arsenal.

[Denisov] We have no commendations; for the most part, we review conflicts. What can we do to a party at fault? For example, we may impose a fine for half a year, that is, take away the 200 rubles monthly which are allocated for the activities of deputies.

[Nadzharov] Have there been cases when sanctions that severe had to be used?

[Denisov] No. We have other, harsher methods of influence. For example, we may deprive one of the right to attend meetings and refuse to give him the floor. However, this is not the "most horrible" measure either. I must say that usually we do not allow correspondents to be present at our meetings and do not publish the results of proceedings. Minutes of our meetings are secret. So, glasnost is the most severe punishment for those at fault. That is, if someone disagrees with a decision of the commission and fails to obey it, we publish our materials. I must say that we have had to resort to this practice only once or twice: Everybody is in mortal fear of publicity.

[Nadzharov] Does this apply to all?

[Denisov] Of course, it applies to all officials. We have already indicated to the president that some of his pronouncements are unethical. In all cases, he has acknowledged our opinion.

[Nadzharov] Therefore, if a person agrees with the remarks of the commission he does not deserve another kind of punishment?

[Denisov] If he agrees. If he does not we publish the information received. This was the case with T. Gdlyan and N. Ivanov when they talked about the president in a most impermissible manner.

Here is one more case. On one occasion, Colonel Petrushenko wrote in a newspaper that the grandson of Deputy Shcherbak had gone to America for medical treatment at the expense of the state. Verification showed that Shcherbak did not have a grandson. The colonel had to admit so in the press.

[Nadzharov] Could you tell us what, so to speak, the technology of your operation is?

[Denisov] Thirty-three people's deputies take part in the monthly meetings of the commission. We discuss current business between meetings. Of course, in this instance we make do with smaller contingents, those who are in Moscow at a given moment. Two of my permanent deputies and a secretary of the commission are also involved in resolving conflicts.

[Nadzharov] What kind of cases do you consider most typical?

[Denisov] What is typical changes with time. Initially, proceedings associated with personal attacks by deputies on one another predominated. However, after several closed-door sessions of the Supreme Soviet at which I delivered reports to the effect that... well, we cannot carry on like this, the number of such conflicts has diminished considerably. It appears that by now many people have understood that they should come out against positions rather than individuals. This appears to be elementary, but I had to deliver an entire lecture about this.

[Nadzharov] What kind of problems is the Commission for Ethics concerned with at present?

[Denisov] Trips abroad at the expense of the inviting party. This was the fault of some of the deputies previously, but by now the scale of such practices has become altogether threatening.

[Nadzharov] What is the situation?

[Denisov] A horrible situation. Hundreds of deputies "go on tours" at someone else's expense, on invitations, deliver lectures abroad, and receive decent honoraria. In foreign countries, they refer to this phenomenon as foreign lobbying, and it is outlawed.

[Nadzharov] Who has been particularly successful in this pursuit?

[Denisov] Unfortunately, for the most part the leaders of new democrats: G. Popov, S. Stankevich, A. Sobchak, and G. Starovoytova. In the process, they also brag of not spending a kopek from official funds. Meanwhile, it should be precisely the other way around. After all, it turns out that foreigners are sort of buying our legislators with foreign exchange. In general, it is not the shortcoming of the new democrats only but of the entire body of deputies: the right, the left, and what have you. They travel on all kinds of pretexts, and all the time at someone else's expense. I repeat that in other states this is grounds for prosecution, and they are aware of it, all the more so because our documents state clearly: "To recommend against" such trips. However, this is a strictly ethical measure, and this is why it is having absolutely no effect. They keep traveling as before, paying no attention to elementary decency. To be sure, A. Sobchak says that personally he is invited only as a scientist. Somehow I cannot recall him being invited that eagerly before.

[Nadzharov] Perhaps, you should have written "to ban" in your "statute."

[Denisov] You see, in this case we will begin to lose international contacts. This is why all we can do is talk since we cannot punish. After all, there has got be conscience, as well as a sense of measure.

[Nadzharov] Now that we are on the topic of mild measures, tell me whether you have regretted the absence of the parliamentary police in our country during the meetings of the Supreme Soviet?

[Denisov] So far, there has been no need for it. I know that fist fights do happen in Western parliaments. Thank God, it has not come to this in our case. Well, some people force their way to the podium, and elbow others away. In this case, the chairman simply turns off the microphone. In general, he does have the right to eject from the floor. However, so far we have not resorted to this measure once. However, to tell you the truth, nobody knows what to do if, for example, a "troublemaker" is not ashamed and does not leave the hall, but says: "I am not going to leave."

[Nadzharov] Indeed, this is quite a situation. After all, deputies also have the right to immunity...

[Denisov] Therefore, specially assigned people are necessary who will be instructed to do this provided, of course, there is general prior consent.

[Nadzharov] Could you tell us what the first case examined by the Commission for Ethics was?

[Denisov] This is hard to determine at present. It so happened that the commission was swamped right away by about 1,500 conflicts that had accumulated for approximately a year. After all, we were set up quite late.

[Nadzharov] What is the last case?

[Denisov] Hard to say. One of the last conflicts occurred at the beginning of the current session. Marshal Akhromeyev disseminated in the Supreme Soviet his letter to which a letter from his voter was appended. In the letter, the voter insulted Yeltsin in all kinds of ways. We examined the situation and found that such attacks on Yeltsin should not be disseminated. It is unethical.

[Nadzharov] Could you recall another interesting case?

[Denisov] There have been no interesting cases. I can tell you about the most notable and, therefore, unpleasant ones. For example, a deputy beat up a militiaman in the airport.

[Nadzharov] Therefore, he is not a deputy, but some kind of common criminal, a hooligan. Who is he?

[Denisov] We decided not to release his name for now because we warned him during the investigation that we would have his deputy immunity revoked. You were correct in saying that this is grounds for prosecution. At this point, he rushed to see the militiaman, apologized, and talked him into retracting his report.

Later, one of the deputies, likewise intoxicated, was rude to one of the employees here, at the hotel...

[Nadzharov] Are you withholding their names in order not to be accused of being politically biased?

[Denisov] Not only for this reason. However, if we were to talk about politics, let me recall that our commission works on an ethical level. Ethics does not recognize politics.

[Nadzharov] Here is a question for you. Naturally, deputy members of the Supreme Soviet who came to Moscow were allocated furnished apartments. Later, rotation came about, and new people came to account for almost one-third of the Supreme Soviet. Have all turned their apartments over?

[Denisov] In general, this is the province of the Commission for Supporting the Activities of Deputies. However, recently its chairman came up to me and asked me to intercede. There is no space to put up new members of parliament because some people have failed to vacate official apartments. Old members, three or four people, are literally clinging to Moscow. Well, we are going to examine this.

[Nadzharov] I was told at the Ministry of Trade that this is not the only example of, shall we say, a grasp reflex of the deputies of the supreme organ of power. They said that the deputies, together with their Russian colleagues, have in essence brought car sales in the capital city to a virtual standstill.

[Denisov] Indeed, about 500 cars have been ordered in the USSR Supreme Soviet alone, mainly of the Volga make. How are we to view this? I came out against such purchases. However, this was not taken into account. The logic was approximately as follows: "Why did I come here if I cannot even get myself a car?"

[Nadzharov] That is to say, they follow the formula "whatever is power for if not to grab things."

[Denisov] Approximately. Alas, all of my attempts to fight this ran into furious resistance even in the Presidium.

[Nadzharov] Do you personally have a car and a decent apartment?

[Denisov] I do not have a car, and my dwelling is not decent either—the ceiling is falling in. I live on the fourth floor, in an old house without an elevator.

[Nadzharov] Anatoliy Alekseyevich, you have already mentioned here the name of B.N. Yeltsin in conjunction with an unethical action by Marshal Akhromeyev with regard to him. What about the actions of Boris Nikolayevich himself? Did the Commission for Ethics evaluate these actions?

[Denisov] Unfortunately...

[Nadzharov] Was this associated with a notorious episode involving him being assaulted by unknown persons on Rublevo- Uspenskoye Highway near Moscow?

[Denisov] There was no assault. This is what we managed to establish. After a rally, Yeltsin traveled in an official car to government cottages to see his female acquaintance. This is where he got into a fight with a man who happened to be visiting this female friend. He got dirty, got to swim in a puddle, so to say. He let the official car go before that. He wandered into a militia booth to call his wife and daughter and be picked up by a car there because the site of this "drama" is as far from a station as seven kilometers. So, he had to hastily invent a legend about his adventure. This is how he put this story of his villainous kidnapping into circulation.

[Nadzharov] What did the commission point out to him?

[Denisov] Nothing. It was important to find out whether an attempt on his life had occurred, and it turned out that it had not.

[Nadzharov] Did he admit this himself?

[Denisov] Of course. He recounted what had happened. However, about three months later, Yeltsin began to maintain that this had not been the case, and that he had been slandered in our commission.

[Nadzharov] Was his admission recorded in the minutes of the commission?

[Denisov] Certainly. Members of the commission signed the protocol.

[Nadzharov] However, you did not meet for this reason alone then. A case involving a trip by B.N. Yeltsin to the

United Stated and a notorious reprint from the Italian newspaper REPUBBLICA was also investigated. How did Boris Nikolayevich explain this?

[Denisov] He said that, upon arriving in the United States, he did not feel well because of jet lag and could not sleep for three days. He suffered a lot, but he had a speech to make. This was when he took all kinds of drugs in order to finally sleep properly. However, the pills did not work. He walked about all night, but in the morning he began to fall asleep as he walked. Yeltsin took something else in the morning, and had some coffee not to "shut down" entirely... We saw the result on TV. I believe that he was sincere in this instance.

In view of the fact that the newspaper did not provide evidence to back up charges of drunkenness leveled against Yeltsin at the time, we proposed that its editor be removed, and this was done.

[Nadzharov] If we may, briefly about a conflict between A. Yakovlev and V. Shevchenko.

[Denisov] I am not sure that it is proper to release this to the press. However, glasnost is what it is. This is what happened. V. Shevchenko went to the president and said that student disturbances and "hunger strikes" in Kiev were organized by Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, and that young people acted as directed by him. The president called Yakovlev and asked whether this was the case. Aleksandr Nikolayevich said that he had nothing to do with what had transpired in the Ukrainian capital. We must say that V. Shevchenko pointed to one of the Ukrainian deputies as the source of this information. The latter was outraged when he learned about this, and wrote a petition to our commission stating that he had said nothing of the kind about Yakovlev. Fact-finding ensued in the course of which we had to approach the president as well. Later I reported to our commission on all of this. Shevchenko burst into tears at the meeting, said that this would not happen again, and that she was resigning anyway...

[Nadzharov] Did she apologize, and how—orally, in writing, publicly?

[Denisov] Yes, she apologized right at the meeting of the commission.

[Nadzharov] As you see it, what aspect of the activity of deputies poses the greatest danger from an ethical point of view?

[Denisov] Lack of culture. There should be some self-restraint concerning what you say. Culture calls for self-restraint in and of itself: I have a right, but I do not exercise it, to say nothing of exercising what I do not have a right to. Alas, in our case endless demands are common. They demand to be given all kinds of electronics, cars, and some even demand weapons.

Of course, incompetence, legal incompetence in particular, is depressing.

[Nadzharov] To your mind, how does the press describe events in our parliament as far as ethics is concerned?

[Denisov] Unfortunately, we cannot by any means count on publications being ethical. Journalists want to produce something juicy much too much. They write, pardon me, about some condoms found on official premises, sandwiches with caviar, and stunning delicacies. Incidentally, they were for sale in the hotel Moscow even before the deputies moved in. However, there is not anything of this left by now. Now we are having a car scandal. However, this case merits publicity.

[Nadzharov] In general, should the press be muzzled, even if it far from being civilized?

[Denisov] No, the press does not need to be taken in hand. However, you see, we have a problem. What is the main woe in our country? It is savagery. In theory, the press should control itself. However, it does not know how to do this. This is a concern. The journalists should not be muzzled in a civilized country. However, perhaps they should in an uncivilized country because there is no conscious self-restraint—I do not know. Apparently, such restraint will appear as a genetic trait of sorts. Perhaps, there is no other way; at any rate, I am not aware of it. For now, our press is somehow very undisciplined.

[Nadzharov] All of it?

[Denisov] Of course, not all of it. Apparently, this feature depends on competence, qualifications, and culture.

[Nadzharov] Thank you for the interview. However, I would like to express regret over the fact that you placed restrictions on the names of some deputies. As I see it, the country should also be aware of its "heroes" of this kind.

[Denisov] The country will definitely learn about them, but only if they personally put themselves above criticism, that is, disagree with the opinion of the Commission for Ethics that they have elected. Even given all of this, the people have a right to their personal secrets. The truth and repentance—which also amount to glasnost—have never hurt anyone.

Government Urged To Be Firm But Even-Handed

PM0403094191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Feb 91 Union Edition p 3

[Yu. Feofanov report under "The Law and Our Life" rubric: "The Prestige of Power Is Dear to Me..."]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Like many people, I was not in raptures over the interview with the head of the Russian parliament. It is confirmed that Yeltsin's ratings fell that night. But in the morning the Union parliament deputies set about rehabilitating him—they got up onto the platform at the session one after the other and held him up to shame.... It is highly unlikely that anybody had prepared the people's deputies for these speeches and had composed irate replies for them. The people's deputies have displayed independence in their convictions on more than one occasion in very heated debates. Yet here.... As I listened, I thought I was at a recent party meeting rather than in the parliament. It was not so much the negative reaction to the interview that was confusing, because such a reaction is wholly natural. Rather it was the tone and assurance of the speeches. And I thought: If this is unrehearsed, if it really is from the heart, then it proves how firmly imprinted the propaganda of the past is, and how deep the furrows are which channel thought in one direction only. Of course, the Russian leader is a thorn in the center's side. The aforesaid is not intended to discredit the Union parliamentarians defending their own positions. It is a question once again of form and "technology." All the same, the people's deputies embody the country's highest authority. But we have to admit that state power is not a battalion providing all-round defense at an anonymous level under the order "No going back!" As if to tolerate all positions, but only if they are solidly focused on tomorrow.

As we all know, when the Russian legislature's plenary session opened, the Presidium issued a near-unanimous demand for the chairman's resignation. The effect was immediate: When discussing the issue of convening an extraordinary congress, the bulk of the speeches expressed support for Yeltsin.

The official 23 February rally produced the same result—two alternative rallies with completely different slogans and far more emotionally inflamed. Too little can always be compensated for, but too much will always lead to loss.

Bearing all this in mind, I do not want to adopt one specific position: "For Gorbachev or Yeltsin," "for the democrats or the conservatives." Representatives are not the issue here—it is the form and technology of power. It has long been said that power must be strong but not defensive. State power must also be objective. Even though it is exercised by people with their own passions and partialities.

So back to the rallies. Even if in principle senior state officials are irritated by the "rally element," they must not be seen to support some rallies and condemn others. Senior activists have every ground for saying that the Kemerovo and Vorkuta miners' strikes harmed the country. But are the strikes at the Union enterprises in Estonia any more beneficial? The two attitudes are diametrically opposed. It's like saying that some rallies are "right" and others are "wrong." While this is logical from a party political standpoint, it is not logical for the state.

Our country's present complex and critical situation demands strong and authoritative government. There is no doubt about this. The President himself, the premier, and many political figures of all colors refer increasingly to the need for unpopular measures in order to transfer to a market and pacify society. How much more in need of authority and public support is a government faced with implementing such measures! It is hard to object to resolute actions—right up to sending tanks into a city—when they are intended to prevent bloodshed. Less understandable, however, is the seizure by troops of a television tower merely because it transmits an "unsuitable" broadcast. I won't begin to explore the legal aspects of the money change—opinions here are conflicting. But the government's strict time limit for the action—three days with no exceptions—showed the kind of strength which is justified by common sense: Without such firmness, there would have been no point in undertaking the move. There was criticism of the decision to grant extensive rights to the militia and state security forces in the fight against economic sabotage. This criticism would have been significantly milder had the authorities moved in on each private farm and each legally formed cooperative with an armored vehicle to protect their existence. It is the one-sided use of force, rather than the use of force itself, which gives rise to protest.

Crises are unavoidable for the power which does not know how to retreat and give way, to "waive its principles." Policy (the state foundation), unlike ideology (the party foundation), tolerates differently minded people. And a reasonable policy cements society infinitely more reliably than the fear of repression. The struggle against heresy over many centuries, and 72 years of persecution for believing in god are ample proof of this. Just like a nation's sovereignty, personal independence is natural and genetic. To "conquer" nature you have to physically destroy the individual or the population. Anything else is hopeless, however long the temporary victory may endure. But already this concerns the philosophy rather than the technology of power.

The legal framework by no means always suits executive and administrative authorities, especially those not used to living under a rule-of-law regime. And if this framework is not sufficiently strong and the legislator gives way, the authoritative bases will necessarily set the pace. More often than not in this case the power base will refrain from looking into the rule-of-law mirror, because it does not lie—it reflects the essential weakness of a regime maintained solely through fear.

They talk about a crisis of power. If it exists, if there is a crisis, then it is no small way due to the fact that the authorities are fleeing from the rule-of-law state they themselves proclaimed and toward the usual repression, away from public wisdom and toward party ideals. The prestige of a legally established state power is dear to me. As is union and republic power. I would hate to see anybody trample the "crowns" in the mud.

The wisdom of the church has long proclaimed: "All power comes from god." It has consistently affirmed this principle. This could be argued in two ways: It renders the faithful vulnerable to tyranny, or it nurtures law-abidingness in citizens. I try to see the positive side in it—a respect for the law and authority, without which no society can be stable. But authority too must be worthy of its divine connotations.

CPSU 'Public Trial' Conference Scored

91UN0925A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Feb 91 Second Edition p 4

[Article by B. Slavin, doctor of philosophical sciences: "Beneath the Mask of Science"]

[Text] *To the talk of the inevitable collapse of communism its antipode—anticommunism—is becoming increasingly brazen. There was a direct clash with it on 5 and 6 February 1991 in the course of a conference entitled "For the Legal, Civic, and Moral Responsibility of the CPSU," whose organizer was some committee in support of a public trial of the CPSU.*

It should be mentioned straight away that the inspiration behind and participants in the conference were not embarrassed by the simple but telling fact that the Communist Party means millions of people who together with their families constitute almost one-fifth of our society. Whom is it that a handful of gentlemen are attempting to put on trial? Tens of millions of people?

As the organizers intended it, the conference was to have been the "first step" in a prolonged campaign to discredit the CPSU ideologically. All means and forms, including theatricalized performances, demonstrations and so forth, are good for the achievement of this goal, they believe. This was discussed openly at the conference. But another goal was not advertised. Which? It is essentially with the aid of a racket concerning the preparation of a "trial of the CPSU" to distract society's attention from the political bankruptcy of the representatives of the parties of the "democratic bloc," which are today in power in certain large cities and regions of the country. The main thing is to impress upon everyone that it is the CPSU which is the "evil" in our life and that merely its removal from the political scene will lead the Soviet people to happiness and prosperity.

It was for the accomplishment of this fundamental task that the conference, as ideological preparation for a lengthy process of a public trial of the CPSU, was thought up. Great significance was attached to it. According to USSR People's Deputy S. Sulakshin, presiding, the conference was to have been held at a high scientific and organizational level. For this reason the historian Yu. Afanasyev, the philosopher A. Tsipko, V. Shestakovskiy, former rector of the Moscow Higher Party School, the economists L. Piyasheva and B. Pinsker, the political scientist I. Klyamkin, former KGB General O. Kalugin, and other "stars" of the democratic and intellectual establishment that is springing up in our society were invited to it. Nor was there any shortage of correspondents of the foreign and our "independent" press. A civilized, composed atmosphere was, its organizers had planned, to have corresponded to the conference's high scientific level.

Such was the intention. Its execution proved (also not fortuitously, evidently) the direct opposite. Except for a "roundtable" conducted at the insistence of scholars not on the official list of speakers, an atmosphere of a political action prepared in advance, far removed from serious science, reigned at the conference. There was everything here: posters demanding "suppression of the CPSU," newspapers calling for "an end to the communist regime," and hysterical shouts from the floor: "Communists to be called to account!" Just one thing was lacking: fruitful debate, new ideas, and objective and profound summation. The principal speakers, former communists, by an irony of fate, relied in their arguments concerning the CPSU on the methodology of the totalitarian Sovietological school, which even the West has long since had taken away for scrap. The contemporary historian knows that this methodology essentially bars the way to an objective analysis of the contradictory historical process of Soviet society. This has been written and spoken about repeatedly by such important American Sovietologists and historians as R. Tucker, S. Cohen, and others. Nonetheless, the idea of totalitarianism pervaded all the speakers' arguments.

No new documents or nontraditional ideas were offered. There was a variation of the anticommunist cliches—revolutionism and recklessness of the Bolsheviks, the forcible implementation of utopian ideology, and the artificial nature of the building of socialism (Yu. Afanasyev); Bolshevik leaders' responsibility for the catastrophic nature of the October experiment (A. Tsipko); the primordial antidemocratism of the organizational structure of the CPSU (V. Shestakovskiy).... The majority of speakers had no doubt as to the identification of the practical distortions of the socialist idea and its classical essence, Stalinism and Leninism and totalitarianism and socialism. The speakers demanded the speediest elimination of the CPSU as a party which was unreformable in principle and proposed an intensification of the struggle for Soviet society's return to the "bosom of world civilization."

As far as scientific reasoning was concerned, there was a manifest shortage here. Thus Yu. Afanasyev buttressed his proposition concerning the "recklessness of the Bolsheviks" by a reference... to the French saying: "first engage, and by and by things become clear," by which, allegedly, Lenin was guided. In the historian's opinion, this is a graphic example of recklessness. Everyone may judge for himself the scientific value of such an argument. Just as conclusive was the argument of V. Shestakovskiy, who maintained that Lenin, speaking about democratic centralism, in fact meant "bureaucratic centralism." Quite recently, incidentally, V. Shestakovskiy himself was calling in his lectures for a distinction to be made between Lenin's understanding of democratic centralism and its bureaucratic distortions. Alas, as can be seen, the logic of anticommunism dictates different "truths," forcing him to go increasingly far, "conscience notwithstanding." Graphic testimony to this was the "polemic" with Yu. Afanasyev apropos the current moment. The latter evaluates it as a "restoration of totalitarianism," but this is not enough for Shestakovskiy, however—he maintains that totalitarianism, despite perestroyka, had not disappeared from society. It is appropriate in this case to ask: Is it not a lack of authority and a growth of anarchy, mob rule, and legal infractions that are currently being observed in society?

Unwilling to sit at the "roundtable" with communists, Balashov, deputy of the Moscow City Soviet, vainly attempted to show that totalitarianism in Soviet society has its origins not in the Stalin times but in Marx himself and Hegel even, who, allegedly, wrongly gave priority to the "general" over the "particular." In his opinion, only individualism merits the status of truth. Dayneko, another deputy of the Moscow City Soviet, who attributed to Marxism a defense of the philosophical category of people's "natural equality," spoke in the same vein. Passing on the stale news of Russian bourgeois thought in the criticism of Marxism, they primitivized communist ideology to the point where it became unrecognizable.

Of what was the CPSU accused? Nothing new: Once again it was branded for the "October coup" and for the "unleashing of the red terror" and the victims of Stalin's punitive measures and for environmental, national, and economic disasters. Even AIDS and children's poor eyesight were called the fault of the communists. And not a word about what has been accomplished under the leadership of the CPSU. As if there had been no victory in the Great Patriotic War. The arduous surmounting of the postwar devastation. As if the page of the conquest of space had been expunged from our history. It was forgotten that the country had become a world power. But Deputy Sulakshin having set the ball rolling, there came to be demands for a kind of Nuremberg trial of the CPSU. This involuntarily evoked in me the following association: the proceedings against communists in the last century fabricated by reactionaries of Prussia, the celebrated Leipzig trial on the even of World War II, the trials of Leninist communists staged by Stalin's judicial machinery and, finally, the recent trial of communists conducted by Iranian religious fanatics. Surely all this is enough for it to be understood, finally, on whose side the truth was and remains: those judging or those being judged.

Who would benefit from a trial of the CPSU? It is clear that true democrats would not accept this misanthropic idea. On the contrary, I am sure that they would raise their voice in defense of the communists. A trial of the CPSU could be profitable only to reactionary forces wishing to change our social system, with whatever "democratic" and "scientific" masks they conceal themselves.

Of course, the CPSU cannot be a criticism-free zone. As the governing party, it is responsible for much in our country's history. But what is needed in order to determine this measure is not a superficial survey of its activity but a serious comprehensive study of each stage of its history. Such an analysis, in my view, would show when the Lenin Party felt the pulse of the times, was directly in the masses and expressed their interests, and was up to the historic tasks; and when, on the other hand, it became divorced from the masses, failed to take account of the changed situation in the country, and at times made major miscalculations and mistakes in its activity. There have also been tragic pages in its history, when the party was split into two parts, as it were: that which was in the camps and that which put it there. Both a one-sided eulogizing of its activity and sweeping censure are contrary to the truth.

Who, however, could reproach the party for having headed the historic transition of the Soviet people from one historical economic system to another? Adhering to positions of historical method, it has to be seen that October was not a mistake or an accident: It had been prepared by all previous history. The socialist choice was made by the people themselves, and the party of communists may be proud that at the most crucial and difficult times it was with them. There have always been in the party reforming forces capable of responding to changes in society. It is sufficient to recall in this connection the party's transition from the policy of war communism to the New Economic Policy, the debunking of the "cult of personality," the thaw of the end of the 1950's, and the start of the present perestroyka.

Today the party is being democratized, has shed the skin of the "old dogmatic Adam," has abandoned its command role in society, and is seeking new, purely political methods of work in the masses and in parliament. At the same time it continues the struggle. A struggle on two fronts—both against anticommunist forces and against neo-Stalinist trends. They are today joining forces with one another in an endeavor to bury perestroyka and those who were at the sources of it. Preventing the death of perestroyka and unswervingly accomplishing its goals connected with the building of humane, democratic socialism—this is the duty of each communist and each true democrat.

The CPSU is not afraid of responsibility. But it cannot be forgotten that, although it continues to call itself the governing party, it does not stand at the helm of power alone. Responsibility for today's situation in the country is shared with it by other parties also. Only constructive dialogue and cooperation between them and the CPSU can provide the country with a way out of the crisis. Neither an "iron hand" nor brutal anticommunism will help here. On the contrary, their encouragement would be deadly.

Future Role for USSR Procuracy Viewed

91UN0949A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 Feb 91 Second Edition p 4

[Article by USSR Procurator General N. Trubin: "Toward a Rule of Law State—What Should the Procuracy Be?"]

[Text]**Our country is going through a difficult time. The recent events in Lithuania, Latvia, Georgia, and other**

regions fill every person's heart with anxiety. Their tragic complexion attests to the fact that the situation is becoming critical.

I will say frankly and plainly: Under conditions of the sovereignization of the republics, the Union SSR [Soviet Socialist Republics] Procuracy was unable to restructure itself and work with foresight, and it allowed a weakening; and, in a number of places, it also lost the administrative threads of the procuracy system. Without our participation, the republics began to adopt legislative acts that in various ways define the tasks and functions of procurators and procedures for their appointment.

Meanwhile, there is no doubt about the need for a single all- Union system of procuracy supervision. At the Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies, amendments were made to the USSR Constitution, in accordance with which procurators of the republics are designated the highest organs of state authority of the republic for coordination with the USSR Procurator General and his subordinates.

All of the necessary conditions are being established for the independence of the procurators. Defects are being eliminated that are associated with excessive centralization of the procuracy system. Henceforth, procurators of the republics have a right to determine the structure of their own and subordinate staffs and to decide personnel questions. The main tasks of the USSR Procuracy will be coordination of the actions of the organs of the procuracy on the basic problems of reinforcing legality and law and order, analysis of the practical execution of the laws of the USSR and the republics, development of scientifically-based recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of procuracy supervision, and active participation in the creation of law. The leadership of the procuracy system itself will be changed. The forthcoming inclusion of republic procurators in the collegium staff of the USSR Procuracy will enable it to become an organ that will be able to take into account both the interests of the republics, as well as of the entire Union.

Why are we for the centralization of the procuracy precisely in this form? For the reason that this is needed first and foremost by the republics!

The procurators of the republics do not always succeed in realistically defending the rights of citizens of nonindigenous nationalities and suppressing occurrences of discrimination. Practice shows that in such cases it frequently happens that the actions of the USSR Procuracy are needed. Without its participation, it is not always possible to conduct an objective investigation of crimes associated with interethnic conflicts. It is a single procuracy system that should guarantee the observance of human rights on the entire territory of the country, an obligation that the Soviet Union assumed before the international community. The USSR Procurator General is obliged to exercise supervision over this regardless of the norms in question—Union or republic.

The most important task is to free the procuracy from functions that are not natural to it. The USSR Constitution assigned one task to the procurator—to exercise supervision over the execution of laws. Any change by the procurators in the organs of administration, the fulfillment of their duties, and interference in operational administrative activity is not permissible. Such attempts only weaken supervision, erode its boundaries, and engender amateurish approaches and evaluations.

It is especially important for the procuracy to get rid of inappropriate methods of the inspection style of work. Checks indicate that procurators, engaging in an initiative search for violations of the law, in many cases retain, without appropriate response, materials that also control other organs with respect to poor management, upward distortions, and other abuses, and they procrastinate with them, return them for the slightest reasons, including far-fetched reasons, and they avoid making legal decisions. This engenders irresponsibility. Therefore, instead of duty checks, it is necessary to ensure a timely and legal authorization of materials, statements, and reports on law violations that come to the procuracy, and to look after the legality of measures that are taken on the disclosure of violations by the organs of administration and control.

The problem of the lawfulness of legal acts has assumed great criticality, especially of local authority which, using independence as a cover, frequently even assumes the functions of a legislator.

It is the supervision of the lawfulness of legal acts that makes it possible to handle very acute problems associated with the rights of citizens. Unfortunately, it is not only in Lithuania that openly discriminatory acts are being applied of late that infringe upon the interests of whole groups of the population, especially the nonindigenous population. This gravely exacerbates interethnic relations, and it frequently creates an explosive situation. People often simply lose faith in their ability to find justice in local organs. In the last two years, about a half million complaints have arrived at the USSR Procuracy, and of these quite a few are justified. Here there are illegal rejections both in job placement and illegal discharges, abuses in the distribution of apartments, and violations of the rights of invalids...

Not long ago, finally, proposals of the procuracy were implemented on the right to protest the illegal acts of local Soviets. The strengthening of this law in the USSR Constitution must become an important step for the activation of procuracy supervision. An immediate task of the USSR Procuracy staff is the strengthening of supervision over the legality of decisions of the Union departments.

Thus, on 23 January of this year, the chairmen of the boards of the USSR State Bank and the USSR Savings

Bank sent out instructions in which they proposed that, when issuing cash from citizens' deposits, a note should be made of this in the passport. I raised the question of abolishing this illegal instruction with the prime minister of the country.

In overseeing the lawfulness of illegal acts, the procurators must proceed from the fact that not even one organ and not one official is excused from the responsibility of being subject to the law. The internal coordination of republic and Union legislation is an indispensable basis of an integrated law. It seems that the procurators, who know this better than anyone else, can make their contribution to the matter of stopping the so-called "war of laws," behind which there are sometimes only personal and political ambitions.

Violations of laws in the economy and parasitizing its difficulties and unresolved problems represent a special danger. The current chaos in this sphere is fraught with ruinous consequences.

Operators in the shadow economy utilize much more successfully than we do in fighting them the "neutrality" of national property, the backwardness of the legal base, the subjectivism in price formation, and the destruction of the system of control that, although imperfect, is in force.

Theft, abuse, and profiteering are growing. According to registered data alone, losses from theft and shortages exceed 4 billion rubles [R] annually. In the agro-industrial complex, 20 to 30 percent of the grown crops and more than 2.5 million tons of meat are lost or pilfered. It was this amount that the state was forced to purchase abroad for hard currency. In a whole series of spheres and regions, bribery is growing into real corruption. Hard hit are cooperatives, trade, supply areas, and foreign economic activity where strategic resources and hard currency are being squandered and misappropriated.

There is a requirement to increase attention to the protection of the rights of the consumer, most of all from those who artificially create a shortage, who secretly store up commodities and food products, and who arbitrarily increase their prices, or transfer them to the "shadow economy operators."

The procurators must make their contribution to the implementation of laws of the USSR and the ukases of the president of the country on measures to stabilize economic ties to support the fight against economic sabotage and other crimes in the sphere of economics. Any abuses must be carefully investigated and be given a correct legal evaluation. The main thing is speed in reacting, and use of all means prescribed by law so that not one violation of the law in the sphere of economics remains unpunished.

At the same time, the procurators must strictly see to it that the broad powers granted organs of internal affairs and state security to fight against economic sabotage are employed only if there are legal reasons and grounds and in strict compliance with judicial norms.

One of the most acute problems that alarms the whole public is the increase in crime that is taking place in all Union republics. Faith is being undermined in the ability of the state and law enforcement organs to guarantee public order and the security of people. The number of registered crimes is approaching three million.

Supervision over the proper conduct of the fight against crime is one of the main duties of the procuracy, and the procurator has the necessary levers for this. Undoubtedly, questions of securing law and order and preventing law-breaking must be resolved mainly by republic and local organs. But crime sometimes does not recognize any borders.

The drug business and smuggling are of an interrepublic and sometimes even of an international character. Machinations in cooperatives and joint enterprises, especially in foreign trade transactions, frequently have an effect on the interests of several republics and the Union as a whole.

All of this indicates that we cannot do without mutually coordinated actions, coordination of measures, common criminal records, joint analysis of the dynamics and trends in crimes, and properly employed practices. It is hardly possible to agree with the position of those comrades who, referring to sovereignty, would like to isolate themselves completely and resolve all problems with their own forces only. This approach is not in the interests of the republics themselves and the citizens who are suffering from crime. For it is a question not of subordination and not of submission, but of the necessity to be comrades-in-arms in the cause that we are all serving.

To unite the efforts of the Union and the republics, the USSR president on 4 February of this year issued an ukase "On Measures for Intensifying the Fight Against the Most Dangerous Crimes and Their Organized Forms." In the fight against crime, all procurators have common problems of a purely professional nature. Attention must be concentrated on the conduct of strict supervision over the fulfillment of laws in the stages of initiating a criminal case and the institution of inquiries and preliminary investigation. The results of this work cannot satisfy anyone—the violations of legality are of a massive nature.

As previously, tens of thousands of crimes escape registration. A majority of the statements concerning criminal occurrences are not reacted to in a timely way. The procuracy of the Ukraine, for example, studied cases in Kharkov Oblast of undisclosed crimes, and of these only one-fifth were filed on the day of the occurrences, although the facts of the crimes were obvious.

There were 1.167 million undisclosed crimes—two-thirds of the number of investigated crimes and three-fourths of thefts of personal property. Criminals are walking around free, and many of them are committing new crimes. Serious mistakes and violations of the law are being allowed during preliminary investigation and inquiry. There are illegal searches, detentions, and arrests. There are incidents of falsification of criminal case materials.

Of course, it must not be thought that every release from custody or verdict of not guilty indicates a violation of legality. This kind of a formal approach disorients the investigators and the procurators and leads to overcautiousness. Each case must be analyzed very carefully. We must proceed from the fact that occurrences of a lack of conscientiousness and incompetence and arrests and initiation of criminal charges without proof, based on unverified materials, are violations of the law. But when the issue concerns an evaluation of evidence according to internal conviction—this is the right of the investigator and the procurator, and it cannot be ignored.

Prospects for the procuracy in many ways depend on the kinds of principles on which its mutual relations with the court will be based. Society is gradually beginning to understand the need to form an independent court system as a very important guarantor of legality. The legal position of the procurator has to be reinterpreted. The concept according to which the procurator exercises supervision over the examination of criminal cases in the courts has become obsolete. The procurator is a participant in the judicial process. The main content of our work remains support of the state's charge.

Is it necessary to preserve the right of the procurator to protest judicial decisions in an appeals procedure in cases in which he did not participate and to file protests against sentences and decisions that are in legal effect? Should supervision be limited to a republican scope. Rather weighty arguments can be made in favor of one or another point of view. It seems that equally unacceptable here are hastily and poorly reasoned changes and adherence to old dogmas. We must now be guided by laws in effect. And it is necessary to agree with great exactitude that in the transition period the existing order will be retained until there is a demarcation of jurisdictions in the matter of Union and republic organs.

As for prospects for the future, I believe that we cannot ignore the right of the citizen to obtain justice at every administrative level, including Union levels. Changes in this procedure, undoubtedly, will be perceived by many as a limitation on their legal rights, especially if there is a question of nonobjectivity resulting from national, local, or political motives.

Of course, it is difficult to predict in what way a renewal of the Union will affect the demarcation of jurisdictions of Union and republic procuracies in the sphere of criminal legal procedure. However, without common principles in criminal and criminal-judicial legislation, it will hardly be possible to conduct a coordinated and effective criminal policy and to ensure the realization of the rights and legal interests of the participants in the process.

The effectiveness of our actions to a decisive degree will depend on how we interact with the Soviets of People's Deputies at all levels.

It is important not only to inform the Soviets about the main criminal trends and the execution by administrative organs of obligations to guarantee legality, but also actively to help the deputy corps, and to introduce well-reasoned and specific proposals on the basis of which the Soviets could effectively improve the situation.

In all of its activities, the procuracy should use the capabilities of the mass media. At the same time, the procurators should not avoid supervision over the fulfillment of the USSR law of 12 June 1990 "On the Press and Other Mass Media." It is impossible not to see that the requirements of this law are violated frequently, and that no one is bearing the responsibility for this. Lately, an information war was added to the war of laws and sovereignties.

Some journalists and editors, who remember well their right to "search for," obtain, and disseminate information, which is stipulated in Article 32, forget about the obligation to verify its reliability, which is stipulated in Article 32 of the very same law. Various kinds of explosive insinuations, expressed in vain, although by rather official but very irresponsible people, roam the pages of the press, the airwaves, and television screens, are picked up at meetings, and agitate the public conscience.

The aforementioned does not mean that I am appealing for a suppression of press freedom and infringement of the rights of journalists and editors. The issue is not to allow abuses of this freedom and not to disseminate information that does not correspond to reality and various kinds of conjectures that promote the exacerbation of sociopolitical tension in the country.

Now the main political question is the formation of a renewed Union SSR on a democratic basis. Its fate will be decided by a national referendum. It is important that the will of the people takes place in a normal situation in precise compliance with the Law on Referendum. The experience of past elections showed that opposing political forces are not averse to unlawful actions right down to direct falsification of results. There were criminal cases in Russia, Kazakhstan, and in the Ukraine, and a number of persons were convicted. It is necessary to give maximum attention and objectivity to notifications about law violations. There should be no departure here from the resolution of questions on the basis of principles.

The recently held All-Union Conference of Workers of the Procuracy clearly demonstrated the devotion of the procurators to the preservation of a single procuracy system and their efforts to overcome the actual disjunction that is beginning to show.

Marxist Platform Official on Goals

AU1103212291 Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 6 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Aleksandr Busgalin, member of the CPSU Central Committee, co-founder and leading member of the Marxist Platform in the CPSU, by Klaus Joachim Herrmann in Moscow; date not given: "We Want Socialism From Below and Not a Parody"]

[Text] [Herrmann] Perestroyka is in a crisis. Does it still have any prospects, in your view?

[Busgalin] In fact, perestroyka was a bureaucratic struggle against bureaucracy. And bureaucracy is some sort of cancer. One has to operate on it in time, but when the operation was started—namely perestroyka—it became clear that the entire body had been affected.

In our country the situation is now similar to that in Poland in the 1980's. With attempts with a state of emergency—but without a real control of the events. With attempts at a market—but via the system of ration cards. Floating halfway between start and finish, a transition. And in the course of that, the party is slowly disintegrating.

[Herrmann] A somber prognosis....

[Busgalin] The CPSU is a complicated political phenomenon, which cannot be determined with the traditional understanding of a party. It is not a party of like-minded people. The structure is bureaucratic—on the one hand, the party is interlaced with the state apparatus, on the other, with the simple people. A simple party member is distinguished from a non-party member only by paying fees and participating in party meetings.

The most important task would be the establishment of a really communist party, which continues the best traditions of the communist movement in Russia. In the Russian and in the Soviet communist movement there are many heroic sides. Not only in the revolutionary epoch, but also in the times of Stalin and Brezhnev. There were many real men, pure communists.

If the party develops from below, if it wins its popularity there and from its leaders, it will be a democratic communist party. The bloc of the forces of socialist choice lets real chances be seen for that. But there are also pseudo-communist, conservative structures developing in our country—for instance, as a result of the Leningrad Initiative Congress, Poloskov's (head of the Russian Communist Party—the editors) followers, who turn up with ultra- Communist slogans, but, at the same time, advocate an ultra- bureaucratic practice.

[Herrmann] Could you describe the goals of the Marxist Platform more in detail?

[Busgalin] Our platform has set itself two main tasks:

1. a consistent grass-roots democracy, democratization of society and the party;

2. on this basis, a consistent progress on the path of socialist choice.

We assume that Socialism is developing only from creativity, from the free responsibility of people. If Socialism does not develop from below but is enforced from above—by a president or a general secretary—then it is not Socialism but a parody, which discredits this choice.

[Herrmann] And how many followers do you have in the CPSU?

[Busgalin] At the conference at the end of January the delegates, who were present, represented about 15,000 to 20,000 communists. One can say that today about 30,000 people support our positions. Among them there are many followers of the former democratic platform, who stayed in the party. Their range reaches from "completely red" to leftist social-democratic in the European sense. The Marxist Platform, in which I see myself as one of the "completely red," reaches up to conservatives with a touch of Stalinism. There are more sympathizers—according to polls, between 2 and 10 percent of the party members.

Unfortunately, over the past months the followers have tended to drift away from each other. The minority, including myself, consider the struggle against bureaucracy to remain extremely topical. In the USSR, a dangerous liberal-bourgeois construction is being conducted in the USSR. In fact, a change in power is taking place—from the bureaucrats in the district committees, in the Central Committee, and in the ministries to the owners of or the money in stock corporations or cooperatives. It is only an exchange of power.

The majority of the platform see it as the most important task to unite the forces in the struggle against capitalist restoration and some even against the "social democratic illusions," which reminds a bit of Stalin in the 1920's. They think that one must struggle against the restoration of capitalism at any cost and with any allies, even with the followers of bureaucracy. However, this price will not justify the result, because the opposite of what is striven for will come about—that is, not socialist choice, but further bureaucratic illusion.

Justice Minister on Party Registration Law

91UN0877A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 9 Feb 91 p 2

[Interview with USSR Minister of Justice S.G. Lushchikov by SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent V. Raskin; place and date not given: "You Have Created a Party... Register Its Statute!"]

[Text] **Pursuant to the USSR law "On Public Associations," the Ministry of Justice of our country has begun**

efforts to register political parties and movements. From a legal point of view, it would be more precise to say that it is not public movements but rather statutes on the basis of which they operate or intend to operate that are being registered.

I will stress that a very young minister has come to head this important Union ministry for the first time: Sergey Gennadyevich Lushchikov is 39. Prior to his election as USSR people's deputy, he worked as deputy minister of justice of the Komi ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. After becoming a member of parliament of our country, he became deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation. Our readers may perhaps remember Lushchikov for presenting the Foundations of Land Legislation in the parliament together with A.A. Nikonov after participating in their development. I will note that he has been familiar with the problems of peasants since his childhood, and not from textbooks alone. He graduated from a rural school. These are the credentials of a new minister who is a member of the Communist Party. During our interview, the minister stressed in a quite principled manner that his CPSU membership would not by any means prevent him from being objective in everything, and from being a jurist first of all.

[begin bold]So, USSR Minister of Justice S.G. Lushchikov responded to the questions of SELSKAYA ZHIZN. [end bold]

[Raskin] Sergey Gennadyevich, you are the first minister of justice to be in charge of an important and, frankly, unusual mission for our country—registration of public organizations. This is why the first question is as follows: How did you begin you work in this new capacity?

[Lushchikov] In short, I began my work, naturally, by familiarizing myself with the collective and the business that I had to attend to urgently. As they say, I took the baton "on the move." There were complications because until 27 December I remained a member of the Supreme Soviet of the country and took part in the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies where the most momentous decisions affecting the Union were made. At present, we are "adapting" the work of the Ministry of Justice to specific amendments of the USSR Constitution that were adopted with a view to perfecting executive power.

Responding to this question in a slightly broader context, I will say that I began my activities by studying in more depth the experience of foreign justice in civilized countries that are more advanced than we are from the legal point of view. However, we will not replicate blindly. We will not ignore the experience of the Russian justice of the last century either. Let us recall that we had trials by jury and an entire constellation of marvelous attorneys. However, this is in the past, whereas new times call for making new decisions. My first directive was to hold an extraordinary collegium meeting in order to prepare for the implementation of the USSR law "On Public Associations" and begin the registration of political parties, public associations, and mass movements.

[Raskin] Have you created a division that will handle this?

[Lushchikov] Of course. This new structural division is headed by Vladimir Nikolayevich Zhbankov. There are people in the division who are prepared to do business professionally: lawyers, financiers, and those who know foreign languages. They stand out for plurality of views.

[Raskin] Perhaps you would name public organizations that have already been registered? How is all of this going to proceed?

[Lushchikov] This is how I will respond to the first part of your question: So far, nobody has been registered. To be sure, in the first week of January, 83 representatives of various parties and movements approached us. However, many of them did not manage to prepare their paperwork properly. Three documents should be submitted to us: a petition signed by members of the leading organ of the organization being registered, a statute, and a protocol of the constituent congress, conference, or general meeting. You should definitely keep in mind the following: We register specifically all- Union associations or those the activities of which embrace the territories of at least two republics. I would like to recall that we do not register associations that envisage the forcible overthrow of our constitutional system. This is expressly banned by the law.

The final point with regard to this issue: Under the law, the Ministry of Justice has two months to consider the petitions filed. After this, we release our findings. If everything is all right—be our guest. We will hold a solemn registration ceremony in order to do everything thoroughly and properly. After all, an event of this nature will be held for the first time in the history of our country!

[Raskin] Sergey Gennadyevich, our readers live for the most part in rural areas. You may want to add something to your answer to the previous question with this in view.

[Lushchikov] Literally in January, the All-Union Association of Blacksmiths made its presence known. I am saying this in order to indicate that there can be public associations of every description, for example, the movement of veterans in agriculture. I anticipate an organization associated with the defense of land and natural resources. An association of agricultural science specialists, or international associations associated with agricultural issues are possible. However, pursuant to the explicit law, we do not register commercial organizations that raise the issue of generating profits. Agrarians also have such associations. I mean consumer cooperatives. They are regulated by other pieces of legislation. Also, we will not register such organizations as courts of peers, worker control, or volunteer people's detachments. I stress that other legislation applies to them.

First Mass Associations Registered Under New Law

LD2502221591 Moscow TASS in English 1546 GMT 25 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Borisov]

[Text] Moscow February 25 TASS—The first 16 mass associations were formally registered at the Soviet Ministry of Justice today in keeping with a law on public organisations, which entered into force on January 1.

The first to get an official lease of life was the National Znaniye (Knowledge) Society.

Others included the National Construction Workers' Scientific and Technological Society, the National Writers' Union, the Association of Free Trade Unions, and the Alliance of Socialist Trade Unions.

No political party has been registered as yet. Justice Minister Sergey Lushchikov explained this either by the insufficient memberships of new political groups seeking official recognition or by inadequately completed documents needed for registration.

Under the law, a party needs to have at least 5,000 members to be registered.

Assembly of Republics' Social Democratic Parties Formed

LD1302195891 Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 12 Feb 91

[Text] An assembly of the republics' social democratic parties has been set up in the Soviet Union. The Moscow meeting has been attended by social democrats from nine republics in the country. One of the assembly's main goals is the transformation of the Soviet Union into a community of sovereign states by concluding direct interstate agreements. Its member-parties committed themselves to coordinate the holding of joint political actions and mutual consultations.

Ligachev on Reasons for Not Suing Gdlyan, Ivanov

PM1902151191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Feb 91 Union Edition p 7

[Ye. Ligachev letter under the "Editorial Mailbag" rubric: "Ye. Ligachev: 'I Intended to Sue'..."]

[Text] Recently the editorial office received the following letter:

On 4 February 1991, IZVESTIYA (No 30) published notes under the "Political Diary" rubric which criticized me for not suing Gdlyan and Ivanov for making unfounded accusations against me. The author of the notes explains my unwillingness to go to court in the following terms: "Most likely (...) the 'number two' ['vtoroye litso'] did not feel that he was a citizen equal with all other citizens before the law. For too long he was outside the law, above it... Ligachev still had to leave his old self behind, to break with habit and tradition and his own guiding 'ego'."

Since the author of those notes, Yu. Feofanov, is putting forward a particularly false version of the "number two's" conduct, I want to briefly explain to IZVESTIYA readers how things really are.

It was like this. I intended to sue for libel and I asked some Moscow lawyers to help investigate. After carefully studying the investigators' report, the lawyers came to the stunning conclusion that the investigators, in trying to cast aspersions on me, did not once directly accuse me of bribery. And thus from the formal point of view the court would not find their actions libelous. Those who launched this libel campaign against me acted skillfully: The press went all out to play up the "accusation of bribery" but the "accusers" themselves avoided saying so directly.

Taking these considerations into account, I nevertheless could not fully concur with that position because in fact the shadow of a criminal accusation was cast. I turned to the USSR Prosecutor's Office on this matter in strict accordance with the law.

This matter is described in greater detail in my memoirs. It has a chapter entitled "Gdlyan and the Others" disclosing the political goals of this squalid campaign. The book pays attention to the "others"—those who were behind the investigators.

There is more. On the allegation that Ligachev "was for too long outside the law, above it...," I consider this a fabrication. As a Communist and a party worker, I regarded and continue to regard observance of the law perhaps more strictly than anyone else. This was not a burden for me. In this instance the author really cannot "leave behind" the distorted image of a party leader fabricated by bogus democrats, many of whom proceed to violate laws, as the press is increasingly reporting.

Social Affairs

Burlatskiy Defends Social Democracy Choice

91UN1021A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 9, 6 Mar 91 p 4

[Article by Fedor Burlatskiy: "Communism or Social Democracy? Regarding One PRAVDA Article"]

[Text] **On 26 February 1991, in a column entitled "Discussion Sheet No 82," the newspaper PRAVDA published an article by G. Kryuchkov, "What Are the Upstart Prophets Planning? On One Unseemly Venture." It was a response to the article entitled "Alternative" published in**

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of 30 January this year and is a transcript of a conversation with S. Alekseyev, F. Burlatskiy, and S. Shatalin.

The article published below is not simply a response to the article in PRAVDA but a continuation of the reflections of one of the participants in the conversation.

Down With Pilate-ism

Do you recall in M. Bulgakov's "Master and Margarita"—"Down with Pilate-ism"? This was the response to the Master's novel about the execution of Jesus Christ.

Time passes but morals, alas, change slowly. "Upstart prophets," "unseemly venture," "political fickleness," "inveterate apparatchik," and, finally, "double dealers"—this is a sample of the vocabulary of the sheet which calls itself a discussion sheet. I do not have the honor of knowing the article's author, G. Kryuchkov, but I know PRAVDA and its editor-in-chief well. Is it really necessary again, as in the thirties, to "strike like Pilate" instead of continuing a serious discussion of serious issues in our life which was begun by fairly serious people?

I must note with great bitterness that the PRAVDA opponent who promised to provide a "serious commentary" to our article completely sidestepped the essence of the problem that was raised. It can be reduced to a simple idea: What can lead us out of the crisis and provide stabilization and a modern way of life for the people in the future—a return to communist ideology or advancement toward common human values, above all social democracy?

In general I am more in favor of pragmatism: Do what produces an effect here and now—to solve the food problem, eliminate the deficit, and regulate the conflicts. But we must return again to general issues since for six years we have been lost in the midst of three ideological concepts: socialism, private property, and sovereignty.

What Is Bothering Us?

The reader will probably be rather interested in knowing why three scholars who have been participating for more than 30 years in the country's ideological and now political life considered it necessary to present this article. None of us has belonged or does belong to any group, including the interregional one, and we have not sought any posts in this way. We did not and do not expect any personal dividends from our article and were guided solely by a sense of duty, which in all times has been a motivation for people searching for the truth in the name of the public good.

What is bothering us? I can only speak for myself. We were afraid of a rejection or a retardation of the policy of structural reforms, above all in the area of the economy, and also state construction and the sphere of personal liberty.

A couple of days ago my favorite poet and long-time friend Bulat Okudzhava made me a gift of Lenin's brochure "One Step Forward and Two Steps Back." Apparently he too was bothered by the many convulsive movements of perestroyka recently.

I did not believe and do not believe that USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, the initiator of perestroyka, has become a hostage of conservative, not to mention reactionary forces. But it is an indisputable fact that pressure from them has increased sharply of late.

I will not deny that I am satisfied with the explanations given in M.S. Gorbachev's program speech at the Belorussian Academy of Sciences. He strongly confirmed his devotion to the reforms. Transition to the market. Reasonable privatization. The formation of a union of sovereign republics. Political and spiritual pluralism. Renewal of the Communist Party program. Continuation of the policy of new thinking in the world arena. In a word, reconstruction of the entire system.

If socialism means humanism and civilized behavior, we have no grounds for a dispute. But if socialism means a state economy, a one-party system, and the predominance of one ideology—as they think and write in PRAVDA, the organ of the CPSU Central Committee—then the dispute will continue.

The idea of the center expressed in the speech by M.S. Gorbachev is absolutely correct. And this is the only position possible for a president who is integrating all the interests and trends that exist in the country. But this in itself presupposes the existence of both right- and left-wing trends—otherwise where would the center be? Incidentally, it is time for self-determination in the Supreme Soviets as well—instead of dividing into groups according to regions and professions, we should form, as all other parliaments of the world do, these three main areas, and it would also be possible to have them seated in the meetings according to this: right, center, and left.

I am convinced that the separation of political forces will proceed not along the horizontal but along the vertical. There is a right, a left, and a center within the Communist Party, within the soviets, within the Army, and, I suspect, within the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB as well. Just as I know for certain that within the framework of any political movement there are more and less educated, honest, and decent people.

As I understand it, Gorbachev is now oriented toward a "team" for stabilization. But sooner or later he will have to augment his "team" with reformers, for otherwise there can be no advancement—either in strategic thought or in reasonable economic and political strategy or in economic and political decisions.

G. Kryuchkov writes that in terms of the content of the ideas, social democracy is not very different from the platform of democratic socialism. To a certain extent this is correct, but largely it is not. It is correct because the very idea of parliamentarianism, the market, a rule-of-law state, and a civil society actually were advocated by representatives of the reformist school. It is wrong because the right- and left-wing extremists embraced it only pro forma: The words were the same but the deeds were different.

The main thing that distinguishes extremism from social democracy is the thirst for blood and violence, wherever it may come from—above or below. If the extremists "above" are prepared to take advantage of the bureaucracy and the Army, the extremists "below" use rebellion and rallies. The extremes meet again here, as they did in 1917. Herein lies the threat of a military or social dictatorship.

Even if the reconstruction of the entire system and the whole psychological condition of the people in the country takes 20-30 years, it is necessary to proceed, relying on common sense and professional decisions and not counting on shock therapy or another Bolshevik revolution.

The most terrible thing that has come down to us from the revolutionary-ism of the 19th century was registered in the words: A cause is secure when blood has flowed for it! Four generations of Russia have been victims of this kind of thought. It is time to recognize this and get rid of it forever, once and for all. Only structural reforms based on the will of the people can lead us to a modern civilized life. This is where we decisively part ways with any extremists.

But here is what people like G. Kryuchkov simply do not know: The evolution of our ideology began a long time ago. And they do not know this because in our textbooks and also in party propaganda our ideology frequently reminds one of the Matreshka [wooden nesting dolls] that are sold for dollars in the Arbat. On the surface is Marx and inside, Lenin, and even deeper inside, Stalin and then Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and, finally, in the innermost part—Gorbachev. This is why it is necessary to define ourselves and to do it unequivocally and candidly, without timorously looking back to the authorities of the past. Otherwise the Communist Party will lose all of its influence in society.

Do We Need a Leninist Renaissance?

G. Kryuchkov quoted a long passage from my article about Lenin but he took it out of context and did not show why it was written. I will restore the omitted text so that the reader can see that the purpose of referring to Lenin was to show the need for deep reforms in the spirit of the NEP [New Economic Policy]. And this was published—note—during Brezhnev's times. Here is the excerpt:

"Imagine the situation in those years. The Civil War had just ended; the economy was in ruins; poverty had become truly unprecedented in scale; demoralization had gripped the broadest segments of the petit bourgeoisie and had even touched the proletariat to a certain degree. The strict regulation of economic practice which is typical of 'war communism' was increasingly at odds with the tasks of restoring and developing the national economy and with the vital interests of the working masses. The question had become crucial: Where should we go from here?

"The best minds in the party, headed by Lenin, sensed the lack of promise and the futility of proceeding along the former path.

"Lenin showed that it was not possible to introduce order into economic life as a side project; it had to be done on the basis of an economic reform, without introducing forced labor but relying on material incentives and the high level of responsibility and creative discipline of the people, without ignoring the masses but unleashing them and letting them be independent.

"Lenin's art of political about-face presupposes above all the ability to look the real facts of life boldly in the face and evaluate the situation realistically. Then there was a decisive rejection of methods that had not worked previously and the development of a clear concept of constructive transformations. And, finally, there was the ability to rely on the true enthusiasts of the policy being conducted."

I did indeed include this article in the book entitled "The New Thinking" published in 1989 in order to show the path the reformist ideas had followed to maturation.

During the period of the first reformation, many of us, like Khrushchev, were convinced: We shall reject Stalin, return to Lenin—and everything will follow that path. This is the essence of Khrushchev's whole secret report to the 20th CPSU Congress. It is no accident that Khrushchev did not heed P. Tolyatti's most important remark: It is not a matter of Stalin himself but of the entire system he generated.

I personally was propped up by Leninist quotations when I began to write (in 1957-1959) about the need for democratization in our country. I recall the explosion of orthodox indignation evoked by my rejection of the idea of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the justification of a nationwide state in the CPSU Program for 1961 (I was working on that section). Members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee at that time were literally shaken by the fact that we were "junking" the main thing in Marxism—the dictatorship of the proletariat. And the esteemed academician, I. Mints, even wrote a denunciation of me on Staraya Square, accusing me of approximately the same thing Kryuchkov is accusing me of now. But Khrushchev supported these ideas and they could not be abolished even in Brezhnev's times.

But what can be said about two other ideas advanced at the 20th CPSU Congress—about peaceful coexistence and a peaceful transition to socialism in the countries of the West? This meant a direct rejection of the most important communist dogma—world revolution.

Nonetheless the fluctuations continued. Under Khrushchev's influence, the CPSU Program included the idea of "developed construction of communism." The economic reform begun under Khrushchev and the creation of sovnarkhozes [soviets of the national economy] were in no way linked to the transition to a mixed economy. And in agriculture Khrushchev at the end of his career even took a step backward, encroaching on the personal livestock and farmyard plots of the kolkhoz [collective farm] workers.

On the ideological plane all these fluctuations were linked in one way or another to the illusion of a Leninist renaissance cherished by the generation of the sixties. The entire world was changing before our eyes—from the atom bomb and space flights to the 40-hour work week and payment of unemployment compensation in countries of the West—and we continued to look back to the distant past. This motivated me to conduct my own investigation of Leninism. I published its results as early as 1970 in a long book entitled "Lenin. The State. Politics."

Lenin, of course, was a great political figure. It is no small matter to create a party and take over power in one of the most powerful empires in the world. And to retain this power in the most ferocious civil war. But I was convinced of this: His objective role in history was by no means what it was generally thought to be. Regardless of his wishes, it was expressed in the rescue of the empire from collapse and not in the construction of communism, for the sake of which Lenin began the revolution. Do you recall the conviction with which he promised the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] members: You will see communism in your lifetime. And how could one not see this reality? Not understand that the attempt to realize the communist idea had cost hundreds of millions of destroyed lives.

Therefore I find it ridiculous and sad when I read what G. Kryuchkov writes about "double dealers." The only people who can write this way are those who studied Lenin from the "Brief Course of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)]" and have never seriously thought about the problems of the theory. Can one think that Copernicus was a fool simply because Newton's cosmogenic theory appeared, or that Newton was a nonentity because he was not aware of Einstein's theory of relativity? Marx and his student Lenin represented one of the stages in the development of human thought, but only the ignorant could think that its development ended here. A historical perspective is even more necessary in evaluating important political figures. After the death of Cromwell, the leader of the British revolution, the English dug up his work and posted it in the window of the Parliament building in Westminster Square. But then they came to their senses and placed a monument to him under that same window instead.

The Leninist renaissance, turning history backward, is another matter. One cannot step into the same stream twice. And that is not an abstract argument but a most crucial problem in today's politics. I have already noted in the article called "Alternative" what a dulling effect this has had in the reconstruction of our political system (it was probably a mistake in the heat of the moment for me to ascribe this to A.I. Lukyanov, since everyone in one way or another submitted to illusions of the past).

Was Lenin a Social Democrat?

My research has led me to the conclusion that Lenin himself accomplished an enormous evolution in his views. And it is not difficult to see that it proceeded in the direction toward socialism and social democratism.

"A specter is haunting Europe—the specter of communism"—the famous Communist Manifesto begins with these words. This "specter" comprised a fairly clearly defined symbol of faith: a violent world revolution; abolition of private property and a commodity economy; elimination of parliamentary institutions and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat; the subsequent dying off of classes and the state, and so forth.

It is known that even Engels at the end of his life, in counterbalance to the delusions of his youth, asserted that a parliamentary republic is a specific form of power of the working class and substantiated the possibility of a peaceful, legislative path to the new society.

This is why at the end of the 19th century, in the worker movement there began to appear parties which called themselves not communist but social democratic. This is why in Russia the worker party itself was called social democratic. And now if we go to this party's first program we are surprised to discover how many ideas and practical points it contains to which we—consciously or unconsciously—are only now returning. These include the idea of a parliamentary republic, diverse forms of property, worker control, personal freedoms, and many other things.

But during the period between February and October of 1917, and particularly after the turning point in the Civil War, Lenin accomplished a reverse revolution. At his suggestion, in 1918 our party was renamed communist. That was the time of the infamous "big leap" to war communism, which placed the country on the verge of complete destruction and savagery. The elimination of the commodity economy, the virtual abolition of money, and mass repressions not only against entrepreneurs but also against the peasants who sold their own products, the semi-military dictatorship with local executions—in a word, the full set of attributes associated with the previous communist ideology.

But after the Civil War was over and hopes for a world revolution were crushed came a new—and most important—stage in the evolution of Lenin's views. And this time there was a decisive shift from communist illusions to socialism. During the first days of perestroyka in one of my articles I quoted Lenin as saying that "we have been forced to recognize a radical change in our entire view of socialism." After that assistants to eminent party figures began to call me frantically asking where I found that "important quotation." Yet it was right under their noses—in one of Lenin's last works: "On Cooperation." At that time Lenin returned to many other social democratic ideas as well: a mixed economy, cultural pluralism, private ownership of the land, and voluntary cooperatives modeled after what he had seen in Switzerland, England, and other countries of the West. Lenin had just begun to realize his new view on socialism but Stalin, or Providence itself, nipped this process in the bud.

Our Mistakes

Why am I bringing this up? Because these discussions are still timely today. For example, the question of the political system. On the eve of the 19th Party Conference two views of the paths to democratization came into conflict. The traditional one—to return to Lenin, to the 1924 USSR Constitution; and the one common to all mankind—to take advantage of world experience in parliamentarianism and municipal power (this was suggested by myself and other specialists). Initially they took the former rather than the latter path as a basis: Lenin's idea of the complete power of the soviets and the rejection of the separation of powers.

Yet in the division of powers along the horizontal—legislative, executive (president), and judiciary—and along the vertical—the national legislature, the republic power (if there are republics), and the municipality—lies the entire essence of representative democracy in the 20th century. Absolute power belongs only to the people, and it is distributed through elections among various institutions, which restrict one another and perform strictly specified functions.

Everyone knows what happened in our country. Every soviet, right down to the rayon, wants to become an absolute sovereign, not subordinate to anyone, and frequently it wants to be involved in everything as well. Even such a democrat as A.A. Sobchak ultimately gave up this kind of confusion as, incidentally, did G.Kh. Popov and S.B. Stankevich.

The problem now is not that the president has temporarily been given a large amount of authority. The problem is that the USSR Supreme Soviet is increasingly forfeiting its independence and is not correcting other authorities when they make mistakes, for example, in determining the budget or resolving ethnic conflicts. For a year now already the Committee for Interethnic Affairs of the Supreme Soviet has been working for the approval of the Law on Leaving and Entering the USSR, which was adopted at the first reading. But the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has not even brought it up for discussion since the government had doubts about it. Incidentally, it is good that the Cabinet of Ministers is located outside the Kremlin. But both the USSR Supreme Soviet and the president's staff should also be separated territorially, as is the case in all parliamentary republics.

I have always been against creating such a cumbersome and unworkable institution as the USSR Congress of People's Deputies (more than 2,000 deputies, according to the 1924 model). And now I am convinced: The less frequently it is convened until its term is over, the better. This institution has proved to be, on the one hand, like a semi-automated machine which approves any previously prepared decisions and, on the other, like a "hockey field" for inflaming passions throughout society. The more people there are in a political institution, the easier it is to manipulate them—this has been shown by the experience of all parliamentary states.

And so life itself has answered the question of which is preferable: socialist democracy or the kind that is common to all mankind. The soviets are developing in the direction of professional parliamentarianism, and they must finally make their choice, casting off nostalgia for the "blessed" twenties.

Or another most important problem has to do with private property. Consider again the words of the founder of socialist realism, Maxim Gorkiy: "We are socialists. This means that we are enemies of private property." Has this not become flesh and blood, has it not become the mentality of almost every person in our country?

Private property is a scarecrow which frightens even great political minds. It is as though it protects the interests of only a small group of millionaires. But that is frightening ignorance. Practically every person has private property—beginning with the child, who carries his books in his knapsack, and the worker, who has the right to a full return from his labor, to a pension, to insurance, to savings, and to his intellectual property—books, pictures, and musical works he has produced.

But the opposite idea still prevails in our country. Property, even that which is designated as private, is at the state's disposal as it was before. If the state wants to withdraw all the R50 [rubles] and R100 notes, it goes ahead and does it. If it wants to freeze deposits which are savings from many decades of labor—it freezes them. If tomorrow it wants to commandeer privately owned automobiles for some emergency purpose—it can do so. Nobody is upset—this is the norm; after all, it is for the state, for its great goals. Such an idea about property goes back to feudal times. We are all servants of the rulers.

The view that considers all mankind opposes this. What a person has earned belongs to himself. This is a key principle of private property. A society which denies this principle knows neither initiative, nor competition, nor guarantees of civil and political rights. It is another matter that socialism rejects the concentration of large amounts of property in the hands of a small group of people and provides, primarily by a progressive tax, for the redistribution of property in favor of the underprivileged and the poor, especially pensioners and the unemployed.

Halfway to Social Democratism

The program statement adopted at the 28th CPSU Congress, "Toward a Humane Democratic Socialism," does not even mention the word "communism." During the little more than three years since this congress, three pillars of state socialism have been rejected: total state property; one-party leadership; and the dominance of Marxist- Leninist ideology alone. But the struggle for practical implementation of these ideas has not only not ceased but, on the contrary, has gathered new force since perestroyka has touched on the interests both of the ruling elite and of many lower social strata which had found comfortable positions within the framework of the existing system. The stumbling and convulsions of the transition period are related to this.

Will the Communist Party survive? Experience has shown that this is not an idle question—above all, the experience of the Eastern European states, and then many republics in our country. The Communist Party can retain its position as one of the leading forces in the political process only if, in actions and not just in words, it renews its program, organizational structure, and forms of activity.

Conservative forces in society assume that they can survive and strengthen their influence by relying on force. This temptation actually does exist. More than 80 percent of the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet belong to the Communist Party and more than half of the members of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet do, and the situation is approximately the same in nine other republics. It would seem to be very simple: Rely on discipline, make it incumbent on all communists to vote for the accepted decisions—and everything will be all right.

But even now Communists are a minority in the soviets of a number of republics. But that is not the main thing. The main thing is the constant erosion of their spiritual influence in society. The party's authority and popularity are plunging downward. Therefore in the future it will be faced with a dilemma: either lose subsequent elections or abandon democracy and return to the old forms of authoritarian rule. The latter would lead to failure of the reforms, complete stagnation of economic development, and a subsequent decline in the standard of living of the population, and it would ultimately cast our country into the most remote backwoods of technological civilization—not only in comparison to Asia but also in comparison to Africa. This means that only renewal—and fundamental, radical renewal—of ideology and policy can produce the impetus for the party's development.

One of the participants in our three-way discussion whose opinion I deeply respect, S.S. Shatalin, expressed doubt that it was still possible to do anything within the party. And a couple of days after the publication of our article he withdrew from the party; true, it was because of the unfair pressure to which he was submitted at the last plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. As for myself, I like S.S. Alekseyev, think that it is necessary to exert further effort to transform the party, and I hope that this is still possible.

Of course, no one is forbidden to believe, like the Christians or Mohammedans, in some ultimate ideal which may or may not be realized in future centuries or millennia, when there will be neither state power, nor money, nor social groups, nor crime, when some new human beings appear who are lacking all the vices and weaknesses. But for now it is absolutely stupid to be guided by such ideals in politics. The communist belief in violence as a method of achieving this distant ideal is especially dangerous.

All this also explains our proposal—further advancement along the path to social democracy. This trend is different not only from communist ideology but also from national democratism, separatism, and certainly populism and anarchy. Of course, the social democratic idea, especially in the event of opposition in the higher echelons of the party hierarchy, could initially be supported by only a minority within the party and by some schools outside it. This does not contradict the CPSU Rules, which legalized various platforms and schools. This cannot be denied in spite of all G. Kryuchkov's indignation. I wish to affirm once again my opinion that this school does not lay claim to any power but only to ideological influence which would contribute to the renewal of the party itself and the entire spiritual climate in the country. **P.S. A couple of words about myself so that readers will not get the wrong impression about my biography. Apparently I was the one G. Kryuchkov had in mind when he wrote about the "inveterate apparatchik." I did indeed work in the CPSU apparatus from 1960 through February 1965. But it seems that I was the only person in the apparatus who seriously raised the question of leaving my post—chief of a subdepartment of one of the departments of the CPSU Central Committee—as a sign of protest against firing Khrushchev and returning to reaction. One can easily imagine that the situation at that time was altogether different from what it is now, when withdrawing from the party produces dividends in many cases. I decided on this, knowing the possible consequences, which were not slow in appearing. I would like to put G. Kryuchkov's mind at rest with respect to another matter as well. He is envious of the fact that I "stayed afloat the whole time." No, that is not true. Brezhnev did not forget the offenses to him, and on his initiative I was removed from three modest posts I held. The first time was in 1967 from the post of PRAVDA political observer, for publishing along with L. Karpinskiy an article against the leadership of culture; the second time was in 1972 from the post of deputy director of the Institute of Concrete Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences for attempting to investigate the real problems of society, which ran counter to "scientific communism"; and the third time was in 1975 from the post of sector chief in the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences for attempting to substantiate political science. I am far from complaining about my fate—many critically**

thinking people outside the party were in jail or emigrated. But a fact is still a fact. For 18 years I was in disfavor, many years without the right to go abroad or to publish my articles in the periodical press, and it was only after Brezhnev's death that I was able to return to journalism. And the last thing. About the tone and style of the publications of many of my former PRAVDA colleagues. How can one write such words about one's comrades—scholars and journalists: "upstart prophets," "inveterate apparatchiks," and "double dealers"? That is not nice, not nice at all, dear colleagues! But that is by the by...

Shatalin's Criticism of Officials Deplored

91UN1004A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Vladimir Bushin: "The Multidimensionality of an Academician" subtitled "How S.S. Shatalin Confirms the Ancient Piece of Wisdom: Style Is the Man"]

[Text] Academician S.S. Shatalin, "former member of the former Presidential Council," as he now calls himself, has recently delivered himself of a number of protests in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (twice), LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (twice) and ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, and on television. One of the articles in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA was an open letter to the country's president. The individual had already, one might have thought, had an opportunity to have drunk his fill of nectar. No, he burns with impatience to converse some more with the head of state and tell him at parting some things in public, in a multimillion edition. Why not, this is democracy. Who minds! The more so in that, aside from grounds of a general nature, the former MPC also has a profoundly personal reason, intimate even, it may be said, for a letter: There was a time, just a few months ago, when M.S. Gorbachev made on the scientist an "ineradicable impression," and the academician "loved him and considered him his comrade," but a breakup occurred, and the letter-writer confesses: "I am experiencing a human tragedy you cannot imagine."

The president will not, in all likelihood, respond publicly. Yet there is in the scientist's letter, as in the attendant articles, much that merits a response. It might, perhaps, be useful to bring this to the readers' notice.

But, first, a personal observation.

S.S. Shatalin is attempting to create for himself, as a critic of the president, some moral-psychological alibi, that is, to persuade the reader that his opinions and assessments are entirely unselfish and pure and dictated exclusively by the highest considerations. Inasmuch as my article might be seen as a not disinterested defense of the president, I would like to follow the academician's example and also attempt to create for myself some alibi. So, I have not received from the president a Gold Star, like some of my colleagues. He has not offered me a seat on the Presidential Council. I have not had the honor, at the president's pleasure, of going as ambassador to some cozy quiet country. I have not even had the good fortune, given the president's assistance, to have improved my housing conditions, as has been the case, to judge by a report in IZVESTIYA, with Vladimir Voynovich, once again a sort of colleague.... I will go further, at the last Russian Writers Congress last December I addressed critical words to M.S. Gorbachev, and one writer-hero immediately resolutely opposed me, and in the stenographic account of the congress my speech was not only not printed but not even mentioned. So now you may think what you wish, but I go my own way....

This will come as a surprise to many people, probably, but I would like to begin my thoughts on the recent publications of the economist with observations concerning his language and his ability to convey his idea to the reader, that is, concerning his literary style. Why? Because, first, the academician himself has plenty to say about culture and maintains that "we live outside of culture," but language and knowledge of one's native tongue is the first principle of the culture of both the individual and society.

Second, style is, indeed, the man. Readers of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA recently had an excellent reason for contemplation on this subject. I allude to the publication in the issue for 23 February under the general heading "Facing the People" of two almost simultaneous television interviews with B.N. Yeltsin and V.S. Pavlov. If we do not even go deeply into the meaning of what they said and merely scrutinize how they did this, clear images of two entirely different people arise before us even then.

The historian Roy Medvedev recently said about Yeltsin: "Boris Nikolayevich has already changed several times his political views and beliefs, if you can call them beliefs.... He was a most outstanding representative of the administrative command system and in Sverdlovsk and in Moscow he acted like a dictator. I am particularly disturbed by the fact that he delights in power and that, as first secretary of the capital's party committee, he took pleasure in humiliating people. This is a very dangerous trait in a person, for whom power becomes an end in itself. He will accept all beliefs for the sake of it.... I have been asked repeatedly whether I believe in Yeltsin. I have answered that I do not...."

All this is close to the truth, I believe. I cannot agree merely with R. Medvedev's claim that Yeltsin could appear to us tomorrow in the character of a Russian nationalist. This would be very difficult for a person whose name is flaunted on posters of the following sample: "Boris! Yegor was right. You are the gravedigger of Russia." And these posters are to be seen at mass meetings from Narva to Dubossary.

Certain features of the character sketched by the historian show through clearly in the stylistic singularities of Yeltsin's interview. We see primarily that most outstanding representative of the administrative command system, and he bears a brand for life, as it were, which shows through all the playful grimaces of liberalism and democracy. Yes, this is that same functionary who for about 30 years read from podiums speeches written for him by others—the Burlatskiys, Arbatovs, and Bovins—but when it becomes necessary to speak without notes, without prompting, his speech is slipshod, chaotic, prolix, and unintelligible even at times. He does not know how to construct a sentence and formulate an idea clearly. Just take a look: "I do not understand Prime Minister Pavlov's speech, that he said that we are making provision for less than what is being given by the Union government...." "If, indeed, this pressure from the viewpoint of the infringement of sovereignty is, consequently, thus exercised against us...." "They have now gradually begun by these actions, urging on the army by such an action against the peaceful population, the people have started in places to waver...."

The speech of V.S. Pavlov is something else entirely. It is composed and sensible. It is the speech of a man of deeds, and he has always done the work himself and has for this reason an excellent command of his material.

Much textual confirmation of these characterizations could be presented, but this would lead us too far away from the subject. We will, therefore, confine ourselves to just a few more examples. R. Medvedev spoke of B.N. Yeltsin's propensity for humiliating an opponent. This shows through here also. It is not easy, of course, to exercise such a propensity in front of the people, but the speaker finds an opportunity, nonetheless, and achieves his goal not only, what is more, by the direct meaning of what he says but by purely stylistic means also. Thus he mentions his opponents repeatedly—M.S. Gorbachev, N.I. Ryzhkov, V.S. Pavlov, V.A. Kryuchkov—but not once does he call them by their name and calls none "comrade." Pavlov spoke the other day and could, seemingly, have responded in the same way to, for example, such wording: "...for Pavlov and others to ride into the market on people's shoulders." But he could not bring himself to do so: He mentions the name of Yeltsin eight times and each time calls him comrade.

Much is seen also in how both leaders speak of their love for Russia. With Yeltsin these are slogans and declamations: "I believe in Russia. I call upon you, esteemed fellow citizens, esteemed people of Russia, to believe in our Russia. I have made my choice. And everyone should make his choice and determine his place. I want you to hear and understand me. I have made this choice. I will not turn aside from this road. I need belief and I believe in the support of the peoples of Russia..." and so forth. What choice the speaker was talking about here is not entirely clear. If it is the belief in Russia which has just dawned on him, it is odd hearing such an admission from a person in his seventh decade of life. As far, however, as the peoples of Russia, the Russian people included, are concerned, calling on them to believe in their motherland is even more odd.

Pavlov does not go in for such appeals and incantations. He speaks concretely and convincingly: "So what do we want? To create an army of unemployed artificially? Why would we want to do this? It (the explanation) should be given candidly: Yes, we wish to modernize our industry, and something has to be paid for this. Fine. We will have to pay in unemployment and will have to pay the German commander. Let him come and command. If we have come to this, let us also, then, candidly tell our people that we ourselves cannot keep house, we need a German manager. There have already been such things in the state of Russia. If we wish to go back, so be it. I, for one, personally disagree..."

Nothing other than the personalities emerge also behind the overall coloring of the interviews. With Yeltsin it is gloomy. Predominant in Pavlov, on the other hand, is a seriousness, and ultimately, moreover, despite all the seriousness, he finds an opportunity for an easy joke, for a smile: He says that his wife, a Ukrainian by nationality, "is most certainly, for that matter, not an enemy of the Russian people." It is impossible to imagine Yeltsin uttering such a joke. He jokes quite differently: "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA recently carried a cartoon: a mausoleum. Where it had 'Lenin,' '500 days' had been written, and a long line...." The lack of breeding and tactlessness of the staff of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, as also their none-too-high literacy, may partly be explained by their youth. But when sloppy gags are taken to the people by a political leader, he might be advised to switch to working for this newspaper.

In a word, literary style contains inexhaustible opportunities for getting to know a person. It is mainly for this reason that we turn to it now.

A notable feature of the style of the most recent publications of S.S. Shatalin would seem to be the saturation of the text with the names of most important figures from the most diverse spheres of human existence, past and present. Just in the one article "I Would Like To Justify Myself Before the People" there flash by in an unending string Christ and the Apostle Luke, Aristotle and Plato, Loyola and Torquemada, Hegel and Marx, Belinskiy and Nekrasov, Plekhanov and Kropotkin, Lenin and Stalin, Trotskiy and Martov, Raskolnikov and Shlyapnikov, Gorbachev and Polozkov, and again Christ and Talleyrand, Christ and Gilyarovskiy, Christ and Berdyayev, Christ and Yuriy Belov, secretary of the Leningrad City Party Committee.... There are mentions here of the Old Testament and the New Testament, "The Thousand and One Nights," and "A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich"....

Perhaps Shatalin should write this way in order that the reader might immediately be imbued with the consciousness that it is an academician who is speaking to him! But he, nonetheless, overdoes it somewhat, I believe, littering the text with quite unnecessary and even altogether inappropriate names, titles, and comparisons. [passage omitted]

Different features of style do not, as is known, exist in isolated pure form and, as a rule, interpenetrate one another and are interwoven. We see this in S.S. Shatalin's articles also. Thus his touching obsessive liking for a joke and a smile is frequently intertwined with just as obsessive a liking for resounding names, famous works of art and so forth. For example, he writes: "Why... was the '500 days' program rejected? A 'Thousand and One Nights' program would not have helped here...." This is very funny, let us suppose. But we go on to read: "Let us return at once to the '500 days.' If they are insufficient, we will add 'A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.'" M-mm.... This is no longer very funny.

Mention should be made also of the extreme peremptoriness and all-embracing nature of many of the academician's assertions. He pours forth: "We all greeted the April revolution with joy and hope." All? Churbanov? "Everyone who can is shamelessly deceiving us." To a man? "In 1987 it had all become clear." All absolutely?

It is useful to examine some such maxims a little closer. For example: "What in our country is called the Great October Socialist Revolution historians of the whole world call 'the adventure of Lenin and Trotskiy.'" Yes, at different ends of the earth there are such historians and philosophers, economists and legal scholars, Zbigniew Brzezinski in the United States, for example. But there are totally different ones also. The historian Yu. Afanasyev and the philosopher A. Tsipko, the economist G. Popov, and the legal scholar A. Sobchak. No one who feels like turning to their candidate's and doctoral theses and their articles and books written at the time of their cerebral heyday will find in them any "adventure" but will see the Great October Socialist Revolution as a logical consequence of the historical situation and movement of the people's masses. [passage omitted]

Yes, Academician Buffon was right, style is the man, and behind such a feature of the Shatalin style as the peremptoriness of his assertions and the maximalism of his demands, as behind others also, of course, the author's personality can be seen distinctly in all its extremity. Having put forward five conditions in his letter to the president, he demanded either their immediate fulfillment or "immediate resignation together with all (!) associates."

What is meant by immediate? The day of publication of the newspaper containing the letter, evidently. But the president, alas, did not listen to his recent adviser. What was to be done? The academician probably surmised that he had struck from the wrong flank. A few days later, it appears, he compiled the "Ouster of the Government Scientifically" program. He had now assembled not five but nine scientific points. And on this occasion he made a rush with them from the pages of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA at Premier V.S. Pavlov. "Swear an oath like the Hippocratic oath or depart tomorrow!" The premier might, perhaps, have sworn an oath to calm down the enraged sage, but the latter suddenly changed his mind and, having worked himself up to fever pitch, was clamoring at the end of the article not about tomorrow now but about today: "I am no longer calling on V. Pavlov to take the Hippocratic oath—he is not worthy of this (truly, what do Hippocrates and a partocrat have in common—V.B.). I am calling on him to tender his resignation to the president today." Today! Good heavens, how he frightens us!

But Pavlov decided that he was not Shatalin's housemaid that he should listen to such academic bawling, let alone abide by it, and has calmly continued to perform his arduous duties. But Shatalin will hardly rest content with this. Any moment now he will be hurling himself against someone once again. And I would not be surprised if tomorrow I read, in MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, say, above the academician's signature: "Yazov! Out of the ministry this instant!" He might then switch, perhaps, to telephone calls also: "Kryuchkov? You are still there? Kryuchkov, just you wait!" "Yanayev? In three hours, with your belongings!" Such is this individual, if not the cleverest, undoubtedly our most impetuous economist.

But Shatalin would not be true to himself and his style were he to confine himself to complaints and demands in respect of individual members of the government. No, he is prepared, of course, to brush away the whole government for he is certain that "Pavlov's action," that is, the exchange of banknotes, "has undermined the population's trust in the government completely (!)." In itself such profound certainty in our days of unbelief is very attractive, but the academician has no facts nor any proof. But V.S. Pavlov has the following interesting factlet: "Contrary to the forecasts of some economists (the cleverest included—V.B.), the exchange of the R50 and R100 notes has brought about not an outflow of deposits from the accounts but an unprecedented influx. In the eight days of January since the 23d some R5.3 billion entered the savings banks. This was unprecedented for the country. What could testify more convincingly to the population's confidence in the state's financial policy?" Indeed, over R5 billion in eight days is not bad! And, in addition, I have not made a deposit yet, but as soon as I receive my payment for this article, I will run to the savings bank the same day. Even if Academician Shatalin stands beneath my window day and night, poster in hand: "No Confidence in the Pavlov Government!"

But we have not yet said anything about the main element of any style—the language itself—although from the quotations and examples we have given the attentive reader will undoubtedly already have made some observations on this score. We have before us a scholar who is, alas, somewhat deaf to his native tongue. He writes in the letter to M.S. Gorbachev, for example: "Mikhail Sergeyevich, with your intellectual potential...." "You are an intelligent, normal person...." "You have long displayed indecisiveness...." "A politician should not allow people to feel sorry for him...." But this is not, after all, a treatise but an emotional discussion, so to speak, a confession, a final explanation, perhaps....

[passage omitted]He declares that Yu.D. Maslyukov and V.S. Pavlov are saboteurs and that the first, as chairman of the State Planning Committee, and the second, as minister of finance, flagrantly violated "all ukases" of the president, but the latter "did not send in airborne forces either to the State Planning Committee or the Ministry of Finance" (Shatalin's humor). Did Pavlov and Maslyukov really fail to fulfill "all ukases" of the president? The academician evidently meant that they had violated not ukases, of course, but some of Gorbachev's instructions and orders, verbal even, perhaps, but how can even this be believed if no proof is given-!((passage omitted))

Were I, like A.A. Sobchak, a legal scholar and deputy of the Supreme Soviet, I would unfailingly propose the insertion in our criminal code of an article in accordance with which such Shatalin words with all their irrational and operational splendors have to be learned by heart for the most serious crimes. There would, indeed, be nothing unusual here. Lev Tolstoy once proposed that writers who use words whose meaning they do not understand be thrashed with birch rods. He even determined the measure—100 blows per instance. A splendid idea!

At the start of the article we noted in passing that S.S. Shatalin was trying to create for himself, as a critic of the president and his policy, some political and moral-psychological alibi. We were alluding to a statement of the following kind: "I am not an 'apostate' leavened on the yeast of anticommunism and am not a dissident. I was born to a supercommunist family." We go on to learn that the academician's father, S.N. Shatalin, was secretary of the Kalinin Oblast Party Committee and that his uncle, "after the death of I.V. Stalin, held the office of secretary of the Central Committee." All very true, supercommunist relatives. But the academician says: "As an economist and mathematician, I think in terms of multidimensional space." So in the interests of multidimensionality it would be a good thing to specify that it was not only after the death of Stalin but during his lifetime also that the scientist's uncle, N.N. Shatalin, like his father, held very high and responsible positions in the party, up to and including Central Committee department chief.

S. Shatalin presents further confirmation of his ideological irreproachability: "I sat on the knee of M.F. Shkiryatov and G.M. Malenkov and knew V.M. Molotov, A.A. Andreyev, and N.M. Shvernik." Very interesting! But, to be frank, this argument cannot be deemed scientifically proper, for sitting on someone or other's knees by no means necessarily testifies in favor of intrinsic proximity to the possessors of the knees.

Recognizing, perhaps, the scientific groundlessness of the knee and seat argument, the author seeks new means for strengthening his position and reproachfully tells the president: "I learned the word 'plenum' before you." This is entirely possible. The following scene, say, would seem highly plausible. M.F. Shkiryatov transfers the future academician from his benumbed knee to the knee of G.M. Malenkov and says here: "The little devil has worn me out. Now to the right, now to the left. A real Shatalin. I am tired of him. Let him sit with you. Incidentally, Georgiy Maksimilianovich, what date have we set for the plenum?" Yes, the little Stasik could have learned this word before the little Misha. So what? It is far more important, in my opinion, that the little Misha learned far earlier than the little Stasik the word "combine." More precisely, not the word but the machine itself, and helped his father work on it.

Not an irreproachable alibi.

As if to supplement it, the academician would like to show also that he has in life seen all kinds of bitter and terrible things once again to a somewhat greater extent than his addressee and writes: "I at the age of nine I saw a gun under my father's pillow." It is, truly, once again very odd to hear from a scientist arguments of such a scientific level. I, for example, saw my father, a former tsarist officer, with a Browning even earlier, at the age of six, but it has never occurred to me to offer this as evidence of the harsh ordeals which allegedly befell me in childhood. Gorbachev might very well have seen a gun nowhere other than in the hands of a German soldier or officer (he was under an army of occupation for two years, after all), and in such cases a gun appears somewhat other than when it is under papa's pillow.

Continuing the story of his difficult career, S. Shatalin imparts: "There was the intention several times in the 'stagnation' years to expel me from the party, Communist Party, of course, for (further Shatalin humor—V.B.), as you probably recall, there was no multiparty system at that time." There should have been at least some hint here of the reason why it was intended to expel him. But we read: "Today I am a member of the CPSU Central Committee elected not in accordance with your list (but in accordance with whose? In accordance with the Voltairean list?—V.B.), although I am an avowed social democrat by conviction, which I honestly and publicly reported to my people."

And what did the people say in response to this public report of their academician? Perhaps it was at that time that the attempt to expel him from the party was made? If so, the attempt has to be seen as entirely justified for, indeed, what is a social democrat doing in the Communist Party? But there was a further oddity. A multiparty system emerged. A social democratic party appeared among others. It was natural to have expected that the "avowed social democrat" Shatalin would now leave the Communist Party and join his social democratic party. Or ("I myself know how to and like to create organizations") create his own. But no, something quite the opposite happened: From having been a member of the Communist Party rank and file he became one of its leaders—became a member of the Central Committee. How did this come about? Did the man ignore his own essential party for the sake of high office?

The academician sincerely confesses: "I truly long for power. Because I love my people. But without power nothing can be done for them." What if everyone thought like this! We would be crushing one another completely in the narrow corridors of power.

Academician Shatalin paints his thorny career with an austere Rembrandt brush. An impressive picture! But this is accompanied by very enigmatic statements and conduct. The scientist writes in his favorite categorical style, for example: "The deep-lying causes of all (!) our problems are obvious to anyone (!) who simply cares to think and who has retained if only a grain (!) of common sense." What, then, is the most important, first cause of all our problems? The answer: "Communist ideology, which has filled up all (!) the pores of our society."

It is understandable when such things are said by the chess player G. Kasparov, for example, who joined the party as soon as his age allowed and was not in it long. We could also understand, say, A. Sobchak, who joined the party, even if in his sixties, but, as one boards a streetcar, in order to get to the Leningrad City Soviet, where he got off. But Shatalin joined the party as a far more mature individual than Kasparov, at the age of 30, and has been in it 15 times longer than Sobchak. And was not leavened on the yeast of anticommunism. In addition, he made a brilliant party career and ascended to the party Olympus. However, he then further added to what we have already quoted: "I am against communism, against communist ideology." And this was issued above the signature "Stanislav Shatalin, member of the CPSU Central Committee."

And further even more strongly: "Communists are not creators, they are destroyers.... They cannot work constructively;... They cannot handle their duties the way that society needs." Heavens! If only he would spare, if not those on whose gentle knees he grew up, at least his own father and beloved uncle!

It might have seemed that, having had a rest and taken a breather, you would yourself be telling the multimillion-strong readers about your own ills. No! His own thing once again: "The party is now struggling to turn everything (!) toward the past." And, fancy that, he has proof of this all-embracingly reactionary conspiracy. Rather, just one argument. But what an argument! "Read the obituaries, the first signature is that of the general secretary, the second, Yanayev, the third, Ivashko, the fourth, Pavlov, the fifth, Lukyanov.... This is the end of perestroyka, good night!" Do you understand? This is not how obituaries should be signed! And this is infuriating the important scientist, the academician sees this as a dreadful banner of the times and sign of reactionary restorationism. I cannot help but recall here another academician, who, having one day discovered in a statistical digest that in 1987 there had been a certain drop in the number of suicides in our country, joyfully exclaimed: "See how successful our perestroyka is!" But the number of homicides and many other distressing indicators were of no interest to the scholar for some reason or other.

I see to my chagrin that Academician S. Shatalin simply cannot recover from the state of anticommunist shock and at a moment perhaps of a most acute attack of it proclaims with malicious hope about the party of whose Central Committee he is a member: "It is, to the public weal, collapsing." Surely the scientist understands that this is to some extent akin to a member of the holy synod of the Russian Orthodox Church calling during public prayers to the Almighty: "Shatter and reduce to ashes, oh Lord, all places of worship on our earth!"

Judging by his lucubrations in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, the question of his continuance in the party has with S. Shatalin undergone a certain evolution. Earlier there was no hint of his leaving. Now it is a different matter. He recalls the names of Yeltsin, Popov, Sobchak, who have quit the party, and says: "However, those whom the people consider moral, intelligent, and serious people, the core of their fatherland, have not left the party as yet." Well, this is right. The academician goes on to deliberate very interestingly. He cites the names of I.A. Karimov, first secretary of the Uzbek Central Committee, and N.A. Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Kazakh Central Committee, and says that these are people who are "educated and responsive and know how to cooperate and argue." The conclusion he draws from this is striking in its scientific profundity: "One could leave the party with people such as these...." Is that so! He did not want to form a team with Popov and Sobchak but with Karimov and Nazarbayev he would be pleased to do so with all his heart.

But to what end? "...To form a new party. If they agree, of course." Precisely. First, if they agree to leave the Communist Party. Second, if they agree to form a new party with Shatalin. Before tempting people before the whole wide world, it would do no harm to find out a thing or two.

With what derision S. Shatalin writes in the letter to the president about those he dislikes: "Your surrender in the face of the 'black colonels' Alksnis, Petrushenko, and Makashov simply astounds me.[no close quotes as published] I have never seen "black colonels," but who does not know blue academicians capable of becoming green or yellow or brown in a flash. Whatever!

Angered by the imaginary capitulation, the academician himself presents the ultimatum: "What needs to be done at once? Immediately form.... Immediately renounce.... Immediately leave...." Then he adds even: "It is necessary to cross the Rubicon and cast the die."

Such vigor, decisiveness, and pressure make an impression, of course, although it is not entirely clear why the die needs to be cast if the Rubicon is already crossed. But it is perfectly clear that tomorrow the two-party academician could with the same vigor put forward an entirely different ultimatum: "Immediately destroy.... Immediately take.... Immediately return.... And, what is most important, under no circumstances cross the Rubicon, even if the die calls for this!"

The academician urges the president: "You would be risking nothing, but would be overcoming in yourself some mystically suspicious attitude toward the democrats." Alas, there is nothing mystical here, but there are real facts of one and the same turncoat order from the life of the multidimensional democrats. And for this reason the risk is enormous.

Publication Defends Shatalin Views

PM0503172091 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 7, 17-24 Feb 91 p 6

[Aleksey Ulyukayev article: "Shatalin's Views All-Important for CPSU CC"]

[Text] How does one debate with the illiterate? They say one must debate. All right, but how? In what language? You tell them about the ellipsoid and the elliptic plane and they rebuff you with the three whales theory. Such are their principles. They are not to be forfeited, are they?

Economists often have to debate in this manner with representatives of the politically active populace of various self-styled denominations. The characteristic reproaches made to economists are as follows: "Didn't you try to advise us a year or two ago? It's you who are to blame for everything!" The fact that the advice was ignored, mocked and rejected, or distorted beyond all recognition when implemented, is nobody's concern any longer.

We keep going round and round, from tragedy to farce, from farce to tragedy. From time to time we change the position of our hands, though: sometimes behind our backs, sometimes ready for action.

The first attacks against Academician Stanislav Shatalin were relatively weak. An orthodox communist from Leningrad published six columns of abuse that did not even merit refutation.

Later the force of the attacks increased. A philosopher and Politburo member of the Russian CP Central Committee published an article entitled "Galbraith Against Shatalin". The tone was certainly quieter and more objective, in fact almost liberal. Poor Shatalin! To lose touch with his people so completely as to go overseas to discuss our economic reform! and to relish the approval he received there!

The outstanding American economist, however, has written lots of books, some of which have been translated into Russian as well. He's got a definite political stand that is liberal verging on social democratic. And above all, he has practical experience in regulating the U.S. economy as a civil servant. It so happens that his political position, practical experience and general ecnomic ideas (Galbraith's and Shatalin's special interests have never intersected so far) are all for rather than against Shatalin, naturally with a normal degree of variation accepted in any scientific discussion.

Also who asked Galbraith if he was for or against Shatalin? Witness the typical Soviet manner of speaking on behalf of all the working people, overseas professors, etc.

The analyst has not bothered to learn the details. In his article he alleges, for example, that the theory of convergence was proposed by Academician Sakharov. A bad mistake, esteemed colleague. Read Sakharov's "Memoirs" to learn under whose scientific and political influence he had come to understand the theory of convergence—created, you will note, by Jan Tinbergen, Walt Rostow, Pitirim Sorokin, and Kenneth Galbraith, of all people!

OK, the analyst might dislike the Academician (which is a widely- spread phenomenon) and criticize him in confused terms. But what followed his article was totally beyond comprehension! The joint Plenum of the CPSU (not the Russian CP!) Central Committee and Central Control Commission had convened to discuss current events and major issues of the party's activity and simply put politics and economics aside, along with the Baltics and the Gulf, to discuss and condemn the apostate Shatalin. Nothing in the world appeared more important than Shatalin's views, it seems.

Their resolution was as follows: "The Plenum of the CPSU CC hereby expresses its disagreement with recent pulications by Central Committee member Academician S.S. Shatalin. We regard his views expressed in the press as incompatible with his membership in the CPSU and especially the Central Committee."

Incidentally, I also "hereby express my disagreement" with Shatalin's Open Letter to Gorbachev. Or rather, I feel pained to read it, and sorry for Shatalin. As a professional, he ought to have defended his position instead of stooping to all those redundant generalities. The only way I can explain his letter is this: one is entitled to a nervous breakdown after working and trying so hard in vain. After so much shouting to no avail. After offering a helping hand and having his hand slapped.

Well, criticism is one thing, and reprisal another. Why did the Academician so infuriate his fellow CC members? What's wrong with his social democratic views? He never concealed them. If they were wrong, why did the CC elect him as a member?

Strangely enough, it always so happens that this party's worst enemies are Social Democrats. Before the war they were regarded as being even worse than the fascists, and invariably condemned as long as they struggled for power. Now there are clericals, all sorts of extremists, and downright violators of the Constitution—but they are all "compatible", as long as they keep clear of the social democatic heresy.

Which component is particularly offensive to the Communist ear—social or democratic? And what about "humane democratic socialism"? Is it of the Devil, too?

But perhaps ideology has nothing to do with it all? Perhaps the Academician is just "too clever"? He wants to show how educated he is!" This Chekhovian remark shows just how long-standing our distrust of human brilliance is.

Esteemed comrades and fellow citizens, don't shoot at economics professors. They work as well as they can (and we can't). Don't demand Marxist or anti-Marxist arithmetic from them if you don't want electric light bulbs to be added to oranges in our statistical reports, and never to have either.

Political and professional careers are two different things. A civilized society should distinguish between political persuasions (which are a strictly personal matter) and professional performance. The latter should be judged according to the principle of presumed innocence. Unless one's guilt has been proved, a conservative, liberal, communist, or social democrat must be tried according to the Law, not a party programme. If one is proved guilty of incompetence, one must be expelled from whatever job one holds, regardless of one's party allegiance.

Shall we live to hear this said in Russian: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it"?

Unfortunately not only former investigators and secret police agents—now self-appointed "freedom-fighters", "solictors for the working people" and members of the "salvation committees"—but also the people rightly regarding themselves as democrats often yield to the temptation to turn polemics into legal proceedings.

Protection of one's good name, the presumption of innocence, the principles of fair political play, and the guarantee of professional behavior are vital principles to be shared by all, left and right. Otherwise... As a nation, we know better than most what may happen otherwise. Although history is said to repeat itself as farce rather than tragedy, there are still ample opportunities for a farce to be elevated to the status of tragedy.

That is so because everything is extended to absurdity here. On the one hand, we have what Voinovich has defined as "anti-fascist demonstrations led by former SS Generals". On the other, academicians are still tried by the party court of justice.

Apostates and right-wing "deviators" were tried to exactly the same manner back in 1929. It would be wise to recall, however, what happened to the judges later. How many of them escaped the meat mincer they had put into operation so enthusiastically? Less than a quarter. An awesome percentage. Shouldn't we try and stop now if only to try and avoid such frightful statistics?

Polozkov 'Departyization' Concept Disputed

PM1303091191

[Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 March 1991 carries in its Union Edition on page 1 under the headline "Peace Be Upon You" an 800-word report by I. Ovchinnikova followed by a 350-word postscript.

The report describes a statement signed by ten public figures including I. Melnikov (CPSU), Yu. Chernichenko (Russian Peasants' Party), V. Zyukin (Komsomol) [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League], and MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI observer L. Karpinskiy, appealing for the politicization of children's organizations not to be permitted since "there is no mistake more fatal than 'attempting to divide children and set them against one another in opposing party children's organizations and national and political organizations fighting among themselves.'"

Ovchinnikova's postscript reads as follows: "I had no time to subscribe to this remarkable wish [reference to headline] or to rejoice at the unanimity reached by various political forces on such an important issue before an issue of PRAVDA was published carrying a report by I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee, which says: 'Yesterday the RSFSR Communist Party Central Control Commission expelled from the CPSU S.N. Smirnov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Young People's Affairs, for actions incompatible with the CPSU Statutes. It was he who initiated the decision "On the Departyization of RSFSR Educational Establishments."'

"Why does I.K. Polozkov think that people are referring to the CPSU alone when speaking about departyization? Nothing of the sort. They simply realize that if they coexist by no means peacefully with a dozen parties in schools, they will inevitably put children in various corners of the political ring. I. Melnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, clearly realized the inadmissibility of this. He obviously has extremely different views from I.K. Polozkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. This is ultimately their own affair. But too much in each of our lives depends on whom—not on paper, not in offices, but in kindergarten groups, school classes, and VUZ [higher educational establishment] lecture theaters—the people teaching, raising, and bringing up our children follow. Will they really follow the call of those who want the world divided into ours and theirs for them? So that another generation is overtaken by the art of hatred? Can we, fathers, mothers, grandmothers, and grandfathers not say once and for all: No, we don't want that and we won't allow it."

Hard-Line Dangers Threaten 'New Thinking'

PM2702124991 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 6, 10-17 Feb 91 p 3

[Andrey Lipskiy article: "'New Thinking' at an End. What Next?"]

[Text] The prevailing theme in the Soviet press on perspectives for the policy of "new thinking" after the Lithuanian crackdown was the world community's criticism of the Soviet leadership's application of power. For us that might mean a cooling of the West's "passion" for Gorbachev and his perestroyka and reluctance to continue to support the reform financially.

However, another question appears to be more important: do the political forces currently in power in the Soviet Union really need the new thinking? If not, what are their chances of gaining nationwide support to revise that policy?

From the very beginning the policy of new thinking was meant to win over world opinion to give powerful backing to perestroyka in the international arena. Meanwhile, perestroyka in its first stage was viewed by its initiators as a "reform from above" aimed at renovating the country's political, economic and social systems. To this effect is was necessary to curb the arms race which had completely exhausted the Soviet economy, to give up confrontation with the West and China, to rebuff the Brezhnev doctrine and paternalism in relations with East European allies, to put an end to the Afghan war, to stop supporting "progressive" dictatorships in the Third World and to create favourable conditions in order to concentrate on domestic problems. This kind of new thinking suited almost everybody, except perhaps die-hard Marxist fundamentalists who still upheld the supremacy of class-oriented values over common- held human values.

Up until the end of 1989 the impression was that the policy of new thinking enjoyed nationwide support in the Soviet Union. Against the backdrop of the aggravating political struggle over the ways of reforming Soviet society, worsening inter-ethnic relations and deepening confrontation between central authorities and the Republics, Soviet foreign policy seemed the only "islet" of national concord.

However, the first signs of a rift on foreign policy issues soon started to appear. Outspoken criticisms of the new thinking were first voiced at the Communist Party's February 1990 Plenary Meeting and were gaining momentum. They culminated in attacks from the Soyuz parliamentary faction against former Foreign Minister Shevardnadze for his policies on the eve of the Gulf war. They lashed out at him for "excessive concessions to the West" in the field of disarmament, for encouraging the collapse of the "socialist community" in Eastern Europe, for "trading socialism" in the Soviet Union for Western economic aid, for the unification of Germany and its entering NATO, for the "betrayal" of the international communist movement and the "anti-imperialist struggle" of developing nations. The same political quarters became more and more insistent in publicly displaying their concern over the "dismantling of socialism" and the "disintegration of the Union", "the gutter press orgy" and the restoration of "capitalist" institutions.

The timing of attacks on domestic and foreign policies was not accidental. Expanding relations with the West within the new thinking helped promote these values and dismantle the old system.

In the current political situation, there is an imminent threat that the policy of new thinking may be reviewed. The conservative and reactionary forces now under the President's patronage (or perhaps vice versa) are not interested in preserving former foreign policy to the same extent - this contradicts their aspirations - to keep the old system intact at any price, apart from minor alterations. What practical steps could they take to carry through their intentions? They could:
- display greater restraint on disarmament issues;
- render political support to former "anti-imperialist" allies in the Third World;
- impose certain restrictions on contacts with abroad (not by way of bans and prohibitions, but by all sorts of economic and administrative measures);
- revive the feeling of "external threat" so as to encourage a defensive mentality and "discipline" society.

This idea of political isolationism appears to be an alternative to the former expansionist policy for which we have neither the strength nor means, as well as to the current foreign policy line towards integration into the world and European communities. Unfortunately this may find support among certain sections of Soviet society - from advocates of a "special course" for Russia to the ordinary people sick and tired of endless queues and angry about the leaders' trips abroad.

A policy like this will undoubtedly lessen our chances for economic recovery and could seriously damage our security, which can be effectively secured only by creating mutual trust and openness and by strictly observing the norms of civilized behaviour both at home and abroad.

Plutnik Laments Resurgence of Old Thinking

PM2002174491 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Feb 91 Union Edition p 1

[Albert Plutnik article under "Political Diary" rubric: "For the Old Thinking Again?"]

[Text] I feel as if I have already read it somewhere. And not just once, I feel. But the issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is a fairly recent one. Could it be plagiarism?

A once prominent military commander puts to rout a television program about the Great Patriotic War, its tone, in his opinion, was permeated with hostility toward those who fell on the battlefield. As it happened, I saw the program. And there is no way I can share the author's categorical opinion that a conversation which the journalist had with a well-known military historian really contained any sacrilege of this sort. But even more than the words I have cited above, I was struck by the general's subsequent musings, and by this generalization: "Unfortunately, these are not isolated attacks but a systematic campaign to belittle our Victory... Who is directing it? I am unable to give an unequivocal answer, but the persistence, consistency, and coordination of these subversions of the truth is obvious."

And so there is "consistency and coordination." The author is undoubtedly right about one thing, namely that such examples really do exist—a disrespectful attitude toward the history of our state, in particular the history of the bloodiest of wars. True, a desire to shed light on the essence of problems with the current permitted level of openness is sometimes mistaken for such an attitude. But if we are talking about a real disrespect for the past, about those who are inclined to show this disrespect, then... Ultimately there are plenty of ignoramuses, simpletons, and frankly dim-witted people. Some make an honest mistake, some judge without essential information. In a word, everyone has his own reason. In any case, the suggestion that all these people are bound together by a unity of purpose, almost as though they are part of a plot being directed from some "center," looks highly unlikely.

And so where is the plagiarism? Not in words—in the train of thought: Everyone who does not think like me is not only wrong—this goes without saying—but is also perfidious, and pursuing some evil design...

Remember how at the start of perestroyka it was stated repeatedly and endlessly in the pages of various publications, in speeches by leaders of all ranks, and at what seemed like every gathering and meeting, how important it is for society to resolve one problem—to finally overcome stereotyped ways of thinking, to get rid of dogma, to cast aside ideological cliches, to master the arithmetic and algebra of the new thinking. At one time it seemed that everyone had already realized: You cannot build a new life by thinking in the old way. Only liberated, emancipated thought is capable of resolving such an extremely complex problem for us as that of filling store counters with goods and food and breathing life into our plans that are now on paper. Alas, a great many facts of social life persuade us today that the break with the past has not succeeded.

The political situation has only to become more complicated, society has only to be faced once more with the need to make a choice between economic changes, and at once, wishing to convince the people of their absolute rectitude, many functionaries, politicians, economic managers, ideologists, and journalists, both party and nonparty, immediately return in thought to what I should say is the rich habit of verbal and intellectual stereotypes. At a critical moment it turns out, for example, that yet again the latest plot, on a global scale, is taking place against our social structure, this time planned by the imperialist captains of finance. And that it was only successfully foiled at the last moment thanks to the perceptiveness of our new government. On another occasion our eyes were opened just as abruptly to the fact that the opposition in our parliament subsists and operates on CIA money and thus serves, naturally, not so much the interests of its own people but those of Western secret services. Cliche number two, cliche number three... it is like the 12 commandments of the builder of communism, but brought up to date... If things are not working out very well on the economic front, then it is almost exclusively because we are not permitted to develop at full power, we are prevented from doing so by enemies within and without, who by means of economic sabotage and immense financial swindles are helping us to suffocate in chaos and confusion. It would even seem that last year's unprecedented harvest was provoked by foreign secret services with the exclusive aim of making a worldwide laughingstock of our theorists and practicians of socialist building.

And what triumph of the new thinking can we speak of if political labels such as "saboteurs" and "conspirators" begin to appear again, if menacing reproaches for antiparty attitudes are revived once more. And in multiparty conditions it is not so easy to understand why, for instance, a man should profess the views of another party more than those of his own.

Some of us are relentlessly tormented in our souls by the image of the enemy, as in former times. The enemy who cannot be caught, cannot be uncovered, cannot be made answerable. There is such a strong desire at all costs to find the object of class hatred and to obliterate it in fury and anger. Many people are drawn to the old ways almost as irresistibly as people are drawn to their homeland when they have been away for a long time. A "fatal attraction," as it says in one classic. So can the fatal period which we thought we had left far behind also be irresistibly attractive? It is still thought that mankind says goodbye to the past with a laugh. But we at least do not feel like laughing. Threats are coming in from all sides. Some, as we have heard, have emerged from their trenches and gone into a resolute attack, others, in a "noble fury," sometimes go as far as to call for physical reprisals against those "who are not with them." Indeed, reason and sobriety desert us most often at the precise moment when we need them most.

The return of the vocabulary of the period of "aggravation of class struggle" is an extremely noteworthy phenomenon. But nevertheless the matter is not only and not even mainly to do with words. Rather with the fact that, by using such language and constantly citing certain universal reasons like CIA intrigues for the origin of our social confusion, economic troubles, and political dead ends, we do not get a step nearer to the truth. On the contrary, we are constantly moving away from it. Herein lies, in my opinion, the perfidy of ideological cliches which make it possible to give a standard answer to absolutely nonstandard questions arising in completely new realities. By saying, for example, that saboteurs are to blame for the economic collapse, like it or not we fall into political oversimplification, we make a diagnosis without analyzing the course of the illness, substituting the old abuse for an analysis of the latest social conflicts.

The new thinking urgently requires new approaches from politicians and economic managers, an ability to give a detailed interpretation in the new historical circumstances of every situation in all its complexities and contradictions. We should think our way toward understanding, not remembering. For the old thinking relied more on ideological precepts set in tablets of stone. It therefore gave birth to such an abundance of all sorts of cliches and labels that it sought to give a ready answer to all of life's situations. So can it really be that we favor the old way again?

In several years of perestroyka trust in the stereotypes has nevertheless been substantially undermined, thank God. Much of what was perceived with absolute uniformity and greeted with unanimity in the years of bygone dictatorship is nowadays interpreted by different people in completely different ways. I daresay, for example, that if today somebody takes it into his head to call a principled supporter of an unofficial viewpoint an enemy of the people, this is not likely to meet with enthusiastic and universal support among the people. Times have changed. And what used to work unerringly in the era of the Iron Curtain is no longer suitable for our present reality. In particular because this generation knows from personal experience what is happening there, in the "corrupt West." It knows that it is by no means populated by soulless slaves of capital and business sharks. It became convinced of this in the days and years following Chernobyl and the terrible weeks after the Armenian earthquake. At these times foreign citizens from the various countries and cities infected by capitalist "gold fever" became alarmed at our food situation and organized a stream of parcels of kindness and compassion. No, we are not living within a hostile blockade...

So recreating the image of an enemy only benefits, I think, those who wish to restore a bygone order and offload their own mistakes on someone else in passing.

Komsomol on Role in Time of 'Bitter Conflict'

PM2002164191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 91 p 1

[Unattributed report: "All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] The Fourth All-Union Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee Plenum was held 15 February. It discussed the questions "On the Current Period" and "On the Mechanism Developed at Komsomol Central Committee Level for the Collective Administration of Property." V. Zyukin, first secretary of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee, and V. Kopyev, second secretary of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee, addressed the plenum.

For the main part the discussions revolved around the Komsomol's political line in the conditions of bitter conflict among various political forces and the country's sharply deteriorating economic situation. The majority of Central Committee members see the Komsomol as a left-wing organization with a wide spectrum of political beliefs and one main function—to defend young people's social interests and rights.

A number of organizational questions were also discussed at the plenum.

V. Zyukin's speech, the plenum resolutions, and a summary of the speeches will be published in future editions of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

Leader on Political Debates

PM2102092191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Feb 91 p 2

[Unattributed report on 15 February All-Union Komsomol Central Committee plenum: "Moving to the Left to Avoid the Right...—From a Speech by Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary V. Zyukov"]

On the Situation in Society and the Position of the All-Union Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League]

It is no secret that the tragic events recently taken place in the Baltic republics, the changing disposition of political forces, and a number of decisions by the higher organs of power are provoking conflicting reactions among the younger generation. The notion that perestroyka is in retreat, that it is crumbling, that there has been a deviation from the chosen path toward democracy and glasnost, and that a dictatorship is being established is gaining increasing prominence. Criticism of perestroyka ideas resounds from various sides. At the founding conference of the "Democratic Congress" in Kharkov the need was announced to peacefully liquidate the totalitarian regime and remove the CPSU from power, possibly through civil disobedience. The resolutions of opposing political forces repeatedly voice demands for M.S. Gorbachev's resignation. Admittedly for a variety of reasons. Whereas the "Democratic Congress" accuses him of violating human rights and establishing a harsh dictatorship, a plenum "Unity—For Leninism and Communist Ideals" organization's political executive committee, led by Nina Andreyeva, demands his expulsion from the CPSU for causing the degeneration of the CPSU, the dismantling of socialism, and the collapse of the state and the international communist movement.

In short, the current political map is so contradictory that it is relatively easy to delude oneself that by moving to the left one can avoid right-wing influences.

The All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Bureau's attitude to recent events is absolutely clear. Let me remind you that, after the third plenum, the Bureau, exercising the Central Committee's political mandate, expressed its view on three of the day's most burning issues—the reform of power in the country, the Union Treaty, and the events in Lithuania. Our position is not a copy of somebody else's view. The crux of the Central Committee Bureau's recent announcements is this: We are completely in favor of preserving the Union's integrity, but through democratic methods and on a new basis. We declared the use of force to resolve political questions unacceptable, condemning at the same time the discrimination against people on grounds of party or national preference which is prevalent in a number of republics today. The need to reform power, but not through the overthrow of democratic processes, was supported. In its statements, the Bureau appealed to political leaders to show reason and patience and not to push their own ambitions to the fore.

We believe the current political situation demands that the Central Committee plenum define its viewpoint on eight questions.

First—The Referendum

The need for a referendum is not questioned, but the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Bureau considers that a number of additional measures should accompany this move. Above all, the wording of some of the Supreme Soviet's resolutions on the referendum is not easily understood. The linkage between the possible results of the referendum and the clause in the Law "On the Procedure for Resolving Questions Concerning a Union Republic's Secession from the USSR" is unclear.

A number of republics have already announced that they will not participate in the referendum. The All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Bureau believes it would be expedient to appeal to the Federation Council and the Supreme Soviet on behalf of the plenum for an urgent discussion on the differences of opinion which have arisen.

Second—The War in the Persian Gulf

The war in the Persian Gulf is going on a stone's throw from our borders. We have no right not to react to the daily slaughter of people who are not answerable for the actions of their political leaders. That aside, the political and ecological consequences of "desert storm" may be simply catastrophic. The USSR President's recent announcement, which the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Bureau is likely to support, contains a range of urgent measures for continuing the search for ways of settling the conflict. Together with this, the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Bureau implores the USSR Supreme Soviet to exploit every political means to bring about the cessation of military actions.

Third—Whose Side Are We On?

Recently we have come up against another factor that previously seemed inconsequential. The process of political polarization in our country is progressing rapidly.

On the one hand we have moved away from the rigidity of the CPSU, declaring ourselves at recent plenums to be an organization with a clear position. On the other hand the country is witnessing the active formation of a bloc of political forces officially proclaiming itself the opposition to the Communist Party.

All political forces have begun appealing directly to the young, courting them from all sides. In this situation, increasing demands are being made for the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee to give a simple answer to the question: "Whose side are you on?"

Emotional calls for demarcation can also be heard within our organization.

The authors of suggestions of a split in the All-Union Komsomol, even if their intentions are absolutely clear, can nevertheless barely imagine the consequences of this step. And sometimes it is necessary to speak openly about this too, because at the bottom of such suggestions, as Sergey Zalygin wrote, lies the ambition of "somebody yearning to become chairman of an all-union force." Would that the matter were merely one of various group interests! The problem is far deeper. A split today, that is the actual liquidation of an influential youth political force, would have unforeseen social consequences—organizations would emerge to fight one another on the political front and willy-nilly drag the young into this confrontation. It has to be clearly understood that we must not think of ourselves but of those who have yet to form opinions and who are still learning to value their own life and that of others. To "brush aside" splinter groups and divisions based on political and nationalist motives today will ensure a meeting at the barricades tomorrow. Don't worry about how best to serve those calling on the young to get out onto the squares and effect a "velvet" revolution. The present-day All-Union Komsomol Central Committee feels its responsibility in this, having followed the will of the 21st Congress and chosen the path of patience, internal pluralism, and guaranteed stability for the young.

If the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee members support this approach, then today the plenum could once again confirm its principled position: that the young must no longer be used as small change in adult political games. All parties and movements should win young people over not through appeals to get out onto the squares, which could easily become barricades, but through programs, beliefs, and practical actions in parliaments designed to attract the younger generation.

Nonpublication of Human Rights Documents Decried

PM1103084591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 91 Union Edition p 2

[Article by Candidate of Legal Sciences T. Moskalkova: "Secret Rights Remain Secret"]

[Text] Three months ago the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee examined one of the most critical questions concerning our life: the practice which prevails in the country of allowing the application of unpublished normative acts on the rights, freedoms, and duties of citizens.

The information heard at that time was really discouraging: 70 percent of legal acts concerning the rights and freedoms of citizens are to some extent restricted in nature, that is to say, bear the seal "secret," "for official use," "not for publication," and so forth. It turns out that while, on the one hand, the state bestows certain rights on its citizens and establishes their responsibilities and duties—sometimes pretty severe ones—it forbids, on the other hand, that they be openly and officially known. Such a situation is flagrantly at variance with the norms of international acts signed by our state—the Final Document of the Vienna meeting, the document of the Copenhagen Conference on the Human Dimension, and the Paris Charter for a New Europe—which enshrined a person's right to know his rights. For many years, therefore, conditions have been created for arbitrary, unlawful, and uncontrolled restriction of citizens' rights and freedoms.

Consequently the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee enjoined state organs to publish within three months normative acts affecting citizens' rights, freedoms, and duties which had not previously been published owing to a restricted-use seal.

The deadline expired on 1 March. But, strange as it may seem, not a single normative act has in fact appeared in the public press. What is behind this? Is it habitual failure to execute laws and disregard of them no longer just by citizens but by the supreme organs of state and executive power, deliberate sabotage? IZVESTIYA was right when it maintained soon after the committee's conclusions were adopted that the public did not fuly comprehend that this constitutional oversight of ours threatened a million-headed dragon of huge girth...

Another important factor is tied up with the expiry of the three-month deadline. "Acts which are not published by the expiry of the deadline become inoperative," the committee said in its conclusion. If they infringe human rights and freedoms, very well. They have become inoperative, and that's a good thing. But there are, after all, quite a number of such acts which bestow rights and benefits on citizens. For example, on questions connected with the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station, with compensation for people unlawfully convicted during the years of Stalin's repressions, with the establishment of awards and benefits for internationalist servicemen, and so forth. It would be fundamentally wrong to stop the operation of these normative acts. Mindful of this situation, the USSR Oversight Committee adopted a decision that these legal documents do not lose their force. However, this has not been conveyed in the public press.

The committee clearly needs to respond quickly to the prevailing situation, demanding the execution of its decisions on this question, or publish the appropriate normative acts on its own authority.

Popularizing of Lenin's Legacy Discussed

PM0603142591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 91 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Deliver the Truth About Lenin"]

[Text] There was a meeting 28 February at the V.I. Lenin Central Museum between A.S. Dzasokhov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and a large group of leaders and staffers of museums, branches, and memorial centers bearing the leader's name. The geographical spread was wide—Leningrad, the Ukraine, Siberia, Central Asia, Far East. The meeting focused on topical questions of the popularization of knowledge about Lenin and also preparation for and celebration of the 121st anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth in today's complex political conditions.

In his introductory speech A.S. Dzasokhov paid special attention to the increasing significance of the Leninist principles of internationalism, people's power, and democracy in terms of the practical implementation of the program for building a free, flourishing, rule-of law, socialist-choice society.

At a time when criticism of Leninism sometimes turns into malicious attacks and when people are all but forcing the younger generation to abandon Lenin it is important to bring everyone the truth about the deeds and the image of the founder and leader of the Soviet state.

It is a feature of the current movement in defense of Lenin's ideological legacy that it is developing more than ever before, figuratively speaking, "from the bottom up," coming from labor collectives, from individual citizens, not only Communists but nonparty people too, and from representatives of all generations.

A.S. Dzasokhov stressed that Lenin's views on the theory and practice of socialist building are reflected in the party's activities in tackling specific tasks to extricate the country from the crisis.

Soviet People Not Used to 'Living by Law'

91UN0899B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 6, 13 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by Andrey Sebenstov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation: "'We Have Not Lived by Law Yet'"]

[Text] Two aspects of the Law on the Press have become apparent since it was adopted. One is the active aspect that has made it possible for journalists to consolidate some positions, codify their status, acquire a more or less firm position—as much as possible under the current, not quite stable circumstances—and maintain it. Of course, being a reader, I am not exposed to problems that arise inside editorial boards. I do not know how difficult it is for them to express definite points of view. However, it is obvious that all publications have their own identities setting them apart from others, and that these identities are sometimes exactly opposed as, for example, are those of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, which absolutely disagree in their assessments and approaches to political leaders and organs of power.

In essence, this law has not worked with regard to the more significant mass media such as television and radio, in particular, the provisions envisaged by the law with regard to programming. They immediately provoked a sharp response by interested individuals. They simultaneously submitted a draft law on radio and television of, putting it mildly, utterly yesteryear's provenance right away, at the time the Law on the Press was being adopted. A decree of the USSR president on these mass media followed soon and, as a consequence of it, the things that Kravchenko does at present. This is not compatible in any way with the Law on the Press.

At present, an overall change of course from democracy and pluralism to a different interpretation of the development of our situation is under way. This is why I understand well those who find the Law on the Press with its quite democratic content unpleasant. As far as events associated with the Baltic republics are concerned, the Law on the Press itself is not really to blame. First, as I have already noted, it has never worked on TV. Second, it is quite harsh. Actually, anything at all may be dealt with within the framework of the law: It has grounds for both punishing the people and closing some organs. All of this may be done, but to this end you have to stay within the framework of the law rather than the framework of the law of force. We just plain cannot get it through our heads that we must work within the framework of the law!

Hence the remark that the president made regarding the suspension of the Law on the Press. We should give its due to the Supreme Soviet and note that it approached the situation in a more balanced manner and did not endorse the proposal of the president to suspend the effect of the law.

However, the proposal to set up a commission within the Supreme Soviet to monitor the objectivity of the points of view does not make sense. It is absurd to make all newspapers publish all points of view. Besides, it indeed runs counter to the Law on the Press that states that nobody may make an editorial board publish an article it has rejected. There are clearly defined cases when a newspaper should publish a particular response or a refutation based on a court ruling....

I will repeat once again that the conclusion is simple: Our people are not used to living by the law. The president is not used to it, no one is...

Institute's Call To Send Troops to Gulf Hit

PM2702141791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 22 Feb 91 First Edition p 5

[V. Tiksin article: "Greek Gifts: Artful Advice to Legislators"]

[Text] How to help Washingtom bomb the Iraqis back into the stone age and immediately state our readiness to take part in military operations against Iraq on the side of the United States and its allies? "Fully" restore diplomatic relations with Israel, offering it "Soviet guarantees of security." And, finally, warn the PLO about the unacceptability of "developing Palestinians' terrorist activity," that is to say, the struggle for their freedoms and rights. What's your opinion: Who is making these recommendations to the Soviet Union? The U.S. hawks from the Pentagon? The Israeli "ultras," dreaming of ending the intifadah? I bet you won't guess. I am citing the basic conclusions of the "analytical" paper "The Present State of Soviet-American Relations," sent to the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet by the Academy of Sciences Institute of the United States of America and Canada. An institute which, as people know, is headed by that outstanding exponent of "new thinking," Academician Georgiy Arbatov. The document is signed by his deputy, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Prof. V.A. Kremenyuk, but it is permeated with the "planetary" ideas and "panhuman" approaches of Georgiy Arkadyevich himself.

Many of our academicians and professors feel mortally offended and fulminate against the "conservatives" when they are accused of neglecting state interests and directly aiding and abetting those bent on completely undermining the Soviet Union's prestige and embroiling it in bloody adventures. But how else can you assess the—to put it mildly—highly disreputable advice offered parliamentarians by this apparently reputable scientific collective?

Fortunately, not all Soviet scientists obligingly kowtow to the emerging U.S. hegemony in the Near East and indeed throughout the world. In his television address on 19 February Academician Ye.M. Primakov, special representative of the USSR President, convincingly showed that Washington's position regarding the conflict in the Near East is far from irreproachable and is even harsh, while Iraq's peace proposals, despite the "conditions attached," are completely sincere in character. Alas, his voice is drowned in the powerful chorus of imprecations against the "despot" Husayn, a chorus accompanied by the noisy orchestra of the Institute of the United States and Canada...

On reading the Arbatov collective's "analysis" you marvel at how clearly the pro-American and pro-Israeli feelings stand out in it without the slightest attempt made to retain even a semblance of "objectivity." In actual fact, according to the logic of our "researchers, it turns out that "certain Soviet mass media" must not show "pro-Iraqi sympathies" because that could cause—god forbid!—displeasure in Washington. You must in no event reproach the Americans with "the way they are conducting the war in the Gulf." But it is perfectly acceptable on the other hand to criticize the Soviet Union for using military force in the Baltic.

The "analysts" from the U.S. and Canada Institute do of course appreciate that the Soviet Union's direct involvement in the military conflict against Iraq will not evoke any enthusiasm among Soviet people but rather the contrary. And they have prepared well-considered remedies against mass protests and the tears of mothers at the graves of their sons who died for the "planetary" interests of American imperialism: "As far as the Soviet public is concerned, it could react to this (our troops' involvement in the war against Iraq is meant—V.T.) positively provided that **appropriate objective information and preparation** is available. It will also clearly be easier (!?) for the Soviet Army to carry out **accordingly a justified order** to defend the international interests of the USSR (more accurately, the interests of the United States and its stooges—the feudal lords of the Near East—V.T.) than an instruction to suppress internal civil opposition" (page 8).

Yes, a "democratic" press does indeed know how to "objectively inform" and "prepare" public opinion, but it will scarcely be possible to "justify" a l'americaine to our officers and men an order for the mass murder of Iraqi women and children—here the Arbatovs and Kremenyuks manifestly overestimate their powers. Let alone the cynical lie about "suppressing internal civil opposition"—even self-respecting Western politicians and scientists of a conservative persuasion try to avoid resorting to that. Incidentally, the well-known political expert Z. Brzezinski has no qualms about demonstrating his open contempt for the Soviet "researchers" in Academician Arbatov's entourage and for Arbatov in person. The Americans do not reward those who suck up to them in an attempt to curry favor. How else but servile can you describe the main conclusion of the U.S. and Canada Institute theoreticians, recommending commitment to "a Soviet policy course in the Gulf zone entirely in tune with the Western and American position" (p. 4). Otherwise, they warn the Supreme Soviet, there will be no Western favor or aid to be seen. As if the meager crumbs which our country received recently and which have now ceased altogether could create the impression that they are ready to help us in earnest!

I would like to use this opportunity to congratulate B.N. Yeltsin, whose closest consultant Academician Arbatov recently became, on acquiring a very valuable specialist. This specialist has, as people will know, given his "valuable advice" on many questions to our leaders, from Khrushchev on.

I would like to draw attention to the timing of the Arbatov collective's recommendations to the Supreme Soviet. The USSR President has, as is well known, launched a major peace initiative designed to achieve a political settlement of the conflict surrounding Kuwait. Demands to immediately end the war and the destruction of the Iraqi people are spreading in every country in the world and are supported by sensible politicians of different persuasions. This is being facilitated by the USSR Supreme Soviet's steps. But the intellectuals from the U.S. and Canada Institute, who love to expatiate on their "humanity" and "respect for human rights," are urging that Iraq be threatened with yet another military cudgel, a Soviet one this time!

No one, of course, is entitled to reproach the institute leaders for holding a viewpoint distinct from the official one—in the final analysis everyone is entitled to uphold their convictions and personal predilections; that is what pluralism is all about, as it were. But when those personal predilections oust elementary objectivity and become the official position of a state institution, it is natural to ask whether we are entitled at this very grave time to waste the people's valuable money on such an apology for "progressive science"? Is it not better to turn to U.S. experience? There scientific institutions in the public sector, in receipt of state grants, will never work in the interests of another country—the USSR or China, say.

However, I do not think that the authors of the "research" seriously expected that their loyal, pro-American spiel would make the Supreme Soviet alter its approach. Clearly it is simply yet another demonstration of their "opposition stance" and of the common views it holds with colleagues from anticommunist public centers in the West, particularly the United States, from where an endless stream of invitations issues forth to seminars, academic visits, and lecture tours. Ultimately the country's prestige and interests are pretty abstract notions, while dollar accounts and honoraria are far more tangible and concrete, particularly as the convertibility of the ruble is still so far off...

But aren't you afraid of error, esteemed sirs. Remember your history. How many times in the past have like-minded people in this country and abroad read the last rites over our socialist motherland while it has risen from the ruins and the ashes even more purposeful and stronger than before.

Justice Minister on Law Enforcement Situation

LD2602224491 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 26 Feb 91

[Text] There has been an extended meeting of the colleges of the USSR Ministry of Justice in Moscow today, devoted to improving the activities of the justice bodies in the circumstances of renewal of the Union and the transition to a market economy.

Commenting upon the results of the meeting, Lushchikov, the USSR Minister of Justice, said the law enforcement situation in the country is sad. The minister noted that we have become distracted by the production of laws. But success does not rest in the number of laws, but in their being properly enforced. At present, we do not have this, with legal nihilism, anarchy and parodies of sovereignty. The whole world is uniting to aim for the wiping out borders, while here the opposite processes are taking place.

However, in the view of the head of the department, the USSR Ministry of Justice does have a future. There is no way of doing without it, either in the case of a federation or a confederation, or any version of a union, since it quarantees the legal implementation of all forms of cooperation.

OGONEK Editor on Soviet Crisis, Gorbachev's Problems

AU1902142391 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 13 Feb 91 p 6

[Interview with Vitaliy Korotich, chief editor of OGONEK, by Zoltan Laczik; in Davos, Switzerland, in February 1991: "If Not Gorbachev, Then the Generals"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Excerpts] Vitaliy Korotich was one of the members of the large Soviet delegation present at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Korotich is seen as one of the pioneers of reform in the Soviet Union. Korotich granted our correspondent an interview; or to be more exact, he thought outloud.

[Laczik] Mr. Korotich, at these negotiations, you have stated that you would never have though that events would take this turn in the Soviet Union. Are you surprised?

[Korotich] I do not think that Gorbachev acted as wisely as the Hungarians did. You dismantled the Party just in time. If you had not done that, an emergency situation could have developed. I do not know exactly why, but I think that the possibility of an emergency situation existed. As far as my country is concerned, Gorbachev is a product of the system, and he still believes that the enemy and the opposition are the same thing. He still does not allow himself to approach the opposition. Given that there has been no rapprochement between Gorbachev and the opposition, the president has brought members of the military-industrial complex to power. If he had done what the Hungarians did, he would have protected himself and democracy from a lot of danger. This way, however, the democratization process will take longer. For its part, the military lobby is watching the Hungarians, the Czechoslovaks, and the others like a hawk. The military lobby is very anxious, but it is ready to fight. [passage omitted]

[Laczik] Allow me to ask a compulsory question: Is Gorbachev being held prisoner by the Army?

[Korotich] As far as I can see, Gorbachev is being held prisoner by the military-industrial complex. The military lobby represents the greatest danger. As an aside, allow me to mention that the Soviet and U.S. military-industrial complexes seem to be nearing one another these days. I remember when Soviet and U.S. generals cried on each other's shoulders in Berlin, because they had to withdraw. Saddam Husayn is almost a gift from above for the U.S. military lobby. If Saddam Husayn did not exist, the Soviet military-industrial complex would be even more dangerous. The Soviet military-industrial complex is keeping an eye on the Gulf war, because this war is also a propaganda campaign for modern weapons. [passage omitted]

[Laczik] The world is trying to guess whether Gorbachev will survive the current situation in the Soviet Union. Do you think he will survive?

[Korotich] Biologically, he can survive, of course. Indeed, under certain circumstances, all he has to do is sign the generals' recommendations; in fact, from time to time, Gorbachev already does this nowadays. [passage omitted]

Gorbachev did a lot for Eastern Europe. He did a lot for the Soviet Union. What happens next? One thing is certain: If it is not Gorbachev, then it will be the generals. Therefore, I hope Gorbachev will remain in office. Nevertheless, I wish he would realize the nature of his responsibility. I do not merely want Gorbachev to survive. I would like him to survive politically.

Background of Tula 'Arms for Food' Deal Eyed

PM1902133591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[TASS correspondent V. Rudenko report: The Explosive Echo of Words; How People Tried to Exchange Sausage for Weapons"]

[Text] Tula—The unsuccessful attempt by the Georgian Government to buy a large consignment of weapons in Tula has alarmed the country's public. Many people are wondering how the idea of such a deal arose at all. TASS correspondent V. Rudenko tried to find the answer by carrying out an independent journalistic investigation.

Food supplies in Tula have deteriorated sharply in the past few months. The introduction of coupons has not put the situation right. The oblast, which is overloaded with defense and chamical industry facilities, is not in a position to feed itself.

All this led social democrat N. Matveyev, a deputy at the oblast soviet, who is a metal workers' team leader at the weapons plant's housing and communal services department, to appeal to the country's president through KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

The telegram, published 25 January, says: "The food problem in Tula is nearly critical, and has been caused by the specific nature of the industry there. The dissatisfaction of workers in military industrial complex enterprises is growing. In addition, the wages, which at one time were high in the defense plants, are now becoming the lowest in the city. The situation demands an initiative concerning the sale of Tula weapons to other regions in the country in exchange for food..."

Commenting on the deputy's initiative, the local newspaper noted: "The food situation really is a nightmare, but what is the point of sabre-rattling? They said that the social democrats advocate disarmament..." What a caustic remark. But if the Tula journalists had known the chain of events the thoughtless telegram from the social democrat would entail, they would have found even sharper words.

Following the publication of the telegram, letters started coming into the plant addressed to N. Matveyev. The first to respond were hunters who were counting on his assistance in acquiring weapons. "In exchange I can offer some pork, some dried white mushrooms, and some cranberries," L., a mechanic from Perm Oblast suggested. "I am fattening up several pigs and can conclude a barter deal with your enterprise," P., a resident of Orel Oblast's Kolpnyanskiy Rayon, announced. A certain T. from Ashkhabad preferred not to reveal details in his telegram: "I have interesting proposals to make concerning your output." But the special interest in the social democrat's initiative came from the hot spots in our country.

Following the publication in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, a messenger arrived at the management of the weapons plant with a letter written on Georgian Council of Ministers paper. It was signed by Chairman T. Sigua. The letter contained the following request to the leadership of the enterprise: "To allocate for the defense of state installations 10,000 hunting rifles, automatic weapon ammunition, 500 Stechkin pistols, and 500 Kalashnikov assault rifles with ammunition for them. In exchange we offer food products to the same value, including meat, sausage, canned stew, condensed milk, canned fish, tobacco products, tea, juices, and fruit."

The message from Georgia caused indignation among the arms industry workers, but the reply from the general director of "Tulskiy Oruzheyinyy Zavod" was couched in diplomatic tones: "The proposal cannot be examined without a relevant decision from the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry and the USSR Cabinet of Ministers."

This is not the first time that officials from regions where tension is running high have made attempts to acquire large consignments of weapons. What comes to mind, for example, is a letter from the leaders of "Armokhotsoyuz" ["Armenian Hunting League"] concerning the purchase of 200 Simonov semiautomatic carbines with ammunition "to destroy stray dogs and predatory animals in the area of the earthquake." That is why the weapons manufacturers have repeatedly raised the issue of restricting supplies of their output. But it was only the publication of the social democrat's telegram that provoked a reaction for which the plant had been aiming for two or three years. V. Krasnov, USSR deputy minister of the defense industry, gave the order to temporarily suspend the shipment of hunting weapons to the six "burning" republics. Admittedly, the departmental instruction does not insure against possible fines for the failure to supply output. Only a suitable decision at government level will save the weapons manufacturers from large material losses. The enterprises hope that it will be adopted without delay.

This attempt to make a "weapons" deal has another aspect. Thoughtless statements, proposals, and initiatives often appear in the press on the crest of the wave of pluralism, and their authors try to resolve very complex problems without due preparation. It is worth reminding everyone who wields a pen: Our duty is to predict what effect our words will have and, in any event, to prevent our words from creating an explosive echo...

Price Rise Compensation Levels Viewed

PM2002095591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Feb 91 Union Edition p 1

[T. Khudyakova article: "Wages and Prices: Which Will Rise Faster? USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems on Compensation Policy"]

[Text] The price reform will bypass only certain goods—medicines and medical supplies, coffee, low-grade, home-produced cigarettes, vodka, goods made from synthetic materials (fabrics, knitwear, footwear, imitation fur, and toys), and also gasoline, kerosene, household electricity and gas, coal, and stove fuel and logs for the population.

Retail prices are expected to double or treble. Some 85 pecent of the money obtained in this way will be returned to the population in the shape of compensation. This was announced at a press conference yesterday by V. Shcherbakov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems.

The chairman pointed out at the outset that this is merely a draft. The final decision will be adopted after a corresponding agreement has been signed by all union and autonomous republics and approved by the Federation Council and the Cabinet of Ministers. Differences are yet to be settled, intensive work is still under way on the draft, and therefore it is impossible right now to give a clear-cut answer to the question as to when the population will receive the compensation payments.

However, V. Shcherbakov believes that it is impossible to get by without a reform of retail prices, and consequently also compensation payments. The reform option which was rejected by the country's parliament last year made provision only for partial compensation and was geared to lowering the state budget deficit. The current option is fundamentally different. The closely linked price hikes and compensation payments will be accompanied by an elimination of wage curbs and an active process of privatization and destatization of property and a switch to shareholding.

On the one hand this measure will make it possible to remove state subsidies from the production of food products and industrial goods. On the other it will enable people to invest their earnings in shares and securities and engage in entrepreneurship.

To increase the population's real incomes in the shape of rising wages, it is proposed to reduce the enterprises' profit tax to 35 percent, and also to change citizens' income tax rates. Incomes of up to 160 rubles [R] per month will be tax-free (compared with the current R100), and a progressive scale will be applied to earnings above R1,000 per month.

V. Shcherbakov went on to explain in detail the system of compensation payments, dividing the population into two groups—working and nonworking.

Wage and salary rates of all workers and employees in the state sector will be increased by R60. This will form the social minimum guaranteed by the state, and no one will be permitted to pay wages below this level. There will be no upper limit; enterprises will be granted total freedom in this respect. It will merely be necessary to conclude a contract between management and the work force with the participation of the trade unions.

Wages and salaries of cooperative, joint venture, and other enterprise hired staff in the nonstate sector will also go up by R60.

Workers in the sociocultural sectors are a special chapter since R17-18 billion have been set aside for their wage increases. The average pay of doctors will increase to R250-R450, and of teachers to R250-R350. The proposed switch to a contract system will make it possible to further increase the real income of these workers.

The draft also makes provision for compensation payments to nonworking citizens, which include pensioners, students, children, and the unemployed.

Every pensioner will receive an increase of R65. This means that minimum pensions will total R135 and average pensions will be R182.

Grants to students at VUZ's [higher educational establishments] will be increased to R120, to technical college students to R100, and for vocational-technical schools to R60. A proposal from trade unions and the council of VUZ rectors to channel part of the student grants into the organization of free food for students is being considered.

V. Shcherbakov dwelt in detail on the range of proposals which concern payments for children. This is what is being proposed: Child-care allowances for children up to 18 months are to be increased to R110, and for children from 18 months up to six years to R75-R80. Orphans will receive R200 per month, and disabled children R135.

Apart from this special payments are envisaged to compensate for the higher cost of children's items whose production will no longer be subsidized by the state. It is planned to pay R200 annually for every child up to the age of six, R240 per child aged from six to thirteen, and R280 from thirteen to eighteen. The compensation under this chapter is to be carried out before the retail prices go up.

Temporary unemployment benefit will go up by R50.

Servicemen have not been forgotten either. Servicemen doing their compulsory military service will receive R50 per month. The salaries of officers, ensigns, and warrant officers will increase by R70. The wives of servicemen living in remote garrisons and unable to find work will receive a special allowance of R50-R60.

And finally, the maintenance rates in all social institutions—hospitals, hostels, and so forth, will increase. Compensation payments are also envisaged in respect of deposits, insurance certificates, and treasury bonds.

The more than detailed exposition of the proposed system of compensation payments nonetheless leaves many questions unanswered. The sources of finance, for example, remain unclear. V. Shcherbakov merely noted (with reference to specialists) that the money to be used will not be simply printed. The claim, that 15 percent of the revenue to be obtained as a result of retail price increases is "in the balance" only because it is as yet uncertain how it should be collected does not sound very convincing. The prices in question are cooperative and purchase prices.

The logic used to arrive at the R60 which form the basis of the compensation payments also looks rather mysterious. During the calculations, factors such as the economically accountable activity of enterprises, the structure of world prices, labor costs, and even average monthly wages were taken into account.

And, finally, the main point: Are all the calculations which are being proposed to us in line with the "consumer basket" calculated in new prices? It transpires that it is ready but has not yet been made public. Unofficially, for the time being, "the basket" costs R170-R175.

To the question as to what reaction the government is expecting to the proposed price reform and the size of the compensation payments V. Shcherbakov replied:

Enterprises are insisting on immediate reform because they are sustaining enormous losses as a result of the differences between wholesale and retail prices. And the people are saying: Rather a terrible end than terror without end...

Leaders Sign Obituary for Writers' Union Member

PM0703170391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 91 Second Edition p 6

[Sergey Alekseyevich Baruzdin Obituary]

[Excerpts] Sergey Alekseyevich Baruzdin, the well-known Soviet writer and secretary of the Board of the USSR Writers' Union, died 4 March 1991 after along and serious illness. Thus we have lost a talented organizer of the literary process who did a lot to unite the writers of our country's peoples.

Sergey Alekseyevich Baruzdin was born in Moscow 22 July 1926. [Passage omitted]

M.S. Gorbachev, G.I. Yanayev, A.I. Lukyanov, V.S. Pavlov, V.A. Ivashko, M.N. Alekseyev, A.G. Aleksin, S.P. Antonov, Yu.V. Bondarev, V.V. Bykov, N.N. Gubenko, A.D. Dementyev, A.S. Dzasokhov, M. Kanoat, A.A. Kim, L.P. Kravchenko, N.P. Laverov, I.D. Laptev, S.V. Mikhalkov, Yu.M. Mushketik, M.F. Nenashev, R.N. Nishanov, B.Sh. Okudzhava, B.I. Oleynik, T.I. Pulatov, V.G. Rasputin, A.N. Rybakov, V.B. Ryabov, O.O. Suleymenov, Yu.M. Solomin, L.A. Ter-Akopyan, I.T. Frolov, A.N. Yakovlev.

Soviet Women's Committee Elects New Chairwoman

LD2102082791 Moscow TASS in English 0734 GMT 21 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Nadezhda Radina]

[Text] Moscow February 21 TASS—Alevtina Fedulova was elected chairman of the Soviet Women's Committee on Wednesday by a plenary meeting of this largest women's organisation in the USSR. She replaced Zoya Pukhova at this post, who now works at the Soviet parliament.

Fedulova, 52, was born into a worker's family in Moscow. She graduated from a teachers' training institute, taught natural sciences at a general secondary school, worked at youth organisations and the Soviet Peace committee.

She was first deputy chairman of the Soviet Women's Committee over the past few years.

The plenary meeting was attended by women's organisations from all union republics. The meeting discussed how the committee and women's councils in localities should operate in the present situation.

In the opinion of meeting participants, the committee should become the coordinating centre of the women's movement in the country.

It should concentrate its efforts on the social protection of women and their families during the transition to a market economy, support for entrepreneurial activities and the establishment of small enterprises.

Church Receives Equipment From FRG

LD1602222991 Moscow TASS in English 2012 GMT 16 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondents Anna Grigorieva and Alexandras Budris]

[Text] Moscow February 16 TASS—Aleksey II, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, and other representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church received today a gift from the German Defence Ministry—UAZ light cross-country vehicles, Ural heavy lorries, Ikarus buses and other machinery. The church also received from Germany field kitchens, power saws, building instruments, a large consignment of large-size camp tents, clothes, medication, medical equipment and food.

The column that covered about 2,000 kilometres was accompanied by Archpriest Anatoly Kolyada, rector of the memorial Church of Saint Prince Aleksandr Nevskiy in Potsdam, the Berlin-Leipzig Diocese of the Moscow Patriarchate.

Archpriest Anatoliy told TASS: "All these gifts turned over to the church were part of the army property deployed on territory of the former GDR. Now it will serve exclusively peaceful purposes."

According to Archpriest Anatoliy, the trip of the column was not easy, first because of bad weather and, second, because of complications with the Polish customs authorities, which delayed the arrival of the column for about a month.

Part of the gifts coming from Germany will go to the Georgian Orthodox Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church, to religious organisations of the evangelical Christians-Baptists, the Old Believers' church, to Catholics and Lutherans.

It is planned to use the machinery for the restoration of cathedrals and monasteries, which were used not for religious purposes for a long time. There are many church building, belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church with its 90 dioceses, that are in need of repair. The gifts will also be used by the recently formed church communities engaging in charity work.

Media Affairs

Kravchenko's Appointment Ensures Status Quo

PM0503170291 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 7, 17-24 Feb 91 p 5

[Olga Bychkova article: "New Company, Old Ways"]

[Text] Leonid Kravchenko's first press conference as Chairman of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company took place at the CPSU Central Committee press centre in the Oktyabrskaya Hotel. There was probably no sense asking questions about the "depoliticization of broadcasting" and, what's more, no clear answer was given.

The head of this company, the only one of its kind in this country and enjoying the support of the USSR President, expressed satisfaction with his becoming a "creative" journalist rather than a minister. He's glad to head not an enterprise or office, but a "creative" organization. Moreover, the change of the media company's name has enabled Kravchenko to avoid needing the approval of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and has enabled the company to escape the need of selling a part of its hard currency proceeds to the Vneshekonombank of the USSR.

Having signed the Decree on the establishment of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, President Gorbachev has answered all the questions heatedly discussed of late. In other words, he confirmed that the monopoly of television and radio broadcasting must remain (the USSR Law on the press and other mass media interprets this problem the other way round), that state property may be wholly turned over to a company which sticks to rigid party positions (this party, one may easily guess, is the CPSU), that relations between the Union and republican companies must be built exclusively on the basis of strictly vertical subordination. Finally, Kravchenko's appointment confirms the preference of the conception under which the main predestination of television is to prevent the people from concentrating on politics.

However, the issue relating to the state television and radio broadcasting company of Russia is still unsettled. For Kravchenko, everything is more or less clear: any sharing of property is out of the question. Similarly, for the time being, the provision of Russia having its own channel is also out of the question "for technical reasons".

But the leaders of Russia are of a different opinion and the President's Decree has only aggravated this confrontation. Thus, the Russian Federation remains the only Republic without its own radio and TV stations. Therefore, it is quite likely that the conflict between the central authorities and Russia's may go too far. As far as the parliament and government of Russia are concerned having their own state television and radio broadcasting company is part and parcel of the Republic's sovereignty. And its absence may hinder Russia from signing the Union Treaty.

Kravchenko on TV Changes, Political Views

91UN1078A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 13 Mar 91 p 4

[Interview with Leonid Kravchenko, chairman of the All-Union Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondents T. Martynova and T. Sekridova; place and date not given: "'I Am in Favor of the Center at the TV Center'"]

[Text] *"I am in favor of the center at the TV center"—this is how Leonid Kravchenko, chairman of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, outlined his position in an interview given to RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondents.*

[Kravchenko] Structural changes were dictated by the realities of life. The Union monster which was called the USSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] has not actually existed in recent times. By now, almost all republics have their own sovereign television and radio committees; there is also a decision to set up the Russian Television and Radio Company. The administrative command system of management associated with this monster, whereby all decisions were made here, in Moscow, and issued from here, disintegrated all by itself.

However, it is necessary for all of us to coordinate our actions in three main spheres. First, a unified technical policy is required. There are international laws, there are assignments of frequencies, there are agreements with companies, there are procedures that nobody can violate. I am not going to dwell on how important these norms and standards are... if we are to avoid a situation in which it so happens that we could receive world TV programs but would not be able to receive one anothers' broadcasts. If all television and radio committees begin to purchase different equipment and different technologies, the republics will end up with incompatible TV systems.

Second, there is our program policy. Local television and radio committees should have guarantees that their best programs will be broadcast on Central Television and All-Union Radio.

Third, there are international relations. To be sure, the television and radio companies of sovereign republics have the right to contact all television and radio companies of the world and sign agreements with them. However, there are also obligations to the central USSR Gosteleradio. They need to be respected by all, regardless of sovereignties, and new obligations should be contracted. There should also be a coordinated policy in this sphere.

The All-Union Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting will undertake the development of measures in these three spheres. The leaders of all republic television and radio organizations may become members with a full vote, on a voluntary basis. The council will have its own support staff, and executive director, and procedural regulations.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Naturally, the staff are concerned about personnel changes in conjunction with the transformation of the Gosteleradio.

[Kravchenko] Structural changes will virtually not affect them. Perturbations will first of all affect the managerial "pyramid." It is premature to name names at present. However, I may say definitively that we will rely primarily on those who work here. I have no plans to bring in some "retinue" of my own. In principle, I know the personnel well. There are many real professionals here, and they will be on my "team."

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Your predecessor took a different view. Incidentally, how do you view the activities of Nenashev in the office of Gosteleradio chairman?

[Kravchenko] This is a very sensitive question. I would voice some substantial complaints if the things we are witnessing were not happening to our country, if we were working in an environment other than that of stormy political reform, if everything depended solely on the head of the Gosteleradio. For example, political broadcasting was heavily overemphasized. However, I know that decisions to broadcast congresses and sessions of the soviets of people's deputies and to produce additional programs have been foisted on our television.

Understandably, life ordained the priority of politics. However, there has got to be a sense of measure. After all, television and radio are the most complex instruments for influencing public opinion. In this manner we may drown the very reform of political structures in a sea of endless debates and discussions, throw the baby out with the bath water, as they put it... In a word, the leadership of the state committee was to some degree held hostage by political processes simmering in our society.

Unfortunately, the long-range program planning went wrong; the technology of preparing and producing broadcasts began to be violated right and left. A decline of professional standards in programming is also apparent.

In addition, I was very much alarmed as I witnessed the gradual departure of genuine personalities who not so long ago could and did set spiritual and ethical examples from television screens. The serial "Meetings in the Ostankino Concert Studio" was an accomplishment of television. However, it nearly stopped being produced. Meanwhile, a belief in someone or esthetic and ethical ideals are all the more necessary at present, when there is a complete lack of faith in our society. This should exist in any society irrespective of all politics. But in our country it was politics that crowded everything off the screen. There were times when meetings were being broadcast on all channels at the same time. No matter which channel you tuned to, there were talking heads.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] We agree with you: Politics cannot be a criterion for all of life, especially in a society that is undernourished and harassed to the point of bitterness. It so happened in our country that newscasts and sociopolitical broadcasting not only became a trendsetter but crowded out, or nearly crowded out, artistic broadcasting. This is why last year many people abruptly lost interest in television.

[Kravchenko] Others, on the contrary, became political junkies: Just give it to them, any time of the day or night! In the morning, lacking sleep and wound up, they once again join the battle, but this time on the job, in their labor collective. They argue about who holds what position, who is on the left, who is on the right, and who is whose enemy. Can we really live like that?

I said on one occasion at a CPSU Central Committee plenum that endless self-denunciations, self-flagellation, and self-abasement can become a poison, a political narcotic, and our society will demand more and more of it. People will lose interest in the newspapers and television unless a fix of "the drug" is provided yet again. Employees of the mass media themselves understand this completely. They deliberately look for something, some sensation to surprise the people with! What if we weigh the consequences of such sensations? Were they a poison or a cure?

Therefore, it is precisely artistic programming that may become a real medicine in our sick society. However, since it has lost its priority status by now, many of its practitioners stopped working at their best, and some altogether lost respect for their art. As I understand it, my priority task is to bring back artistic broadcasting and restore it to its original role of moral adviser.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] However, complex processes are under way in art and culture as well. We mean primarily the commercialization of these spheres, which is a most atrocious influence on creativity.

[Kravchenko] Indeed, this is paradoxical. It would appear that in a period of stagnation we should have only "stagnant," worthless art whereas, on the contrary, in a perestroyka period the country should generate dozens of brilliant works in literature, theater, and cinematography... But where are they? This means that it is the measure of talent of artists that matters, rather than the times. We can start playing all kinds of games on account of management models or economic freedom... So, you get freedom, and then what? I am now ashamed to go to the movies or the theater with my wife and children because we frequently encounter vulgarity and triteness. However, why do they not take advantage of freedom to create true works of talent now that nobody stands in the way?

This is why we need to impose stricter professional requirements on ourselves, to hold each other to higher creative standards, to raise the quality plank for artistic broadcasting, literary and music programs... However, this does not at all mean that some genres need to be banned.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] You previously subscribed to the following principle: Everything may be done, even the things that may not... Later, this somehow changed abruptly. Why?

[Kravchenko] I will divulge a small secret. When I was unexpectedly invited to the CPSU Central Committee for a conversation and offered to head TASS, I was told that a number of high-ranking leaders had just one doubt: Supposedly, I was too far to the "left." In all honesty, I was very much surprised because by then I had clearly moved toward the "center" from the "left flank" where I had been at the time I was appointed to the Gosteleradio. However, this process was not due to fear of losing my position or a change in my political views. It was due to the fact that I saw TV journalists as well, splitting into groups of various stripes, in an environment of the mounting political strife and growing contradictions in our society. The pluralism that appeared on the screen was not the kind under which various opinions are represented in the same program, but an absolutely different kind whereby programs themselves began "to take up positions," some on the left and others on the right... It appeared to me that some journalists were simply not aware of their responsibility to millions of viewers when they failed to tone down their personal arrogance or that of the groups of persons they advocated on camera, that they just did not understand where they worked. I sought to prevent this in-house struggle of political extremism and all other kinds of extremism, including the matter of artistic taste.

By that time, the processes of search and renewal at the Gosteleradio had become irreversible. I myself was carried along by this stream. The most joyful moments for me came when I found titles of episodes unfamiliar to me on the program of broadcasts for the following week. This meant that the people had become emancipated, gotten rid of their inner censors, and were creative without restraint.

This is how I defined my position: slightly left of "center." Why? Because creativity, innovation, and progress are impossible in the absence of it. If you just "stand in the center" you may get bogged down. Therefore you really need to move. To be sure, "the right" and "the left" are relative notions because the division into innovators and conservatives is to a certain degree a matter of convention. However, by the end of 1988 I began to understand that destructive forces to whom it did not matter what was going to happen and how were beginning to operate on TV. Some needed to satisfy their personal ambitions, some their political ambitions, and some their creative ambitions... This aspect began to bother me...

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Did you come back this time as a convinced "centrist?"

[Kravchenko] I deliberately do not stake out a rigid political position in the current harsh political situation. However, I am firmly convinced that we need to rule out all extremism in programming, especially political extremism. Our society is panicking, the people are on edge, their minds are overstimulated; some of them have developed psychoses, and bearings have been lost. Under these circumstances any kind of extremism is dangerous given the tremendous influence that television enjoys. Figuratively speaking, at present I am in favor of the center at the TV center.

Professionalism and human decency are important to me first of all. A real professional is a person who appreciates the responsibility of television to society, who is politically sophisticated, and for this reason will not stoop to the level of either shameless anticommunism or primitively affirmed Marxism. Both bring about confrontation if political passions are stoked, whereas we need civil accord.

At present, one needs to be a professional and a reformer. The main point is to rally all who are interested in the enhancement of artistic standards and the saturation of programs with information.[end Kravchenko]

P.S. Perhaps, not a single central publication has failed by now to assume the role of arbiter with regard to Kravchenko's endeavors, or more precisely the role of prosecutor rather than arbiter. Some have managed to accuse him of dictatorial behavior; some have spread the word of "a right-wing coup at the Gosteleradio..." The situation is far from rosy within the organization itself at present, despite the fact that in November almost all were happy to learn about Kravchenko's return to his native parts. Time will tell whether the reorganization of the Gosteleradio will succeed in "cutting the Gordian knot."

Programming Official on 'Vzglyad', Censorship

LD2302222791 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 23 Feb 91

[Interview with Vsevolod Bogdanov, general director of Soviet Central Television Programming, by correspondent Vladimir Perfilyev; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] There is perhaps no publication or news agency in our country that has not put the work of Central Television in the spotlight recently, and understandably so. We all have an interest in television being modern and satisfying the most diverse tastes among its viewers. Our correspondent Vladimir Perfilyev interviewed Vsevolod Bogdanov, general director of programming at Central Television.

[Perfilyev] Vsevolod Leonidovich, two months have already passed since perestroyka began at Central Television. What results have been achieved, and what response has there been?

[Bogdanov] If you mean by perestroyka the new structure, the Central Television network of news and entertainment broadcasting, then I would say that this work is only just starting, is only just getting under way. Even though this was only the start, in January and February, we have been receiving a large number of letters saying that we have in general chosen the right direction. Here are just some of people's comments: Comrade Bushuyev of Moscow writes: I am writing to express my immense human gratitude to you for putting onto the First Program programs that people really need. You promised from 1 January to show films up to the Vremya program, and you are strictly sticking to this, thank you.

Our information programs unfortunately still suffer from clumsiness or (?verbosity) and sometimes contradictions: the main information department is, I know, doing a great deal of work on restructuring all information broadcasting. There are very many problems with the shortage of films and various entertainment programs—and not only entertainment programs, educational ones, to. Large-scale production of these has to be set in train, all the more so in that we have had difficulties with showing feature films, because of the stand taken by some organizations of film, workers, as you are aware.

[Perfilyev] The mass information media and the press have recently devoted a great deal of attention to the work of Central Television, and some allegations have been made to the effect that the censor's scissors have appeared at Central Television. Is this the case? [Bogdanov] Well, I, for example, do not know who could in fact be wielding such scissors, beacuse in principle, I cannot cite any examples over these last two months when anything was cut out of or changed in any program. It is another matter, however, that we have perhaps become more demanding, we are trying to find films that people need in the current situation, in today's state of affairs, that would help them in some way to stand up for themselves and defend themselves.

[Perfilyev] And what about your attitude to the actions near Red Square, the attitude of your subdepartment, that of the general director of programs?

[Bogdanov] Regarding the Vzglyad program? Well, our attitude is this: We consider, for instance, that Vzglyad is needed on the First Program. That is my own opinion, and that of our program editors. Both the Vzglyad program and the programs are needed. But where Vzglyad is concerned, I can say only one thing: We would like this program to appear on the air again, it was a favorite among viewers: we would like the program not to be one-sided, but to be in the spirit of the time—I have in mind here words such as pluralism, democracy—every participant in the program should feel he has the right to say what he thinks, and should not say opinions imposed upon him.

[Perfilyev] Vsevolod Leonidovich, I should perhaps touch upon one more issue, namely the letter from cultural workers. Is there not now a shortage of people to appear on Central Television?

[Bogdanov] These are all issues of the same order as Vzglyad. Of course we are suffering because Vzglyad is not going out, of course we are suffering because some people refuse to do something, refuse to appear or work on television. But it is we who are suffering—and when I say we, I mean television viewers, because it is they, in the final analysis who are suffering, it is they who are not getting in the evenings or during the day the program they are used to. And therefore, well, this of course gives rise to a great deal of perplexity, not only for me, but for viewers. We have letters on this, too. But there is indeed a large group of other people in the arts, literature, the cinema, who voice a different attitude to television, to the First and Second Progams. They think that today the people must not be left without attention , they are ready to cooperate with television. We are getting a large number of phone calls. The most revealing meeting for me as a program maker in this respect was a meeting with Nikita Mikhalkov; he suggested, on the contrary, making a retrospective of his films, and he is even ready to appear and make some sort of address to his compatriots, so to speak, to help and given them support in this time so difficult for the entire country.

Television Programming Debate Ending

PM0503162191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 91 p 4

[Article by "a certain B. Karlov": "The End of a Column: 'Teleweek' Is No More"]

[Text] When a new column is created in a newspaper an effort is made to present it as effectively as possible: a page one announcement and a flashy headline. Then people get used to the columns. They die off quietly and unnoticed. Today we break with this tradition and fire a valedictory salvo in memory of "Teleweek," which has met an untimely demise.

Sad to admit, but it is a fact: "Teleweek" has completely exhausted itself. It has become just as boring to write about television as to watch it. One can only "do one's thing" by criticizing the television bosses, or by sending up the latest multiserial film or stupid concert. The first option is unacceptable, because when "Teleweek" was started the main principle stipulated for it was to write from the viewpoint of the ordinary viewer who does not know what goes on on the other side of the screen. The second option is a one-way street to utter creative degradation, because no lexical store is sufficiently well stocked to enable us to write in different ways about one and the same thing. Hence came the idea of closing "Teleweek" down. But still, here are a few words anyway.

Literally within the space of a couple of months our television, which was on the point of becoming genuinely interesting, has taken a brisk step backward. It is customary to link these changes with the advent of L.P. Kravchenko to the post of chairman of USSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting]. It would be stupid to deny this connection, but let us all the same allow ourselves the little luxury of speaking about something else.

In no event do I intend to give Leonid Petrovich any advice, because, first, I am roughly half his age, and, second, I have never headed any committee or all-Union state company, and I simply do not know the details of such work. But I shall venture to share some of my own ideas—again, exclusively as a television viewer.

In my opinion, public opinion vis-a-vis the television leadership has in many ways evolved under the influence of two of that leadership's biggest mistakes. The first mistake is that too much emphasis has been placed on its closeness to the president. Five years ago this might have been quite handy. Nowadays it only makes one think that we should give up any dreams of an "independent" television. I personally have never deceived myself on this score because I remembered that our television is state-owned, and consequently its policy simply cannot be determined by any one man (and if it can, then it is certainly not the chairman of Gosteleradio). Consequently, to say that it is he who has shut down "Vzglyad" and ruined ATV [Author's Television] is the same as accusing Yeltsin, as the "number one" in Sverdlovsk, of putting this same oblast on a rationing system. Slogans of the type "Resign, Kravchenko" strike me as naive. After all, even supposing someone listens to them, we would receive in his place a new mogul of the airwaves who will offer the same line as before.

Now for the second mistake. In my opinion the new policy was formulated in too clear cut a manner, and was trumpeted too loudly. Predecessors in such situations have got away with vague formulas, but in this case they just shot straight from the hip: Less politics, more entertainment! And everyone suddenly took offense—just who do they take us for, why don't they tell us the whole truth! At the same time it is by no means obligatory to allocate all airtime to "the whole truth." It can be expounded clearly and concisely. And afterward, let's have shows, films, concerts, quizzes—there is nothing wrong in this. What is really awful is that carelessly presented (although thoroughly prepared) news alternates with boring entertainment programs.

For me personally the symbol of the changes happening nowadays on television is the fact that "Vremya" has gone back to the newscaster form of presenting the news. And it is typical that both the very "pundits" who recently were involved in creating "current affairs" programs and the young journalists on whose arrival many hopes were pinned and who, beginning sometimes in popular, sometimes in much-pilloried programs, in the course of time went to seed, and now in the interval between reading out TASS communications interview the top people in the state—both these groups feel perfectly at home in the role of newscasters. Hence the conclusion: The reserves of reliable cadres in television are large, you simply have to give people the opportunity to reveal themselves.

However, there are still relatively independent broadcasts and journalists, but they expend most of their energy on defending their independence, and hence lose out in the visual entertainment respect.

There are indeed more entertainment programs now. But, sadly, it must be noted that our comedy programs look extremely poor compared to Western ones, and they can hardly compete at their level. What is to be done? Buy more such programs from abroad. This is thoroughly realistic in view of the fact that there are many Western partners ready to provide us with their output. Obviously we ought to go down this road. But then there could be a big swing around: The same people who support the new policy so actively today will tomorrow come out against the domination of bourgeois mass culture. And then the screens of our television sets will perhaps be boldly dressed up in red lace napkins with fourth-generation white elephants placed on top.

But for the moment we are watching what they give us, and we curse Kravchenko in a disorderly chorus. Leonid Kravchenko behaves like a real swell guy in public, but I expect that it is far from easy to live in his "line of fire." Here I sympathize with him—purely in human terms. But, on the other hand, I envy him somewhat. I think that a president of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company who can with a pure heart say "My time has come" is a happy man. However, if you look closely, it has not come entirely.

"Teleweek" was not born of itself but under the influence of the good things that happened on our central television last year. In spite of its sharply critical orientation, it was a true indication that something was changing for the better on our airwaves. However, they assure us that it is as yet too early to criticize, since they have so far managed to realize virtually nothing of their plans. But in six months we will see to what extent television becomes more interesting and entertaining. I have a crazy idea: What if we take them at their word? Then we will be able to think about reviving "Teleweek." But for the time being—permit me to take a bow.

Populist Journalism Waning

PM2802105291 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 6, 10-17 Feb 91 p 14

[Dmitriy Radyshevskiy article: "Our Time Is Over"]

[Text] I have a nagging feeling—which, I believe, is shared by many of my colleagues—that the time of journalists is over.

Never before in russian history has the press had such a great impact on public opinion as in the years of perestroika, leaving politics, history, economics and the arts far behind. It's aroused the entire nation, but seems to have buckled under the weight. Going from servant of the people to leader proved too much for it. There simply was not the moral potential, which remains at the level of the public consciousness.

Journalists no longer play the role of opposition or popular heroes. MOSCOW NEWS is no longer forbidden fruit, nor is OGONEK our weekly gulp of freedom anymore. The Vzglyad show has run out of shocking news that used to keep the public aghast. The only chance for a journalist to win public accolades now is to get himself shot. Journalists risk turning into mere windbags and pseudo prophets for us to throw stones at. In fact being a journalist today has become very boring.

It's boring to step on the gas if the motorway is empty or to throw oneself at pillboxes if there are no machine guns inside. It's boring to write "thorough analyses" about TV debates between deputies or to comment on political leaders' statements; to make up depressing economic and political forecasts; to write reports on inter-ethnic clashes, with headlines like "More blood", and make nauseating appeals to sit down at the negotiating table. All the exposures about Stalin, the KGB and Lenin, Moscow's retail trade and ministerial projects aimed at "improving" nature only make the readers firmly convinced that it's all rubbish.

When I took up journalism three years ago, I thought the press could really help people. Besides, there was that romantic hint of risk about the profession. But what kind of help? We just pointed to where the shoe pinched and that was all; we could do nothing else. Today, the same people come to us with the same concerns: distressed parents whose sons are still being killed in peacetime, convicts humiliated and maimed in prisons, believers still fighting for the churches to be returned to them. All we can tell them is: "Sorry, we've written about this already. All of us have, hundreds of times. Try your deputy or the Human Rights Commission."

How about romanticism? All you can do is conduct a private investigation, in our conditions meaning yet another revelation about the KGB. But all this is so boring. The KGB is no longer news today.

The messianic role of journalism is over. Journalists now have to occupy their legitimate place in society, requiring "normal reporting" and reliable information. This is how it should be. It's inevitable. But this, too, sounds boring to me, considering that we are not professionals—we haven't been trained that way. By Western standards, our articles are no good and have to be rewritten. We don't know how to collect information, how to be objective, how to value our work and demand fair pay for it. Today, our leading newspapers and magazines are losing their staff: journalists prefer better-paid jobs in commercial periodicals and advertising, preferably run jointly with foreigners. The enthusiasm is gone. Who will hunt for news day and night and get twenty times less than what Western agencies offer? A similar situation exists in other professions.

What is to be done? I don't know. We probably have to give up maudlin rhetoric and cliches. What we need is hard-hitting facts—thoroughly checked and well paid for. Let us do our work professionally. Journalism should become an art in its own right, for which we have to disassociate ourselves from the old junk. Enough films and plays prompted by "topical" newspaper articles. Reports on political themes shoudn't be watered down with inner monologues and reminiscences revealing the bad style of a failed writer. Why not write straight news items? Why mix different genres? After all good style means moderation.

Most young journalists will subscribe to this. But it's different with the older generation. It won't give up its role as popular leader so easily. There are plenty of arguments proving that the journalist's role is messianic. But who cares about our disagreements anyway?

Journalism's Golden Age Over

PM2802104891 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 6, 10-17 Feb 91 p 14

[Irina Dementyeva article: "The Fire of Youth"]

[Text] Is the time of journalists over? It is. There's a time for everything, you know.

The time of economists will also end someday and they would go back to teaching economics. The time of politicians will also end and they once again become public servants and bureaucrats. Having served their terms of office military MPs will drop their aggressiveness and be just the military. Journalists, too, will stop being banners blowing in the wind and prophets to become just people, and journalism will again be just a profession.

I would make a distinction between Radyshevskiy as a young journalist and the heroic political image he projects. He has to admit that there are only the two forms of payment for a journalist: twenty times as much as he is paid today and public accolades. Now that the latter are no more they shouldn't be revived. They are harmful to more than just the press.

It is of course sad that ardent journalists writing about topical politics have not been able to drum up any massive organized support. Journalists of course are free to curse their fate and swear never again to write essays on politics, and instead to start giving the reader hard facts (something profesional reporters have always done). They can always quit the scene altogether and write fiction or screenplays if that's what they want to do. Or they can pause and think. This is what Dmitriy Radyshevskiy did with his elegant essay.

To turn pro? Not bad. Providing hard facts is incidentally not the only way to become a successful journalist in the civilized West. There is of course our own Russian tradition. Writers of fiction and poetry, university professors, theology students and aristocrats turned to journalism in the bad old days in this country. In the worst of times some gifted young journalists even cursed their gift and youth as handicaps. They failed to arouse the people, but they managed to keep the moral temperature in society hot. It may well be that Russian journalism translates badly, but it has always strived for honesty.

Dmitriy was lucky to join MN when its reputation was on the rise. Frankly, this was not so much the work of its staff. Politicians, philosophers, economists, and sociologists were coming up with exciting new ideas, and the press, to its credit, published them. Radyshevskiy took this high tide as the norm, and this norm as a tragedy. But it's no tragedy. The press was simply breaking out of the mould of the command system, and what it wrote no longer corresponded to practical actions, but remained mere words. We all were intoxicated by the idea of the so-called power of the Soviet press. I'm not sure if Radyshevskiy was under this illusion, too. Journalists of the older generation like myself were proud when we were able to change anything with our written word. It was an illusion bred by the totalitarian system and shared by journalists and readers alike that the press had any real power. Let's recognize that the only legitimate power the press wields is to write efficiently. We are full of rhetoric? Why don't we get official replies on what has been done to remedy situations we report about? This is not because those who are supposed to give them are not afraid. In their cynicism they simply don't care. But this cynicism is not going to last forever. It is in fact dwindling. There's no crying for our lost "efficacy". A newspaper cannot force a government minister to resign anymore, and that's good. A time will come when public opinion in this country will be able to make disgraced ministers resign of their own accord. Why not foster this public opinion?

It would be apt at this point to note that this country's transition from a country of ladies and gentlemen to a country of comrades proved less painful than going back to a country of ladies and gentlemen. Less painful because that transition had been unwittingly prepared by the entire course of history: it did not begin with Marx and did not end with Lenin. Russia had a similar experience when it discarded its pagan idols, throwing them into the rivers only to race along the shore invoking the pagan gods to come back. It's not the journalist's job to create idols from either wood or flesh, or to run with the mob (though journalists often do this). Becoming a decent society is as difficult as delivering on our own well-intended slogans.

The change of slogans can invoke nostalgia for the old ideology in more than young people. Worse yet, it can make people impatient and push them towards a new ideology. It only takes a certain degree of naivety and conceit. While conceit is rare in our profession, it may now and then overcome even the best of us. St. Petersburg sounds to us sweeter than Leningrad, but we fail to see that insisting on it is as vulgar as wearing a cross, meant to be worn next to your heart, on your sweater. All too often we become enthused by each other's ideal and by what we read rather than by reality. We then succumb easily to panic.

Are we bored? Our role as popular heroes is over? Our role as opposition finished? No. Opposition is no role. If messianism is not in the nature of journalism, being in opposition is. Journalists are always in opposition in one way or another. The press played a unique role in perestroika, but this role was assigned to it from the top—and the press played it well, destroying some stereotypes in the public consciousness. But before perestroika, the press was the only alternative to the command system, and it will continue to be an alternative to any system. I hate to rationalize, but none of us have exhausted the potentialities of journalism. To say "we've written about this already" proves nothing. How have we written about it: with talent, with convictions, in good faith—this is what matters.

Journalism is in a state of crisis, this is clear. Readers have become sick and tired of us: we've talked too much and with too few results. This is all the more the reason why we should not quit. Especially today. We seem to retreat before those who hate a free press and who do not miss the chance to throw a stone at us as we retreat, as they taunt us: look at those democratic journalists, they make lots of noise and slink away, their tale between their legs. There are no machine guns in the pillboxes. TV has become inundated with programmes lulling the audiences into complacency while the hard-hitting "Vzglyad" show has been cancelled. A romantic hero in the circumstances is entitled to his share of self-doubts, to asking the questions Hamlet asked. But Dmitriy, I think, already knows the answers.

I thank him for being serious, romantic, daring and demanding.

He still has the fire of youth.

Protest Against Censorship Remain

PM0503111591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Feb 91 p 1

[Feature on threats to press freedom consisting of excerpts from USSR Supreme Soviet letters department submission, report by correspondent O. Musafirova, and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA comment: "Do We Need a Free Press?"]

[Text]

1. "It Is Reported as Information"

Let us recall that on 16 January in the Kremlin at a USSR Supreme Soviet sitting it was said that the press should be placed under the control of parliament and possibly that

the operation of the Law on the Press should be suspended. Perhaps this was also a stipulation uttered in the heat of polemics, but it came from the USSR president and, as soon emerged, it had consequences. The Supreme Soviet instructed the Presidium to prepare a decision and the Presidium in turn instructed the committee on questions of glasnost and citizens' rights and appeals to do this. The committee sat 14 February and its members were issued with the document prepared by the Supreme Soviet apparatus "on the basis of citizens' letters." We think it would do the citizens themselves no harm to learn of their own opinion.

Recently there has been an increase in the number of citizens' appeals to the USSR Supreme Soviet raising keenly questions of the activity of the press and the other mass media. They voice serious concern at the fact that many newspapers and journals are failing to observe objectivity in their coverage of history and the events taking place in the country and that the position of specific political groups prevails. It is claimed that the press, except for the party press, is replacing pluralism of opinions and glasnost with the kindling of hatred for the ideals of socialism, is mounting "shameless propaganda against the CPSU, the soviets and the USSR," and is persecuting the Soviet Army... They speak with indignation of the gross attacks against the supreme organs of state power and its representatives and the attempts to discredit the USSR president.

In the citizens' opinion, the press has forgotten patriotic education, is distorting the truth, focusing attention on negative pages of the past, "putting salt on our wounds," and engaging in frank discrediting of the path we have traveled...

People do not want to come to terms with the propaganda of the cult of violence, toughness, and overt pornography. In the citizens' opinion many publications and items in the press have an adverse effect on society's moral state and "corrupt our young people," who "must be saved."

There are rebukes against Central Television (the "Vzglyad" program), the newspapers MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, IZVESTIYA, and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and the magazine OGONEK. The letters' authors also criticize PRAVDA for its "one-sided coverage of events" and its attempts "to teach adults how to live."

The appeals assess highly the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA for the clarity and precision of its position and its consistent defense of the ideas of socialism; they approve the desire of SELSKAYA ZHIZN to make extensive use of working people's letters.

Soviet people rebuke the USSR Supreme Soviet, the committee for questions of glasnost and citizens' rights and appeals, and the people's deputies, including Communists, for their failure to intervene in the activity of the mass media and for their passive stance. They demand that the activity of the press be put in order and they support the USSR president's opinion voiced at the fourth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet to the effect that society is in need of objectivity so that all all newspapers and all radio and television channels should have different viewpoints and give considered assessments... **(From submission from the USSR Supreme Soviet department for citizens' letters and reception)**

2. They Have Turned Their Pens Loose, You Realize

At the committee sitting the supporters of a resolute—scissor-wielding—approach toward the text of the law on the press remained in the minority. For the time being. But as we can see the matter is to be continued...

[Musafirova report begins] Kiev—It looks as though people in the Ukraine have again begun to implement the classic principle of the party-based nature of the press. The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Ideological Department has prepared a memorandum on the nature of the youth newspapers. Those press organs which in the opinion of the senior comrades have gone too far down the path of democratization have been asked to go even further... To be precise, to leave the party publishing system entirely.

It was recommended that three oblast youth papers—MOLODU GALICHINU (Lvov), MOLODU GVARDIYU (Kiev), and ROVESNIK (Ternopol)—be removed from the printing plant capacities at the first opportunity. They were given a definitive diagnosis in the memorandum: "anticommunist orientation." The republican pioneer newspaper, ZIRKA, has also been branded unreliable. But since children are not responsible for their fathers, it has been decided to subject the pioneer newspaper to further education within the framework of the party publishing house. If—and I quote—in the future "it does not mount anticommunist and nationalist propaganda." The party committee has given instructions that the other Komsomol [Communist Youth League] press organs which have emerged from supervision be dealt with directly in the Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee.

And primarily the republican newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA ZNAMYA. The submission devoted several paragraphs to it. "For a long time the newspaper has been conducting massive anticommunist propaganda and has embarked on the path of discrediting the policy of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the Communists' activity in the Supreme Soviet, and is kindling unhealthy sentiments regarding the CPSU's property."

No sooner said than done. The question was promptly submitted to the Komsomol Central Committee bureau outside the agenda. And they began to think how to call to order a newspaper which had accumulated a circulation of nearly 1.5 million copies and become the most influential and respected in the republic.

It is true that the exchange of opinions was not particularly animated. The bureau had difficulty in issuing any recommendations—except for expressing the wish that more be written about the Komsomol. Then they decided to take this sector of work entirely into their own hands. Henceforth scheduled items in the newspaper have been imposed—by official directive!—as a duty on the Komsomol aktiv. Items with the correct and principled viewpoint.

"When the subscription was under way, the reader had to be won with piquant publications. We understood that and did not prevent it," Sergey Vovchenko, first secretary of the Central Committee, summed up. "Today the reader has been won. And the program provisions of the Komsomol Central Committee must be introduced into his consciousness..."

It is to be supposed that the concluding year of perestroyka has come for the Ukraine's youth newspapers and the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee teaches: Do not turn your pen loose. [end of Musafirova report]

3. They Are Pleased to Joke...

We have already described on several occasions why KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has been obliged to switch to five issues a week although during the subscription it was proposed to publish it six times a week. No longer having the strength to struggle with the Ministry of Communications and with paper problems, having notified all leading bodies, including, incidentally, the Supreme Soviet, the editorial office collective went to a meeting 5 January to the watchwords "fear dangerous ministries of communications," "thank you for at least not turning off the light," and "we want to work." At the time we asked readers to support us and send protest letters to the Supreme Soviet. And we know that there are already many thousands of these letters in the Kremlin's mail. But workers of the USSR Supreme Soviet are forwarding these letters to the editorial office demanding that it "carry out an investigation and answer the letter-writers..." You cannot deny they have a sense of humor. Nor evidently can you accuse them of any special affection for the press...

Journalists Defend Article

91UN0899A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 6, 13 Feb 91 p 3

[Commentaries by TASS commentator Vladimir Petrunya and USSR and RSFSR People's Deputy Galina Starovoytova]

[Text]**The Sverdlovskiy Rayon People's Court of the city of Moscow ruled in favor of USSR People's Deputy Galina Starovoytova in a lawsuit brought against the editorial board of PRAVDA and the author of an article in this newspaper TASS commentator Vladimir Petrunya.**

Let us listen to the defendant and the plaintiff.

Vladimir Petrunya: "I Am Not Personally Hostile"

Perhaps, we are indeed gradually embarking on the road toward a rule-of-law state. However, such a conclusion is perhaps somewhat premature. Here is why. No sooner had the court proceedings come to an end than voices began to be heard from all quarters, including from the pages of newspapers, that were most contradictory—beginning with the assertion that... the trial has not been held yet.

All of this is, so to speak, circumstantial.

I am not going to touch on all aspects of this civil case that the Sverdlovskiy Rayon People's Court tried in conjunction with my article. I will address what to me appears to be the key element. A "discussion" (lawyers will forgive me for this layman's term) developed concerning this problem: Does public approval of particular actions (in this case, forcible) amount to a call, even if indirect, to commit such actions. From my point of view, it does.

As we may surmise from a ruling read on 4 February, the court decided otherwise—since there were no direct appeals, a statement to this effect is not true. This is an issue of, so to speak, legal logic.

I may communicate to those itching to fan yet another "political fire" on the basis of this fact: The esteemed court tried a civil case, and during the proceedings nobody allowed himself to paint it otherwise even by half a hint. As far as G. Starovoytova, who acted as a plaintiff, is concerned, I was not, and I am not, personally hostile or prejudiced against her. In general, I think that such biases do not become a journalists.

Galina Starovoytova: "To Take It All the Way to a Criminal Case?.."

At present, when an open offensive against glasnost is under way, I believe that this case indeed carries a broader message and affects not only me. It touches on several topics that are important to our society. First, we may see from this case that efforts to see justice done may be productive, and they may be successful even in the environment of a looming dictatorship. Second, as far as the essence of charges ascribed to me without proof by the newspaper PRAVDA and TASS correspondent V. Petrunya, this case touches on a very current topic—pluralism and violence in our society.

At present, it seems very important to me that the ideas of anticommunism that are gaining the right to exist and be spread in our society do not overlap with the idea of revenge. I have always propagated this view of things, and this is why I found the rude attack all the more insulting.

Many of my colleagues, as well as lawyers, insist that I continue the case, this time as a criminal one, and demand that I be reimbursed for the damage I have suffered, all the more so because the newspaper PRAVDA is not a poor publication. I also believe that it is very important to set a precedent of this nature while the Law on the Press still applies. They also advise me to use the article on slander (I think that fabrications regarding me were deliberate). I still have not made a final decision on these issues. However, my workload associated with holding two deputy positions and having almost 1.5 million constituents would hardly make it possible for me to participate in such a trial myself even if I agree to carry it on.

Commentary Views Right Wing Publications

LD1802114291 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 16 Feb 91

[N. Agayants commentary: "Glasnost, the Referendum, Journalists' Honor, and Other Mysterious Things"]

[Text] Recently, or, to be precise, since last December when the appeal went out to Communists to finally abandon the trenches where they had for some reason or other been sitting it out and to go on the offensive—well, from then on my favorite pastime, not without a dash of masochism, it must be said, has been regularly reading the party newspapers. No, there is nothing stunningly new there, just the same rehash of hackneyed accusations against so- called democrats, destructive actions, separatism, ethnic chauvinism, antisocialism and other such sins. So, from that point of view I was able to satisfy myself fully by rereading the articles by Nina Andreyeva or the stenographic accounts of utterances by high-ranking leaders of the CPSU and the Russian Communist Party. But what a selection of materials from our most worthy rightwing publications on issues of destiny! And the style! This great and powerful language—just judge for yourselves. While all kinds of doctors and professors appear on the pages of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA making veiled suggestions in an attempt to prove that holding the referendum on 17 March with a question that is not properly formulated runs counter to the law on holding plebiscites, the organs of the Moscow City Committee and Russian Communist Party and the CPSU Central Committees, in a spirit of glasnost and without too much fuss, without forgetting to consult the people, are dotting the "i"s and crossing the "t"s. MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, in its section headed "To Save the Union" has published letters which, in the words of an editorial note, contain genuine anxiety about the destiny of the country and resentment against those who are driving our country with its many nationalities to break-up point. Readers Samsonov and Mityayeva write: Just look at all the energy and pushiness the democrats are displaying on the pages of the independent and nonindependent newspapers, on Russia's radio and television, hammering into people's heads their delirious, albeit democratic, ideas. Many will fail to realize that their aim is to break up the USSR as a union, eliminate the CPSU and establish a profascist capitalist system. We must not keep silent; we must act. Such is the cry from the alarmed readers of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA. However, so far they have offered no recommendations as to what sort of action. In the case of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA it is not letters; its genre is a terse one, though no less impressive for that. Under the heading "Telegrams to the Newspaper" one reads: Be vigilant! In the process of holding the referendum do not allow any provocations aimed at breaking up the USSR. This was the message hurriedly tapped out by Yakushkin, Makarov, Tarasevich, Turchenko and Krupenko from Novosbirsk. We stand for the unity of the USSR, the friendship of all peoples and a single Soviet army. Comrade Yeltsin, stop sowing the seeds of dissension and waging a struggle for power! That is how a telegram from the council of war, labor and Soviet Army veterans at the Saratov bearing works production association runs. What is remarkable is that all these appeals, this clamor over intrigues by much vaunted democrats appeared simultaneously, like carbon copies issued on instructions from someone. But of course the article by PRAVDA political observer Viktor Shirokov is especially good. I have neither the energy nor the opportunity to cite it in full, but I am still going to quote the most memorable fragments from this opus because they are so consonant with the widescale offensive against the opposition that the party press has started. When the country is going through a period of trouble, the political observer of PRAVDA begins in an epic fashion, there have always been those who have taken the titanic burden of saving the people and the fatherland upon themselves and weathered it. However, there are also leaders who, while they talk about the complexities of global geopolitics, do not give a damn for the historic destiny of their people. They ruthlessly burn down ancient temples for the sake of personal ambition and a lunatic vanity—thus Shirokov writes and then he goes on: Themselves victims of political AIDS, not only do they surround themselves with a group of nationalists and separatists who are also at risk but also plant the virus, at first successfully sometimes, into ordinary people's minds. Every single word is a recherche diamond here. Let us excuse the author, however, for a careless tautology like global goepolitics. The elegant term ordinary people is far more curious here. Yes, those poor souls are so simple and obtuse that they have no idea that they are already infected with the dangerous virus. It is the un-ordinary ones, the chosen few, who know for sure who is who and what it is all about. It is they, without doubt, who by talking of glasnost, referendums and other mysterious things, without surrendering their principles but only having sold their journalistic honor, will lead our long-suffering people out into the same old broad and clear road.

IZVESTIYA Editor Comments on Glasnost

91UN0899C Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 6, 13 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by Nikolay Bodnaruk, deputy editor in chief of IZVESTIYA: " 'They Are Dictating Terms to Us'"]

[Text] Judging by the response of the domestic and foreign press and anxious telegrams from our readers, events surrounding IZVESTIYA are viewed as an obvious attempt to strike glasnost a blow and, in a broader context, as yet another proof of giving up democratic option. Still, I would like to believe that this case has to do with an internal crisis in the editorial board.

What caused the crisis? Top-flight professionals have always worked in IZVESTIYA, even during the worst of times. Glasnost called for rejuvenating the collective and taking in new forces. Due to high criteria applied by the then editor in chief I. Laptev, we succeeded in putting together a collective of highly professional journalists that I believe may now be the envy of any world-class newspaper. Uncommon wisdom and character are necessary to lead such a collective, to say nothing about strictly professional qualities. If this is absent, a drama becomes unavoidable.

This is what happened in our case. Conflicts began literally the day after the new editor in chief arrived, and as time went by they mounted increasingly instead of being smoothed over. Following an attempt by N. Yefimov to get rid of his first deputy, they triggered an open confrontation between the collective and the editor in chief.

They ask us: Is the striving of the editor in chief to change the direction of the newspaper which, as is known, some people do not like the real reason for this confrontation? Perhaps. However, it is hard to say anything definitively: A clear-cut, understandable program still has not been offered to the collective. As far as attacks on IZVESTIYA are concerned, they are not new; they are due to the centrist orientation of the newspaper. We present a target for strikes both from the right and the left: For some people, the newspaper is too radical, whereas for others it is not radical enough. IZVESTIYA has never made a secret of its support for the perestroyka course of the president, reserving our natural right, rooted in the very nature of journalism, to analyze particular decisions critically. Finally, we have never made a secret of our adherence to the democratic option and have consistently supported the efforts of the USSR Supreme Soviet to restructure our state.

In addition, there is our relationship with the readers. Trust in a press organ (as well as an organ of power) is absolutely necessary; in the absence of it, our work simply does not make sense.

We are being asked about the founder's attitude towards his publication. We do have miscalculations and "glitches." However, as far as the general orientation is concerned, no direct rejection of it has been voiced by the founder. Quite the contrary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet A. Lukyanov confirmed the desire of the founder to preserve the centrist orientation of the newspaper, first, in May when he introduced the new editor, and quite recently, at a meeting with representatives of the editorial board, saying on this occasion that nobody needs an obedient newspaper.

Nonetheless, I will not hide the fact that there is much suspicion in the editorial office that the conflict grew out of an attempt to put IZVESTIYA in its place—that is, on a par with newspapers that reflect and service the official "one-party" point of view exclusively. I believe that these suspicions are perhaps also caused by the general environment in the mass media.

As is known, the role of arbiter in this conflict belongs to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. As I understand it, there is not much choice. The end rather than the means are at issue. If preserving an authoritative newspaper, which is trusted in our country and in the world, is the goal, there will be one kind of a decision. If the orientation is to be changed, and the newspaper is to serve a certain idea or someone's interest, there will be another decision.

We will wait and see.

Frolov, Luchinskiy and Local Journalists Meet

PM1502123791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Feb 91 Second Edition p 6

[Unattributed report: "PRAVDA's Representatives"]

[Text] A three-day conference of PRAVDA correspondents working in the country's republics, krays, and oblasts ended yesterday at the editorial office. The talk turned to the regions' problems, perestroyka processes in the localities, PRAVDA employees' tasks in covering Communists' work in conditions of a multiparty system, and journalists' creative plans for the immediate and long-term future.

The following took part in the exchange of opinions and addressed the gathering: CPSU Central Committee Politburo Members I.T. Frolov, PRAVDA editor in chief, and P.K. Luchinskiy, CPSU Central Committee secretary; V.P. Leontyev, director of the CPSU Central Committee "PRAVDA" Publishing House; members of the editorial collegium; and leaders of editorial departments.

PRAVDA Editor Opens Leftist Meeting

LD1303042191 Moscow TASS in English 2134 GMT 12 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent igor Gvritishvili]

[Text] Moscow March 12 TASS—An international meeting of representatives of newspapers of socialist orientation opened here today. The meeting is being attended by representatives of 14 newspapers from Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, Germany, North Korea, Cuba, Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.

The round-table discussion with no preliminary agenda was declared open by Ivan Frolov, PRAVDA's editor-in-chief.

He emphasised that radical changes in the socio-political life of the countries represented at the meeting call for a radical reorganisation of the work of the left-wing press.

Frolov believes that a left-wing newspaper must carry a "certain ideology and at the same time penetrate increasingly wide sections of society". In many cases "we are not prepared to wage a keen political struggle at a proper level because we have been brought up under conditions of decades-long totalitarianism," Frolov said.

Speakers on the whole concluded that the left-wing press can survive only provided it becomes really democratic and will rely in its articles on the pluralism of opinions, without losing its main orientation.

TRUD Editor Considers Popularity

91UN1023A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 9, 6 Mar 91 p 2

[Report on interview with A. Potapov, TRUD editor in chief, by A. Baklanova under the rubric "Life of Our Country: Politics": "Free Press?—We All Are United by a Most Pressing Problem..."]

[Text] **The TRUD staff is among those who happened to experience all the delights of the "guided" newspaper market. In spite of all the trade union subsidies our colleagues are not sure of their future. The payments arbitrarily frozen by the State Bank in January may in April transform into closed cashier's windows on salary payment days. "All of this with free economy, with the declared freedom of the press?" said our correspondent to A. Potapov, TRUD editor in chief.**

[Potapov] Unfortunately, it is not freedom we need to talk about. Now we all are united by the most pressing problem of economic protection for the newspaper. Primarily, we need to protect it from the uncivilized onslaught by the monopolistic paper producers. Excessive paper price increases are also detrimental to the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, but they are especially bad for a mass periodical such as ours. We are quite justified in our attempt, together with our cofounders, trade unions, to make the government and the paper producers agree on a fixed price limit for this year—from 260 rubles [R] to at least R800 or R850 a ton. You cannot abuse the only mass workers' newspaper in such a vulgar way. The highly profitable periodical that used to bring R50-60 million annually has been "milked like a cow", if I may say so.

[Baklanova] What makes it possible for you to print the same number of copies and keep the support of your readers?

[Potapov] The most stable thing in our country is the complexity of our situation. I do not know any other such country... For a long time our people tried to get used to living not "here and now" but in the midst of a severe struggle for their future. In that they were looking for support in their mythologized past. However, for a long time TRUD has aimed at being the newspaper of the present time. This simple fact, I think, serves as the source of its popularity and stability.

We strive to be a periodical that is humanized to the maximum; how well we are doing it is a different matter. I remember hearing, when I first came here, that our paper was fully a la Dostoyevskiy—a publication of the humiliated and the insulted—I was even shocked at that. But then I thought—who was not humiliated or insulted in our country? First and foremost, it is a conscientious worker that gets humiliated—by the dirt cheap cost of labor and of working force, by the eternal begging position forced on him...

TRUD is trying to do more than fight for, say, income indexation under conditions of unbearable consumer prices pressure or to protect people from unemployment. Our readers believe that we can help them find their direction, help them to understand themselves, or just help them to survive in the inflamed situation of our transfer to the market economy. We are not very concerned with how far to the "left" we stand; it is important not to be more to the left than the heart or more to the right than the truth. That is when we have to be uncompromising...

But, generally speaking, there is a certain mystery, a moment of intuition in the relations between the newspaper and its readers. We will learn about it one day "for sure" from scientists. As Pasternak used to say: From their doctoral dissertations that cast a light on everything.

[Baklanova] How are the relations of the staff with your cofounder?

[Potapov] Not without problems, of course. We are all being schooled in the science of freedom of the press. The new unions, the USSR VKP [General Confederation of Trade Unions] Council is now trying to establish their individuality. Our newspaper can and should help them in that respect. What kind of a market can be there without strong unions to oppose the government? Some officials on the cofounders side, from force of habit, try to interfere in our editorial work, to tell us what we can or cannot publish; they even try to teach us editing. It is not everybody that comprehends the Law on the Press. We regret it when the rights of our third cofounder—the 19 million readers—are being ignored. They did not subscribe to a union newsletter, to which we are being pushed from time to time. They wanted a newspaper with the widest range of general politics. However, I would not rush to emphasize such incidents.

[Baklanova] On the day of your newspaper's 70th anniversary—by the way, congratulations on the occasion—you published some materials under the rubric "Looking Through Old Issues." Among other things, there were articles describing how your editors withstood blows from Stalinist ministers, from the CPSU Central Committee, even before Khrushchev's "thaw." Adherence to your principles is a tradition that, evidently, you can also be proud of?

[Potapov] That is a norm, rather than a tradition. But it is another matter that under the conditions of the "old" lack of freedom it was more difficult to hold it up and not to deviate from it. Now we do not need all that much courage to criticize a minister or, moreover, the party organs.

Glasnost and the freedom of the press clarify a lot, including the criteria of adherence to principles and of journalistic courage. But we should not idolize even the best of traditions. We have to remember that they carry seeds of conservatism within themselves. It is a highly complex art to renew, to change, but at the same time to retain one's image. The thing we can by no means afford to forget is our informational honesty, and that is especially important during our present, critically complicated struggle where the stakes are too high.

New Popular Journal To Cover Legal Issues

PM2702154091 Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian No 7, Feb 91 (signed to press 12 Feb) p 44

[Unattributed biography of Vladimir Zimonenko, editor of ZA I PROTIV [FOR AND AGAINST], under the rubric "People"]

[Text] The 39-year-old legal expert Vladimir Zimonenko risks reminding us about laws at a time when many people prefer to forget them. And he wishes to do this through the new literary publicistic legal journal ZA I PROTIV [FOR AND AGAINST]. He considers that "every reader of the new journal is a new voice FOR democracy and AGAINST lawlessness."

Why does the country have dozens of laws no one wants to administer? Does a government whose activities are not sanctioned by the people have a legal basis for its existence?

You cannot answer such questions without a serious juridical analysis, without knowledge of other states' experience.

ZA I PROTIV will elucidate in one of its sections which laws and executive orders should be followed in the "set pieces" in our lives: when appealing against a court judgment, buying or exchanging accommodation, receiving a pension...

Vladimir Zimonenko, a graduate of a foreign languages institute, received his second training from the All-Union Correspondence Law Institute. Since 1978 he has worked in the justice agencies. He soon realized: In our country, it is a thankless business waiting for the law enforcement organs to learn to defend our rights. It is better and more reliable to foster in people something which does not even allow them to think about breaking the law. This became the credo of Vladimir's work, when he served as a desk chief on the journal SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA ZAKONNOST. This is now the program of the editor of ZA I PROTIV.

New Magazine for Foreigners Appears

LD1403125291 Moscow TASS in English 1159 GMT 14 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Igor Agabekov]

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—The first issue of the new magazine for foreigners "PASSPORT IN THE USSR" come out in the Soviet Union on Thursday.

"Businessmen who visit the Soviet Union have already seen the whole world, but Russia is a mystery for them. Our magazine is for them," said Boris Shkolnikov, the director general of the Soviet association Inturreklama.

"We intend to tell our readers about the country's nature, handicrafts, religious revival, painting, music and museums. We will also publish materials for tourists, who come here to take a better look at the Soviet economic and natural resource potential," Shkolnikov said.

The magazine is published on order from a Soviet-U.S. advertising agency and has exclusive rights to represent the Soviet Union in Intourist hotels.

Psychiatric Newspaper Launched in Moscow

PM1902161391 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Feb 91 p 4

[P. Tolstoy report: "Evening Call to Kanatchikova Dacha"]

[Text] Moscow—A new publication has appeared in the sea of information—the psychiatric newspaper NA KANATCHIKOVOY DACHE [AT KANATCHIKOVA DACHA]. Curiosity compelled us to call its editorial office and put some questions to the chairman of the newspaper's editorial council, going by the intriguing name of Liliya Ivanovna Belyayeva.

[Tolstoy] How did you come to think of such an original publication?

[Belyayeva] NA KANATCHIKOVOY DACHE newspaper is published by the "Sudba Cheloveka" [Fate of Man] Sociopolitical Club, where many crusaders for truth, who have now become well-known politicians, started out. But among them there were also those who proved unable to adapt to the struggle for their dignity. In such cases people start losing their grip on reality, and as a result there is a huge number of mental deviations. A bureaucratic system can rapidly drive a normal man insane.

Our newspaper's aim is to help these people cope with spiritual derangement. The newspaper will publish advice from psychiatrists on how to avoid ending up in an insane asylum given our life, since mental illnesses in people have already become a serious problem for society. We plan to give legal aid to mental patients and print nontraditional treatment methods.

[Tolstoy] Do you intend to influence readers' social consciousness in the political process?

[Belyayeva] We think that the time for ideological struggle has passed; the newspaper is not playing politics. An exhausted man must be helped to mentally feel like a man and not a tool in someone's hands, be it the "Conservatives" or the "Democrats." We are fighting for the lot of the living and the suffering who have become entangled in this life of people.

MOLODOY KOMMUNIST Journal Renamed

PM2602112691 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Feb 91 p 2

[S. Drozdov report: "What 'Prospects'? MOLODOY KOMMUNIST Journal Changes Its Name"]

[Text] In January some 60 new periodicals appeared in the "Soyuzpechat" kiosks.

Among them was the journal PERSPEKTIVY [PROSPECTS]. True, it can be called new only in a manner of speaking. From its foundation in December 1918 the journal had a class orientation, which was even reflected in the title: YUNYY KOMMUNIST [YOUNG COMMUNIST], MOLODOY BOLSHEVIK [YOUNG BOLSHEVIK], and, lastly, MOLODOY KOMMUNIST [YOUNG COMMUNIST], which was coming out until very recently. That is how we remember it.

The journal is beginning the new decade with a new name.

The first issue made a pleasing impression. What does it include? An account of the secrets of Japanese ikebana and an interpretation of Mandelshtam's tragic fate, a writer's reflections on national problems and poems by Viktor Tsoy, a "view from the 21st century" on the events of October 1917 and journalists' testimonies on the theft that flourished among our servicemen in Afghanistan. Incidentally, for the first time in its 72 years of history a representative of the Orthodox Church appears in the journal's pages—a novice at the Vvedenskaya Oltinaya Monastery...

New 'Depoliticized' Newspaper Appears

LD2702230491 Moscow TASS in English 2139 GMT 26 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Igor Agabekov]

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS—A depoliticised newspaper, ZHIZN (life), with a print run of 100,000 copies hit Soviet news- stands today. It was blessed by Patriarch Aleksey of Moscow and all Russia.

The publishers of the newspaper decided to make it a depoliticised one, Chief Editor Yuriy Ponomarenko told TASS. It will not be apolitical and will not uphold the interests of any definite political circles, parties and movements, he added.

"Our newspaper," Ponomarenko said, "must promote the spiritual revival and the development of the lofty culture of people who should be able to find in it information which would impel them to do good.

"Through their articles the newspaper staff will seek to direct people to constructive solutions to complex problems facing society.

"After decades of blind obedience we must get rid of complexes-ridden mentality. To do this, a person should come to believe in his or her own strength," Ponomarenko emphasised.

The Soviet-West Berlin joint venture ELPAW is the founder of the newspaper.

Magazine Published in English for Foreigners

LD0303073391 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 3 Mar 91

[Text] The first issue of "PASSPORT TO THE USSR," a new magazine, has been published. This color edition is intended only for foreigners who visit our country. It will be sold only in hotels and on Aeroflot aircraft. For these reasons, the magazine is published in English only. Its staff has decided to show foreigners only the bright sides of our life. The editorial board believes that the long years of collectivization, five-year plans, and perestroyka have failed to destroy the main thing—the people's heart. A spiritual legacy has remained. The magazine intends to reveal it to the readers.

Latest KOMMUNIST Outlined

PM0603162691 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 91 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Journal's Latest Issue"]

[Text] Issue No 4 of the journal KOMMUNIST opens with an editorial commentary "The CPSU: New Program of Practical Action."

The articles "Historical Consciousness—Political Culture" by A. Razumov, "Looking for a Lost Idea" by G. Shakhnazarov, and "Capitalism, Socialism, or a Postindustrial Society?", and the letters to the editor touch on the most diverse aspects of the new CPSU Program, now coming to birth in the course of a collective quest.

The journal publishes an account of the report by IMF experts and other leading world financial organizations devoted to an analysis of the state of the Soviet economy and ways out of the crisis. Characteristically, although the assessments are cautious, prospects are pinned on the preservation, in one form or another, of the USSR. The

"Economy" section also includes Yu. Goland's article "Financial Stabilization and the Way Out of the Crisis: Lessons of the Soviet Chervonets."

Under the "Modern World" rubric there is an item by Ye. Lukashenko and B. Pugachev, "Yugoslavia: Federation or Confederation," and also an article by M. Gremetz, Politburo member and secretary of the French Communist Party, to mark the party's 70th anniversary. The well-known Japanese Sovietologist H. Kimura expresses his view of the forthcoming Japanese-Soviet summit meeting in an article written specially for KOMMUNIST.

Organizational, economic, and psychological problems of the struggle against AIDS and our society's attitude to this disease are considered by the biologist L. Milovanova. "The Road to Autonomy"—that is the headline on an interview with G. Vormsbekher, member of the State Commission on the Problems of Soviet Germans.

"The initiates were proud of who they are and that it is up to them to decide who else to initiate, and how many"—that is how we look today at the propaganda show around the replacement of N.S. Khrushchev, printed here among the archive documents.

DEN Editor Prokhanov Interviewed

91UN1075A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 Mar 91 First Edition p 4

[Report on interview with Aleksandr Prokhanov, editor of DEN, new alternative writers' newspaper, by L. Perkina: "The DEN Is Ready To Take Off"]

[Text] *Nobody gets surprised any more by the emergence of yet another newspaper. The appearance of DEN, however, did not remain unnoticed.*

[Prokhanov] DEN was emerging as an all-Union newspaper aimed at the general public. The idea to publish a newspaper was born deep within the USSR Union of Writers at the time when it lost its own press: LITERATURNAYA GAZETA has achieved freedom and about a dozen magazines likewise got out from under its jurisdiction. The now silent Union Secretariat found itself without a political mouthpiece and without its own sources of income. So, the literary chamberlains came up with the concept of a new paper.

I was offered the editor's post and I agreed to it, but I had something entirely different in mind. I did not mean to serve the writers' secretariat but I wanted to create a newspaper capable of accumulating a lot of intellectual, religious, spiritual, philosophic, and cultural energy, which was all ignored by the so- called democratic and liberal press. In my convictions I am a supporter of the state system. A lot of what has been brought upon us by the six years of liberalism to me seems to be some terrifying and repulsive destruction. I wanted to start a paper of the spiritual opposition, the opposition to everything that was being done at present to our country, to our culture, to whole strata of our history, and to separate individuals. This is how I envisioned DEN and it seems to me that this is the way it is shaping up.

[Perkina] Why the name DEN?

[Prokhanov] First of all, we registered as a daily periodical hoping that it would become such. We did not want to include in its name any of the "writer," "pen," "manuscript" words. Both our public and our culture are now tired of this choice of words. The reputation of our writers and of our literature has, unfortunately, dropped considerably. The word "day" is a multifaceted one. But, mainly, "day" is a source of light, a synonym of maturity. Not morning, not evening, but day. It is our hope that all the types of energy that we are going to run into in our newspaper would be daytime and not nighttime ones. That is why this word is so attractive to us.

[Perkina] Aleksandr Andreyevich, you were among the candidates for the post of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editor in chief when Aleksandr Chakovskiy was preparing to leave it. Obviously, we can look at DEN to judge what the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA could have been, had you gone there instead of Fedor Burlatskiy?

[Prokhanov] Of course, you can. I have not changed meanwhile, have I? That could have been a lot more convenient; it is an established newspaper with a reputation, it has its readers, its trademark, the huge intellectual combine of its authors... I could have used it all if I were sufficiently flexible, diplomatic, and clever. Now we have to start everything from scratch. On the other hand, two ideologies would have collided there—those of the editor in chief and of the dominant group in the newspaper. There would have been a drama, exhausting for both sides. However, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA is not a uniform entity; it has diverse layers and undercurrents.

[Perkina] An opinion was heard at the last congress of Russian writers that the decision to publish DEN meant a capitulation of sorts, that the Union of Writers should have insisted on the return of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA first. Most of the writers, by the way, supported this opinion. Are you not afraid that they will not pay any attention to DEN?

[Prokhanov] No, I am not. All these writers stick to the patriotic, centrist line; so does our newspaper. They are my companions-in-arms, my comrades, and they are already in our newspaper. The feud with the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA can go on forever. Then the writers would not have their own, alternative newspaper.

[Perkina] Are you going to maintain polemics with LITERATURNAYA GAZETA on your pages?

[Prokhanov] We have already begun to. We had not even started yet, we were still getting into our chairs and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA was already shooting at us. We were shot at while still on the runway, before we even took off. Thus, we started to gain altitude in our still rather small "plane" in the midst of an aerial dog fight. Our first issues appeared out of a polemic—tactful, not ugly—with the authors who had already had a chance to pinch us. Of course, we will have polemics and constantly. Cannot do without them!

[Perkina] Many publications now, including the literary ones, are very politicized. What is the DEN going to be like?

[Prokhanov] Our first issues prove that we are also politicized and there is a lack of live literature and live culture. The newspaper is a commercial enterprise and, therefore, it cannot afford to run at a loss. If it directs its attention at literary life, at the writers' clan exclusively, it might not become a national newspaper. Our people are primarily concerned now with the catastrophe that has engulfed us, so it is impossible to publish a purely cultural newspaper. All our writers have become politicians too. You cannot find a critic now who would write an essay or a review of a new novel. They all indulge in saving the country.

[Perkina] DEN, however, is aimed at the intellectuals, at the intelligentsia.

[Prokhanov] Yes, we want the real, multilayered, multifaceted, flourishing culture, with all of its complexity and polyphony, to be present in our newspaper as an ideal. Structural phenomena such as politics, economy, philosophy, defense, etc. should find room for themselves within this culture. In other words, politics should be intertwined with this bushy flowering culture. Only then these stern, sometimes even gloomy subjects would be able to exist through the psychology of the present-day intelligentsia and the people. The people will have to work again, to function again, but as corporations and not as crowds this time. They should understand in the name of what they are acting, who they will be saving, for whom they are going to make sacrifices. All these concepts may be presented through culture only, if it is oriented at the basic values of the nation, of the human spirit, and of the human cosmos.

[Perkina] It is no secret for anyone that the editor's likings, whether literary or purely personal, often determine the paper's image. Who is going to be admitted to your pages, whose opinion is interesting for you?

[Prokhanov] Look, all the liberal elite now has been merged together so well by their mutual cover-up that one can hardly expect any authors to appear from there. But I will be happy if the liberals feel like working with us; I am not totalitarian at all. Culture is liberal in its spirit. As for literary items—prosaic or poetic works—I would like to see all the schools. It is desirable to have this area of reading consist of everything most talented that we have, be it outstanding, complex, avant-garde and archaic, realistic and symbolistic, etc. No limitations, in other words.

We are going to defend our sadly orphaned and neglected, abandoned by the government national culture. Not only Russian culture, but also that of Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Ukrainians... We will also try to achieve a correct proportion of different ideas belonging to Europe, world culture, and to our nation. I understand perfectly well that we are world artists and world writers so far as we are national ones. To support the weak, the downtrodden, the defamed, those who do not appear on the newspaper pages—this policy will become part of the "Literary Politics" rubric.

Next to it we have the "Ethnic Concept." Ethnic forces and ethnic features are very important now. That is where the crack is that split the Union. We are trying to reveal ethnic ideas in all their strength, power, and beauty. For that reason, I think, this rubric might and will attract artists and thinkers on a national scale.

We have political scientists on our staff. They are creating a new climate around them and entirely new forms of conscience and intellectual thinking are cultivated there. On the one hand, we are going to conduct intellectual education, to remove the masks from society, to show what it consists of in reality. We are going to draw the "true" outline with all of its drama and the positioning and interchange of forces.

On the other hand, we are going to create a concept of the perestroyka ideology. I am convinced: We will emerge from perestroyka as wrecks, we will be split and crushed. We will have to restart a lot of things, to create an ideology that will include purely cultural and religious features, as well as a new comprehension of history and a new intellectual potential for our ethnic groups. The future leaders of our country could have entire intellectual schools and programs at their disposal. We would be very proud, of course, if our paper could establish such a university for the future leaders, but we are going to assist it. There is also another, fast acting side to our work. In this we react to all the country's events as they happen, to the politics, defense and conflictology.

[Perkina] What difficulties are you experiencing now, what do you have to overcome to make your newspaper set on its own course?

[Prokhanov] There is a world of difficulties. The first one is blending in with the market that has been captured. We have to overcome the alienation of distribution means that now only seem to be government-related. All of them have been commercialized, they hold their own court, set their own rules. New periodicals of a type similar to ours get rejected by them. I do not know what is happening deep within those structures. Maybe they have been bought or seized by someone long time ago. Politics, apart from commerce, are dominant there.

The second difficulty is, of course, our organization. We do not have suitable premises. We are not completely staffed yet. Often our paper is coming out through pure enthusiasm and that is the reason why the people who come to work for us are obsessed with ideas. Ours is a group of people with identical ideas who are ready for sacrifices. To our authors we can offer extra attention, extra care, and immediate appearance on our pages.

In July we will become a subscription; soon we are starting our subscription campaign. At present, we print 150 thousand copies, which are immediately sold out.

[Perkina] This means you have already had the feeling pleasant to any editor—not seeing your newspaper some two hours after it was delivered to the newspaper stand?

[Prokhanov] I would like to see it there at least for a while, but sometimes it does not make it there at all. If it is true that some of the copies are being bought and destroyed in Moscow by our opponents (see the article to that effect in our No.3 issue), then we will have to wage a serious battle.

Shatalin Views Economic, Political Crisis

AU0503142891 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 4 Mar 91 pp 204-212

[Interview with Stanislav Shatalin, former member of the Soviet Presidential Council and Gorbachev's ex-adviser on economic issues, by Fritjof Meyer; place and date not given: "Suicide of the Government"]

[Text] [Meyer] Stanislav Sergeyevich, if you had had your way, with your 500 days program the Soviet Union would have had capitalism at the end of this year.

[Shatalin] The central issue of the program of transition to the market economy was to permit all forms of property, including private real estate, and free entrepreneurship. I do not want to discuss anymore whether this is capitalism or socialism. The most appropriate term is: free market economy.

[Meyer] The experimental field for this is not a small, easily surveyable country, but a gigantic area from Brest to Vladivostok....

[Shatalin] ...with many nationalities, religions, habits, and traditions, with many sovereign states. In particular because of this variety, all possible methods must be tried.

[Meyer] What took the West centuries should have been achieved within 500 days.

[Shatalin] These 500 days were a symbol for a brief period in which all forces should have been joined to tackle the most important problems and to see whether the solutions are workable—in contrast to all long-term programs so far, which reached up to the year 2000 or 2005, without being able to check in advance whether the path is the right one.

[Meyer] If your program had come into force on 1 October 1990, as you wanted, today, after five months, the following would have been achieved: the peasants could leave the kolkhozes....

[Shatalin] They also could stay; we permitted everything, we do not want to force happiness on anyone.

[Meyer] It is said that most peasants in the Soviet Union do not want to do any independent work.

[Shatalin] This contains a spark of truth and a lot of demagogy. If this were true, one could offer the land to them and those who want it would take it. Instead, the last big harvest finally destroyed the Soviet economy, as one of our satirists said.

[Meyer] How much of the last harvest was lost?

[Shatalin] Some claim that it was up to 40 percent. A shame, a disaster.

[Meyer] According to your plan, over the first 100 days the state's debts would have been reduced from dozens of billions of rubles to five billion. For this purpose, you wanted to cut back development aid.

[Shatalin] In particular the expenditure for the Army....

[Meyer] By 10 percent, this is not much.

[Shatalin] ...and the costs of bureaucracy, of the ideological apparatus, of the economically inefficient buildings—and not only for fiscal reasons but also in the interest of a change in our society and our approach to the West. The precondition is the political will to do this.

[Meyer] You accepted political considerations concerning the Army.

[Shatalin] Our Armed Forces are facing the big problem of their withdrawal from Eastern Europe. We offered the young captains and sergeants settlement in the rural areas, where they would be happy, while today they have a miserable life.

[Meyer] According to your program, all "deficit companies" would have lost their subsidies already. But how can it be determined whether a Soviet company incurs losses or works profitably?

[Shatalin] Only through the emerging market, the competition.

[Meyer] This presupposes a disengagement of the monopolies, and this was supposed to come later.

[Shatalin] You have really discovered a contradiction in our program. But at first one could have used comparable world-market prices as the yardstick.

[Meyer] By the turn of the year the first 50 state enterprises were supposed to have been sold. Who was supposed to buy them?

[Shatalin] Everyone, any other company, the staff, and also other countries.

[Meyer] Everyone—with what kind of money? Did you intend to get the large amounts of savings with that?

[Shatalin] It is a mistake to suppose that the people have large amounts of savings.

[Meyer] The enterprises, too, have hardly any savings, not even working capital. So, who was supposed to buy the state enterprises?

[Shatalin] Our country has enormous resources. They must not all belong to the state alone.

[Meyer] The Germans are just now learning that the state enterprises, which you still want to sell bit by bit to the audience, are only a piece of junk in reality.

[Shatalin] Efficiency can be achieved only if one follows the path through poverty. There is no path to prosperity without renunciation.

[Meyer] We have the impression that you are acting in line with Lenin's principle: First one throws oneself into battle, and everything else will be seen afterward.

[Shatalin] The principle is correct, but it was Napoleon's principle: On s'engage et puis...on voit.

[Meyer] By February you wanted to release all prices for basic consumer goods, except those for staple goods. Is that what the government is doing now: doubling and tripling most prices for foodstuffs and not setting any official prices at all for luxury goods?

[Shatalin] What the government is doing now is suicide, because without a market there are not more goods, either. What it is achieving is rationing. The development took place more quickly than expected: 500 days do not count anymore, because the situation is deteriorating day by day.

[Meyer] What should be done?

[Shatalin] I proposed an economic union as a first step, in which the individual republics come to an understanding about their respective potential, which they can contribute and delegate to the union—for instance, financial policy, the army, the KGB, space research, the main railroad lines. We met in a dacha—all reforms are drawn up in dachas, the weather was beautiful, the air fresh, the atmosphere good. We discussed which problems can be solved jointly and which questions every republic has to tackle for itself.

[Meyer] Did you come to an agreement?

[Shatalin] The representatives of the republic growled at first, then one could hear the tigers roar. I explained everything to them; in the end we concluded an agreement on the economic union, and there was a big banquet.

[Meyer] Stanislav Sergeyevich, if Mikhail Gorbachev were to give you dictatorial powers—what would you do with the economy now?

[Shatalin] I would not be satisfied with that; if we have a dictatorship, we should not only have an economic one. I no longer want to be an adviser. I was team leader in the Spartak Moscow soccer club—in the past I was a professional soccer player. Now I no longer want to have anyone above me, but I want to play and coach myself. The resistance against a change in our economic system comes from the political area.

[Meyer] So, what would be the first thing that dictator Shatalin would do?

[Shatalin] Form a normal government, competent, free of ideology, really linked with the people, and open to the West—instead of seceding from the international community of peoples as we are doing now. And those who oppose this without a democratic legitimation would be eliminated.

[Meyer] What should your government do, for instance, so that all of the harvest ends up in the bread-basket?

[Shatalin] An old Russian saying says: Half for the master, half for the peasant. The peasant should be permitted to do with his share what he wants, and immediately the markets would be full—even the losses as a result of the deficient infrastructure would be smaller. This is all. After all, we are a rich country. But at the moment the situation is at follows: There is nothing, absolutely nothing on the markets and in the shops.

[Meyer] If the Shatalin program were implemented with far- reaching privatization of the industrial enterprises, this would perhaps lay off 40 million workers. Your government would have to face this mass unemployment.

[Shatalin] One must not exaggerate this problem. There is enough work, we must build roads and apartments, schools, and hospitals and we must renew the entire infrastructure.

[Meyer] Why does dictator Gorbachev not do this now?

[Shatalin] Mikhail Sergeyevich is not a dictator. One can quarrel with him, one can accuse him of indecision, but one certainly cannot suspect him of being a dictator. In my view, the West is wrong in thinking that Gorbachev is an instrument in the hands of the Army, the KGB, or the party. Difficult processes of differentiation are taking place in these organizations, too.

[Meyer] Is he unable to decide with whom he should join forces—with the reactionaries, as it looks now, or with the radical democrats, who see themselves as belonging to the leftist, progressive wing of the political range?

[Shatalin] I am still hoping that Gorbachev will join our side and will manage to gain a second wind. I told him: You can struggle for power if you take over the leadership of the bloc of the left and the center. Overcome your position of mystic suspicion toward the democrats.

[Meyer] We have gained the impression that Gorbachev is not using his powers. His decrees are not obeyed and the events in the Baltic states rather show weakness in terms of leadership. Do you still think that a coalition between Gorbachev and Yeltsin could be successful?

[Shatalin] I have long supported this coalition, and it also worked for some time. Now I no longer really believe in it. One should no longer link the development with names at all, because this gives it a seeming reality that does not exist. I told both men that they should not think about a third man but that they should be already thinking about the ninth.

[Meyer] What is Gorbachev's relationship with you personally, his former adviser and member of the Presidential Council, that is, of the leadership? He is said to have supported you as regards your exclusion from the party.

[Shatalin] It is said that he did this several times. I still have a very good relationship with Gorbachev. I like him very much as a person, and it seems that he liked me and this is still the case—there is no doubt.

[Meyer] Do you also sometimes think about the fateful question of whether Russia needs to become more Western at all, whether it is right to proclaim the priority of private interests, even though Russia's own traditions are much more aimed at equalization and collectivity? Perhaps a modest, cooperative life corresponds more to the dominant mentality.

[Shatalin] Yes and no.

[Meyer] There is one mood: back to the 1960's. Everyone had sufficient means of living, even though at a low level, and there was order.

[Shatalin] Yes, this mood exists among simple people—because we continuously lied to the people and cheated them. They do not know that it can be different, and many have lost all hope. The people in the big cities, however, the intellectuals, want to finally live better. They demand democracy and a market economy, and the rural areas will join them. Everyone is ready for great sacrifices if they can be absolutely sure that they are no longer lied to and at least their grandchildren can live better. But if they see that their grandchildren, too, are supposed to be worse off, they will become angry.

[Meyer] What will happen then?

[Shatalin] Then the government will fall, and we will make a clear sweep.

[Meyer] What will this be like?

[Shatalin] A normal, democratic society as in your country must develop, with a free economy—and that as quickly as possible. The so-called humane, democratic socialism—this is a thread-bare, patched-up suit, which belongs on the trash-heap.

Fedorov Appointed to European Bank

91UF0550A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Mar 91 Union Edition p 2

[Article by M. Berger: "Why a Former Minister Is Going to London"]

[Text] The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) ruled on the appointment of B. Fedorov, former RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] minister of finances, to one of its executive posts.

Having left the post of RSFSR minister of finance at the end of December 1990, the 33-year-old B. Fedorov recently received an invitation to head one of the departments of a new international bank—the EBRD. As many people know, the main task of this bank with capital of $12 billion is to support market reform in the countries of Eastern Europe, including the USSR. It is important to note that no less than 60 percent of credit resources must be granted to the nonstate sector. That is, if the EBRD were to grant us $100 million, for example, then state structures, including local organs of power, would receive no more than $40 million and the rest would go according to the plan to nonstate borrowers, including joint-stock, joint, and cooperative enterprises and firms.

The EBRD will begin operations on 15 April. J. Majors, F. Mitterrand, and the heads of other states are expected at the official opening ceremony in London.

The USSR Supreme Soviet still has not ratified the decision of our country to join the EBRD. If this does not happen by 31 March, the USSR will lose the opportunity to be one of the founders of a major financial organization, which has already happened more than once to us. In order to join afterwards it will be necessary to submit a statement and await a favorable decision by the founders.

The contribution that has been determined for our country at six percent of the total capital of the bank is relatively low in monetary terms—600 million ECUs (442 million foreign currency rubles). In the course of the first five years it will be necessary to contribute one-third of the amount—130 million foreign currency rubles, or 26 million per year.

J. Attali, president of the EBRD, is due to arrive in Moscow in a few days to discuss issues of cooperation with the EBRD and other questions with the leadership of our country. B. Fedorov will also be included in the delegation from the European bank. The former minister of finance is not taking up one of the spaces granted to our country by official quota. B. Fedorov has been invited by the president of the EBRD as an authoritative and well-known specialist who is able to be of benefit to the bank and, one may suppose, to his country. He is the first Soviet citizen to receive such an invitation. According to unofficial information, dozens of our specialists and bureaucrats of various ranks, including some fairly high ranks, are applying for work at the EBRD. Incidentally, B. Fedorov is only the second representative of Eastern Europe at the bank at present.. K. [as transliterated] Nemeth, former premier of Hungary, is one of the vice presidents of the EBRD.

We are, of course, happy that we have specialists whose actions are so notable in the international arena, and the experience that B. Fedorov gains while working in the EBRD will later serve all of us. At the same time, one cannot help but regret that undoubtedly able people cannot find the opportunity to effectively use their skills in their own country and are compelled to serve it in such an indirect manner.

Journalist Describes ANT Investigation

91UF0538A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 9, 6 Mar 91 p 6

[Report on discussion between Krasnodar journalist Vladimir Udachin and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA political observer Aleksandr Borin: "An ANTique Story: Yesterday—ANT, Today—the Case of the R140 Million, Tomorrow—"]

[Text] **Hardly anybody would still doubt that the campaign for routing ANT [Automation, Science, and Technology] pursued certain far-reaching political goals. But how, in what particular way, it was organized is still a mystery. This is why for each new fact, each new document, is so important. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA political observer Aleksandr Borin speaks with Krasnodar journalist Vladimir Udachin, the author of the sensational article entitled "An Octopus at a Traffic Light," which first discussed ANT (SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA for 14 January 1990).**

[Borin] Vladimir Yakovlevich, from the podium of the Third Congress of People's Deputies your article about the domestic "octopus" was called an "information explosion that shook all of our people, from small to great." How did this article come into being?

[Udachin] On 11 January 1990, somewhere around noon I received a call from the then first secretary of the Krasnodar Kray party committee, I.K. Polozkov, who told me about the platform cars loaded with tanks that had been seen in Novorossiysk. I was busy that day: I had my first meeting with my constituents for the elections for RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies and I did not get back to Polozkov until 12 January. At my request, Ivan Kuzmich telephoned editor in chief V.V. Chikin, spoke with him, and then handed the receiver over to me. "Go and take a look," said Chikin. I left Polozkov and set out for the KGB administration for Krasnodar Kray, looked at the video tape of the tank train, and then got in my car and drove to Novorossiysk. The chief of the Novorossiysk KGB department, I.F. Samarskiy, had already been notified of my arrival. And he was the one who showed me the train. I can say at the outset that I was impressed.

[Borin] And did you immediately decide to write the story?

[Udachin] No, I had to overcome strong doubts. Well, in the first place, it was a hot subject and somewhat classified: Will the newspaper be able to print it? And in the second place, everything was too strange and inexplicable. Even in peace time, if a tank train were to travel essentially unguarded across half the country, from the Urals to the Black Sea, it would seem strange. I myself am from the Urals and have had occasion to see how tanks are shipped. On each platform car is a guard with a rifle... In a word, I did not take up my pen. But the next day, 13 January, at noon I received a call from the deputy editor in chief, Yu.N. Nikolayev. He asked: "Well, did you go to Novorossiysk?" "I did." "Did you see them?" "I did." "Did you write your article?" "No, I had my doubts about everything." "What kinds of doubts? I want you to be through by 2000 hours. We will put it in the paper." At 2000 hours I was dictating the article to the newspaper stenographer. Some time after 12 midnight Nikolayev informed me that the article had made it into the issue.

[Borin] In one interview Polozkov said: "It worked out that on the day the article came out there was a meeting of the Russian Central Committee Bureau at which M.S. Gorbachev, in response to this article, gave instructions to the chairman of the Party Control Commission under the CPSU Central Committee, B.K. Pugo, to look into the matter." Why, a party organ was instructed to look into this case before all the circumstances were clarified is separate question. I was interested in something else: Was this really a "coincidence" or was the "information explosion that shook all the people" necessary at the moment of the meeting of the Russian Central Committee bureau?

[Udachin] Comparing all the facts, I am inclined to think that today. Although the most unthinkable legends are being invented about my article. In some articles they even portray me as a KGB agent who was sitting in Novorossiysk waiting for the tanks. All that is nonsense.

[Borin] Legends appear when the information is inadequate. Does it not seem to you that this loud tank scandal, which also served at one time as an occasion for getting rid of the ANT and the initiation of a criminal case, is being deliberately forgotten today, assiduously pushed to the side? And I would not be surprised at all if, even after reading the report on the results of the investigation, we are still left in the dark as to how and why the ill-fated tanks appeared in Novorossiysk.

[Udachin] I do not rule out that possibility either.

[Borin] This could probably be impeded by our dialogue, a discussion between two journalists who have written about this story at different times and in different ways, who are familiar with the numerous materials and documents, and today are prepared to make them public.

[Udachin] Good, I agree. Then I have my first question for you: Do you believe ANT workers who assert that in general they purchased from Uralvagonzavod not tanks but only truck tractors for peacetime?

[Borin] I believe the documents. And three extremely important circumstances emerge from them, which essentially refute I.K. Polozkov's assertion that ANT had purchased tanks in order to secretly sell them abroad. THE FIRST CIRCUMSTANCE: IN THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN ANT AND THE VZLET NPO [Scientific Production Association], THE INTERMEDIARY IN THIS TRANSACTION, THERE IS NO

MENTION OF TANKS AT ALL—only trucks, "dismantled and reequipped for use in the national economy."

[Udachin] And what if this was a deliberate cover up, a camouflage?

[Borin] No, the figures deny this. A tank costs 200,000 rubles [R]. But ANT paid R321,000 for each vehicle. Why the extra R121,000? And for all the vehicles—R1.7 million? That is not chicken feed. The plant's general director, V.S. Seryakov, in his official report explains it this way: Vzlet NPO did not require that the tanks be made into truck tractors. "They suggested" writes V.S. Seryakov, that we "remove the machine gun and other arms and the optical systems, pack them up separately, and send them along with the transportation." That was all. They took the R1.7 million essentially for preparing the vehicles for shipment.

[Udachin] Is your version that the ANT deliberately deceived us?

[Borin] We do not know that. But after the scandal broke out, punishments came down like out of a cornucopia. Even before the results of the investigation were received, many people were fired and expelled from the party. And only the plant's general director, V.S. Seryakov, about whose guilt there is no doubt, got off with a slight scare and received only a severe reprimand. Why did he get off so easy? And they made short work of the plant's deputy director, N.A. Malykh, who, judging from the documents, was not even in attendance at the negotiations with the representatives of the NPO Vzlet and was only following the instructions of his director.

[Udachin] Did you meet Seryakov?

[Borin] No. He refused to meet with the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent for the Urals, N.N. Zenova. But she spoke with the chief of the plant's first division, A.S. Kovtun. This is how it happened. He asked for a list of questions that interested the editors, left his office, and when he returned he said that he would not answer a single one of them. "And where is my list?" asked Zenova. "You will have it in a minute." "You are making a xerox," N.N. Zenova guessed. "But that does not take long," the chief of the first division simply placated the correspondent.

[Udachin] Now all of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA is under suspicion.

[Borin] Yes, probably. And so there was a lot of work. On 15 December, 12 platform cars loaded with tanks and carloads of arms set out from the plant for Novorossiysk. A curious detail: The order schedule did not go through the plant's commercial division even though these were ready-made products and according to the rules this should have been done. They were filled out simply: "through production."

[Udachin] The newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for 1 April 1990, printed the explanation of chief of the Central Administration for Military Communications Lieutenant General Yu. Vorontsov. "The investigation showed," he reports, "that this was not a military shipment and it was done according to the plan of the Ministry of the Defense Industry by the Uralvagonzavod enterprise... At the Smychka station of the Sverdlovsk Railroad the train was inspected by an officer of the VOSO [military communications service], Senior Lieutenant A.V. Karpukhin and, because of the absence of a military guard, was removed from the plan for shipments and monitoring of traffic on the railroad network..." That is, there was neither a plan nor monitoring.

[Borin] BUT THIS "UNPLANNED" AND "CONTROLLED" TRAIN FLIES AS ON WINGS, WITH A GREEN LIGHT. It seemed that someone was leading it. In rail register No 696848 ("Name of cargo; means of transportation") the indicated delivery date is 25 December. But the train arrived in Novorossiysk three days earlier, on 22 December... This was the second mysterious circumstance. And, finally, the third one: WHO NEEDS TO HAVE THIS HERE SO QUICKLY. WHO IS IMPATIENTLY WAITING FOR THIS SECRET TRAIN?

[Udachin] When I arrived in Novorossiysk it was explained to me: The ANT is waiting for the train.

[Borin] This does not square with the documents. A long explanation begins—senior assistant military commandant of the Krasnodar station A.F. Samekhin questioned the duty officers from the adjoining sections of the railroad, the Novorossiysk trade port telegraphed Uralvagonzavod, and the plant immediately communicated with Vzlet NPO—until they finally established that the train was intended for ANT. But the tanks that arrived along with the truck trailers remained on the sidings. The port would not accept them and they did not know what to do with them. The plant guard dispersed. The ANT workers who arrived from Moscow concluded an agreement with the railroad for temporary storage... Incidentally, when did Polozkov first learn about the tanks?

[Udachin] If I am not mistaken he told me that it was on 9 January 1990, when he was at a conference at the kray KGB administration. Although he told the SOVETSKAYA KUBAN correspondent something different. "From the moment the trainload of tanks arrived in the kray," he said, "I immediately went to work on this story." But, in his words, all appeals to officials "ran up against some kind of brick wall." "Finally," said Polozkov, "we decided to go to the press and make this story public. The newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA was immediately interested in the story... It was probably not until then that things got off the ground and started moving."

[Borin] No, Vladimir Yakovlevich, things "started moving" even before your article appeared. On 10 January, that is, the day before Polozkov's phone call to the journalist Udachin, an official of the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry, A.M. Rychkov, sent a panicky telegram to Uralvagonzavod telling them: "Rush a telegram to Novorossiysk to return the transportation with a guarantee of reimbursement for expenses... If there is no guard in Novorossiysk, organize the dispatch of one immediately. The deadline is 11 January." All this took place in one day. An order was immediately issued for the plant: For accompanying the cargo from Novorossiysk form three teams, appoint the head of the guard, and give him the necessary instructions. Another telegram flew to the chief of the Novorossiysk port and to the chief of the railroad station from the plant: "Departed 15 December 1989...to the Novorossiysk seaport in keeping with a decision of the higher organizations, request that you return immediately.... Payment for all expenses involved in diverting transportation-...guaranteed." Commotion, panic! What caused all this, how did it happen? And, I repeat, your article had not yet appeared in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

[Udachin] In that same interview Ivan Kuzmich told the correspondent from SOVETSKAYA KUBAN: "The very first thing I did was to call the bureau for foreign economic ties of the USSR Council of Ministers. They answered: No, we do not trade in arms, you have misunderstood something, do not interfere, this is not your business..."

[Borin] Incidentally, if ANT did want to sell arms on the sly, it would be interesting to know how they did it. In the words of the chief of the cargo division of the Novorossiysk customs office, V.A. Syrma, ANT intended to submit for customs control "tanks removed from operational status, stripped down, without arms, with the turrets removed." And what if instead of all this the customs officials suddenly discover new combat vehicles with machine guns folded up next to them? And who would send them out without special permission?!

[Udachin] As far as I know, there is no arms trade through the Novorossiysk port. But I continue to quote the interview with I.K. Polozkov. "Then," he said, "I went to the party Central Committee, and still not officially but in a friendly way, asked for help in verifying what was what. After a certain amount of time the comrades I went to in the Central Committee apparatus confirmed our assumptions that this smacked of a big scandal and that this was the work of the domestic mafia."

[Borin] They confirmed it without waiting for an official verification or even any special investigation? It seems to me, Vladimir Yakovlevich, that herein lie the answers to many of the questions that are tormenting us today. We do not know (and will we find out?) who started this whole mess, why these tanks were not converted into peacetime truck trailers, or who gave them the green light. But circumstances that are perhaps much more significant are being revealed. It turns out that even before your article, even before Polozkov's phone call to you THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE APPARATUS HAD ALREADY DONE THE NECESSARY WORK, PREPARED AN OPINION, AND PRONOUNCED A SENTENCE: "A LARGE SCANDAL," "THE WORK OF THE DOMESTIC MAFIA." So can one be surprised at the panic that gripped workers of the Ministry of the Defense Industry who had not promptly objected to a transaction that was advantageous for the plant? One can also understand their heart-rending telegram of 10 January demanding that the tanks be taken back immediately. But it was too late, the cat was out of the bag. On 11 January, Polozkov called you and your article appeared on 14 January, the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee convened, and the country was shaken by an information explosion... Everything like clockwork.

[Udachin] But why did the government, which created the ANT, capitulate so quickly? If, as was stated, the ANT was intended for a good cause, for setting up direct contacts with the West, for bypassing the bureaucratic obstacles so that we can advantageously see what has been lying at our feet for years—why not fight for this wonderful ANT?

[Borin] I think it was all a matter of alignment of forces. For it is important not only FOR WHAT to fight but, above all, WITH WHOM to fight. And the political forces to whom I.K. Polozkov turned in a "friendly way," one must assume, at that moment were mightier than the forces that created the ANT. Subsequent events seemed to confirm this.

[Udachin] I have heard a version according to which the ANT action was directed against N.I. Ryzhkov personally. He had just visited the regions of Armenia that were suffering from the earthquake, everyone was touched by his kindness and humanity, and his ratings had risen extremely. Not everyone liked this.

[Borin] That is very possible. I attended the Third USSR Congress of People's Deputies when I.K. Polozkov spoke, and then Nikolay Ivanovich went to the podium. I remember how his voice trembled. Everyone paid attention to the fact that in justifying himself he still did not say a word about Polozkov. Apparently he had information we are still not aware of.

[Udachin] But still, Aleksandr Borisovich, I would not want ANT to look like some kind of Christmas present, a selfless savior and benefactor to the homeland. Everything is not that simple here either. All right, I agree that the tank story is really mysterious. But in the Novorossiysk port I saw with my own eyes goods prepared for sale abroad. And believe me, they were not junk but quite good items: bars of lead, sawed timber, and many other things. All things we need ourselves.

[Borin] We also need our own gold. In all times the state's gold reserve has been considered inviolable. And it turns out that they calmly sold it so they could use the money to buy meat and milk. And in general: Is foreign trade really the sale of only what is superfluous and unnecessary? Of course not. But what if it is a question of whether or not the ANT activity was advantageous to us, if it and other similar firms operated in a skilled or unskilled way, in a legally intelligent or unintelligent way! The essence of the matter is that the language of political accusation, the language of political campaigning, unleashed against ANT simply precludes any businesslike, thorough, substantiated discussion. Enemies, criminals, and the mafia should be behind bars—and that is all there is to it. For this campaign is not winding down; on the contrary, it is gathering more and more force. On 15 May 1990 PRAVDA printed the article by Z. Bystrova, "What Was in the Tankers?" It turns out that the government is also selling out the Yaroslav petroleum base and sending valuable fuel oil abroad. I called Yaroslavl and found out: The case was closed because of a lack of evidence of a crime. All the newspapers are passing over the startling case of the cooperator B.I. Korobochkin: He sold abroad some feed supplement that was lying around doing no good and in exchange received computers for the Ministry of Railways. Korobochkin was taken from the hospital ward to Lefortovo, to the KGB solitary confinement facility and then pressed charges against him. And the result? The procurator refused to convict him and the court sent down a not guilty verdict. RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA was raging, and bringing thunder and lightning down on the court but the Republic Supreme Soviet, based on the law, upheld the not guilty verdict. Now there is a new scandal and a fresh political campaign: a sensational case of R140 billion. And also—before the results of the investigation, before the careful check, before the clarification of all the circumstances.

[Udachin] I attended the hearing of this case in the session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. And I think that perhaps a not altogether intelligent economic transaction was openly used here for a mass political attack on the Russian Government.

[Borin] Incidentally, with respect to ANT no one has yet registered a complaint, although the USSR Procuracy promises to complete the investigation in March-April. And here, Vladimir Yakovlevich, if you will allow me, I have this question: How do you today, more than a year later, assess your article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA?

[Udachin] What can I tell you? I think the very fact of mysterious tanks on the sidings would draw the attention of any journalist. And hardly anyone would refuse to write about them. I do not see that I did anything wrong here as a journalist. But what this kind of article can lead to, what kind of impetus it could be for a far-reaching political campaign, and how certain political forces would try to use me—all this, of course, I could not have imagined. And, understandably, this does not make me very happy.

[Borin] I know that you left SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. Why?

[Udachin] Recently I have not liked where the newspaper has been headed. I thought and still do think that the newspaper is not the property of the Russian Communist Party and the editor in chief V.V. Chikin; it should be a newspaper with a general Russian direction. Then came the notorious letter from 14 of our workers criticizing the leadership of the editorial staff, and I decided: It is now or never. And I presented my views to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. After which I could not remain on the editorial staff, of course.

[Borin] Thank you, Vladimir Yakovlevich, for the conversation. I understood that we would not be able to answer all the questions. But certain forces usually count on gullible simpletons who swallow everything that is handed to them. To prevent that and make public the facts and documents about which, possibly, not everyone knows, and to force the people to think again and again—that is our professional duty. I understand that it was not very pleasant for you to go over this story again.

[Udachin] I cannot deny it.

[Borin] So thank you again.

Briton's Assertions on Ruble Deal 'Absurd'

91UF0532A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
1 Mar 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by M. Berger: "And the Suspicions Are Based on This?"]

[Text] **It is possible that one of the sources of information on the "ruble plot" is Briton Diana Miller.**

As A. Krivopalov, our correspondent in London reported, the weekly OBSERVER published an article a few days ago from which it follows that Diana Miller, the 66-year-old head of the Anglo-Soviet joint enterprise Dynamic, may be a leading actor connected with the strange assertions of the Soviet leadership concerning the existence of a plot aimed at destabilizing the Soviet economy.

The article reports that last year D. Miller warned the Soviet administration about a "Western swindle." She said she had learned that 10 major U.S. companies, a number of which have close contacts with the White House, had purchased significant sums of rubles with which they intended to inundate the Soviet economy in order to cause unrestrained inflation. D. Miller also said that when she began to telephone around to the stock exchanges in order to sell off the rubles she had, she observed that they were bought at $6-$7 per hundred at a time when the exchange rate inside the Soviet Union was only $4.5 per 100 rubles [R]. "I could not understand why people would pay so much unless they had evil intentions," stressed D. Miller in the article.

She has seen proof that approximately R130 billion are in Western hands. She also noted that if a nonprofessional like her could so easily observe R130 billion outside the USSR, then the true figure must be much more, enough to overwhelm the Soviet economy. She shared her information with highly-placed Soviet leaders and does not rule out the thought that "Pavlov took his measures on the basis of that information."

Explaining how D. Miller was able to learn about the scheme over many weeks, the OBSERVER indicated that Miller has an excellent pedigree for taking part in the dramatic events connected with the Russian money. Her father, Petr Petrov, writes a newspaper, took part in the creation of political structures in the Red Army, and was a member of the Bolshevik Party and a deputy of one of the commissars in Lenin's administration. For the last 20 years D. Miller's business activities have spanned the distance from Cambridge to Moscow. Three years ago she transformed her small computer firm into an Anglo-Soviet company specializing in the export and import of software with its headquarters in Moscow.

Upon receiving this report from London we met with Ms. Miller in her office on Tsvetnyy Boulevard in order to become better acquainted with her and to try to find out how serious this source of information is. It is possible that this information, along with other similar information, served as one of the foundations for statements about the existence in the West of a "ruble plot."

Who profits by fighting us with such a refined means—our money—when we already have rampant inflation at no cost to Western banks? D. Miller answered without a pause:

"The United States. They need it to put an end to the Soviet economy. I have known for a long time," she continued, "that there is an 'American connection' in your mafia. The burning of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI took place with the participation of Americans."

"Do you have grounds for asserting that?"

"Approximately a week before the fire, I accidentally overheard a conversation at the next table in the bar of the Natsional hotel. An American and two Soviets were sitting there. They were talking in English, assuming that I would not understand them. The American asked, 'What will we do with MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI?' 'We will take care of it,' answered a Soviet, 'and if necessary, we will burn it down.' A week after that the fire took place. I told a journalist from MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI what I heard, but for some reason nothing appeared later in the newspaper..."

It is not difficult to understand my colleague from MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, who did not consider the conversation of an unknown person accidentally overheard in a hotel bar to be convincing proof and would not publish the dubious suspicion.

"Judging by the article in the OBSERVER, you have proof that at least R130 billion are abroad. As you indicate in the OBSERVER, can you specifically name the companies who have the majority of the rubles?"

"I will name three: Coca-Cola, IBM, and ITT."

On this point it should be said that a significant quantity of Soviet money might indeed be at the disposal of several major Western companies, and the rumors and information about it might circulate freely in any fashion. The existence of rubles at the disposal of Coca-Cola or other companies that are carrying out major projects in the USSR, as a rule with the participation or support of our governmental structures, is a completely legal consequence of such cooperation. These companies receive the right to open ruble accounts up to R100,000 (the usual ceiling) in this country without limitations, although it is true that they do not have the right to take the rubles out.

"You also said that one fellow from Switzerland has R100 billion and another has R30 billion. Are we talking about cash or some kind of bank documents?"

"The R30 billion is cash backed up by a certificate. The R100 billion is in both cash and bank documents. Canadians and Americans also have large sums—R200 billion, I believe."

"Did you yourself see a large quantity of ready cash under any circumstances, or documents for it such as certificates?"

"No, I myself saw nothing of that."

"Did their owners talk to you about them?"

"People who frequent the society of the owners and who are well- informed told me about these sums, and they can be trusted."

"Do you have other proof?"

"No, and if I had begun to show too much interest they would not have even told me that much."

"You have named amounts of rubles abroad that exceed all the ready cash in circulation in the USSR several times over. How is that possible?"

"It means that this money is in certificates and other papers."

Given a person who has not herself seen the money she is talking about or documents affirming its existence but relies for her accusations on rumors coming from people "who frequent the society of the owners" of billions of rubles—is it possible to treat her information seriously? These proofs are hardly more conclusive than the suspicions expressed by Diana Miller concerning those guilty of the fire at MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. One also cannot help but be put on one's guard by the ease with which she changes key details in her story. At first she stated that it was a question of cash worth many tens of billions of rubles, and after the very first follow-up question she immediately said that it was not cash but monetary documents...

"Do you know that the USSR State Bank has officially declared that it would not recognize negotiable instruments in rubles abroad?"

"But that is exactly one of those measures which I proposed that the Soviet leadership take. Several weeks ago when I understood what was happening with the money, I proposed that four steps be taken: Officially declare certificates for the right to transfer rubles abroad to be invalid. Second: Under no circumstances open a stock exchange by 1 January 1991. Third: Pay no attention to attempts to take R50 and R100 notes abroad. And fourth: Conduct a monetary reform, and if that is impossible for some reason, then exchange notes with a value of R50 and R100. And do not declare the exchange any earlier than two to three hours beforehand."

"It seems that our administration acted strictly according to your prescription with the exception, perhaps, of the third point."

"I cannot confirm that it was because of me specifically, but I spoke of it to everyone who could pass it to the very top."

Several explanations on the course of the conversation are in order. The fact that rubles are being sold more cheaply inside the country than abroad and that the British entrepreneur, Ms. Miller, was so amazed is explained by the simple circumstance that in our country the supply of rubles is far greater than abroad, despite imaginary and real intrigues to take out Soviet money. In addition, it was a somewhat strange way to refer to the exchange rate for the ruble on the black market—stock markets are not involved in the purchase or sale of ready cash.

As for the supposed "evil intentions," it is not a question of that; the exchange rate of the ruble against the dollar in the West ($6-$7 for R100 versus $4.5 inside the country) is determined not by someone's private intentions but by the lesser quantity of the supply for sale as well as payment for obtaining them and the risk connected with bringing them out illegally.

It is a different matter that various negotiable instruments worth many billions have recently begun circulating abroad. Not the billions of rubles themselves, as they try to convince us, but documents for them that have no more real meaning than a used tram ticket. These securities were either forged there or, issued by Soviet commercial banks or entrepreneurs, have no legal force. This pertains even more to the rumors of licenses supposedly issued by the USSR State Bank for the sale of hundreds of billions of rubles.

Not everyone, probably, in the West is sufficiently informed, and at times they accept worthless documents for valid currency. In conjunction with this, at the end of last year the USSR State Bank sent out a special statement to all the world's major banks. In particular, the statement said that reports had recently been received from different sources concerning the appearance of negotiable instruments in rubles beyond the borders of the USSR (checks, bills of exchange, and letters of guarantee) issued by Soviet banks and enterprises for sums in the tens of billions of rubles. In addition it is asserted that a portion of these obligations are guaranteed by the USSR State Bank. In conjunction with this, the State Bank considered it necessary to declare that in accordance with existing legislation, the withdrawal from the USSR of Soviet currency and negotiable instruments in rubles is in fact prohibited and can only be carried out by special permission of the organs of currency control. Neither the USSR State Bank nor the USSR Ministry of Finance have given such permission to Soviet banks and enterprises.

Moreover, says the statement, the State Bank has information at its disposal that the majority of these obligations are not backed up by any real assets of the banks that issued them and often turn out to be simply forged. This also pertains in full measure to the so-called white, blue, and pink checks which are being sent abroad and which were never issued by the USSR State Bank. The State Bank pointed out to foreign banks, companies, and individuals that are purchasing or taking part in the provision of such obligations that as a result of their own lack of information or gullibility they may be subjected to significant financial losses.

But let us return to Ms. Miller—the general director of the Anglo-Soviet joint enterprise "Dynamic," whose information has produced such an impression on our British colleagues.

"Ms. Miller, what has been your business between Cambridge and Moscow over the last 20 years, as reported in the OBSERVER?"

"Since 1970 I have worked here in Moscow as a freelance (nonstaff—M.B.) editor and proofreader, and I have edited translations for PROGRESS, APN [NOVOSTI Press Agency], and MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI."

"How and when did you begin your own business?"

"In 1982 I brought a computer from England and sold it for 100 pounds more than it cost there. It was so much cheaper than the computers you sell here that the people I offered it to thought that I was selling them a toy. Later I took part twice in exhibitions on computer technology. Today our joint enterprise has very many plans. We are developing a fundamentally new type of printer and are trying to get it into production. We are also preparing to produce common garden spades from an original design of one of your craftsmen. This spade is five times more productive than the traditional one. We are also preparing production—if we can find a technical solution—of 50-liter metal barrels for beer. Right now 80 tons of fish are being sent from Kamchatka, where we have a representative, in exchange for disposable syringes. We are thinking of buying furniture and equipment in the West from firms going bankrupt... But now I will tell you something that will probably surprise you. I, a general director of a joint enterprise, believe that joint enterprises will do your country more harm than good."

We leave it to the reader to judge the reality of the existence of a "ruble plot" and the conclusiveness of the arguments cited by the leader of a joint enterprises who previously worked in Moscow as a free-lance literary editor and then a small-scale wholesale seller of computers. They seem absurd, to put it mildly, to us.

Silayev Explanation of Ekho Deal Refuted

91UF0526A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Yu. Nikolayev: "'An Octopus' in the 'Russian House'"]

[Text] "You should not doubt our commitment to your interests..."

Chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet I.S. Silayev ended his interview on the Russian TV channel last Saturday with these words. We would like not to doubt it. Who else is going to express our interests, the interests of Russians, if not the Russian Government? Certainly, not the American or South African Governments. However, the facts are such that they make us doubt even these assurances. Why? This is what the discussion is about.

Even in his speech at the session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, delivered before the TV broadcast, I.S. Silayev angrily denounced (for the nth time!) those who, in his opinion, have mounted an "unruly campaign" against the government. Alas, while accusing his opponents of some kind of unruliness, Ivan Stepanovich himself did not care very much for propriety. "All the numbers—300 billion, 140 billion, and how many trains would be needed to transport them are the figments of the sick imaginations of some hard-core theoreticians." "I reject all charges which continue to be leveled against the government." You see, the leading ministers "have been made... a target." Throughout the world, commissions of congresses, senates, stortings, parliaments, and so on get **testimony** from officials if needed, whereas, according to I.S. Silayev, the ministers "have been invited one at a time for a most detailed **interrogation**" to the Supreme Soviet.

Ivan Stepanovich took his rejection of any and all critical remarks still further in an interview for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. He stated: "I have no doubt that the goal of deposing the Russian Government has been set." "The problem of the purchase and sale of the funds in question is a separate issue. Neither I nor any of the members of the government even thought about trading at the prices of shadow business and the black market, and selling rubles for foreign exchange. All of this is slander. We did not have such a policy, nor could we have had it..."

If what Ivan Stepanovich says and writes is to be believed, there was no contract to purchase and sell 140 billion rubles [R] for $7,756 million, and he personally did not request "necessary powers for signing pertinent agreements" in order to open a credit line for a foreign partner with a length [as published]... of R300 billion, "including R140 billion immediately," in exchange for "$5 billion immediately."

However, the more threatening the peremptory shouts of Ivan Stepanovich are the more acutely and vividly we begin to understand that this is done for a reason. The ultimate goal of incantations, unsubstantiated denials of any complicity by the government in dubious schemes involving billions becomes clearer: To muzzle the people's deputies and the press. After all, having compared one transaction with another planned transaction, and then yet another, we will willingly or unwillingly embark on a discussion of not just individual errors or "mistakes in the choice of partners," but precisely **a government policy, its substantiation, and direction.** Apparently, this is precisely what the leaders of the republic do not want.

One more planned action was reported at the aforementioned meeting of the Supreme Soviet. It turns out that on 31 August 1990 a "Protocol of Intent To Carry Out a Joint Project To Normalize Economic and Social Conditions in the RSFSR and Other Regions" **was ratified** in Moscow. The document was signed by I.S. Silayev "for the RSFSR Council of Ministers." Company President V.I. Ryashentsev signed "for the Industry and Commerce Company Russian House." They signed for the Soviet side; John Ross, president of New Technology and Production International and American Laboratories, signed for the American side.

I will admit that I experienced a condition bordering on shock when I saw all three signatures together for the first time. I could not believe, I could not even allow the thought that the head of the Russian Government might ever find himself in the company of two characters with very definite reputations. There is a very pressing need to especially dwell on each of the partners once again. For now, let us look at the intentions themselves, because superficially they appear quite worthy.

THE AMERICAN SIDE ensures "the delivery of foodstuffs and consumer goods... including urgent deiiveries of such goods for no less than U.S. $1 billion, which will commence no later than 1 October 1990; resolution of all credit and finance issues associated with financing all stages of the project, with a view to the total sum of investment of up to U.S. $50 billion...." "THE SOVIET SIDE undertakes to ensure the consideration of the issue of adopting a set of normative acts on the government level which will guarantee legal and financial protection for all undertakings within the framework of the complex, and to coordinate it with the overall program of transition to a market economy in the country.

"To accomplish the tasks of the second stage, THE AMERICAN SIDE ensures: Deliveries of technical

equipment and technologies, cooperation in creating favorable conditions in the world market for selling products manufactured by the enterprises of the concern and its partners.

"At this stage, THE SOVIET SIDE ensures access to secondary raw materials, production wastes, and other resources for manufacturing competitive products at the enterprises of the concern and its partners; ensures coordination with regard to the issues of attracting foreign investment to the territory of the RSFSR.

"The sides consider the present protocol to be the basis for an immediate transition to the practical implementation of the joint project."

I repeat that at first sight the intentions do appear enticing. "Immediate" deliveries of goods and foodstuffs to Russia will begin, mutual cooperation will develop, and advanced technologies will be introduced. To be sure, the draft smacks of "self-devouring economy" which the Russian leaders are so fond of criticizing. Likewise, "access" to "other resources," after "secondary raw materials" and "production wastes," makes us somewhat wary. It would be interesting to know what specific "other resources" these are. However, this is not a contract yet, but merely "Protocol of Intent," and we may omit what we read between the lines. Besides, how can you purchase and attract foreign capital without selling anything, paying with something, or providing some incentives for the other side? Certainly, even an element of risk cannot be avoided. However, we cannot help asking questions of a different kind.

First of all, it is logical to ask this: Why was the "project" of considerable scope discussed yet again **behind the back** of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet?

The following question is also reasonable: Did at least the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, or its chairman, B.N. Yeltsin, know about I.S. Silayev's "intent"?

Finally, **how seriously, thoroughly, and responsibly** were foreign and domestic partners selected for implementing the "intent" of the Russian Government which is so strongly binding upon all of us?

I asked A.A. Zakharova, chief of the secretariat of the RSFSR Council of Ministers chairman, about this.

Alla Anatolyevna answered: "John Ross is a reliable businessman; behind him are companies whose solvency is beyond doubt."

I said: I have heard things about John Ross, and quite unflattering things...

"If there are suspicions I will recheck everything right away and call you."

The promised call was never made, but I recall this: As early as the beginning of last December, an engineer I know, who had returned from on-the-job training in the United States, came to me. He was indignant about an interview with... John Ross, published in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA KULTURA:

"He is as sly as an old fox; there is not a shred of honesty in him, but look at how they painted him as a businessman!.."

John Ross, president of New Technology and Production International and American Laboratories, a.k.a. "Yan Semenovich Zubok, born on 15 July 1927 in the city of Kiev, Jewish, non-party member; has a secondary technical education. Worked for a while in various construction organizations of Kiev, Lvov, and Crimea Oblast. Committed a number of crimes associated with speculation and theft of state property, for which he was sentenced twice: in 1954, to eight years of imprisonment, and in 1963 to two years of imprisonment under Article 84, Part 2 of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Criminal Code..."

My Ukrainian colleagues have helped to find and mailed to me only a copy of the sentence by the people's court of Radyanskiy Rayon of the city of Kiev in the second case. However, even this is enough to introduce our "character." When you read the sentence you involuntarily begin feeling bitter shame for those who were led by the nose by this Zubok-Ross. "Together with former Repair and Construction Administration employees... Geller, Lipinskiy, and Shestak, Zubok... stole and sold roofing sheet metal to the following persons... 125 sheets, ...56 sheets, ...94 sheets..." "Three tons of roofing sheet metal were stolen from Housing Management Administration No. 110 and sold with Zubok's participation."

This is how "enterprising" Yan Semenovich Zubok is. Only an extremely naive or irresponsible person can believe that this petty swindler immediately grew on American soil into a billionaire able to "invest" in his former, not quite beloved motherland.

To be sure, certain "transformations" did occur indeed. In 1976, Yan Semenovich left Klyazma in Moscow Oblast for Israel to join his cousin Sarra Vaynter. He soon ended up in Italy, and later in the United States. Over there, he indeed became a co-owner of small factories producing condoms, "with a labor force of five, including clerks," and pool cues. He did a snow job on the readers of SOVETSKAYA KULTURA telling them that he had opened a joint Soviet- American school of management in New York together with the Moscow Institute of New Technologies. Soviet specialists whom I have managed to meet maintain in unison that he is not at all a participant in this joint venture. Small-scale hauling is his line of business; he hires cars for people undergoing on-the-job training. He stands out for being phenomenally careless and unreliable. He is unscrupulous. When our specialists tried to hold "John Ross" accountable in some manner, he invariably produced the "Protocol of Intent..." and threatened offenders with inescapable punishment inflicted by Russian House and "Ivan Stepanovich Silayev personally."

I am aware of how sickening it is to even read these lines. I am sure that the readers will agree: In my previous articles about the 140 billion and 300 billion, I described the more than just suspect partners of our leaders in projects and contracts very sparingly. I believed that they would undertake a serious, self-critical analysis of initial attempts at independent foreign-economic activities. However, since this has not happened, we must reluctantly, so to say, remind them how absurd, nonsensical, and immoral it is to deal with wheeler-dealers of this stripe on the government level.

It makes sense to recall here the third person signing "Protocol of Intent..."

Vladimir Igorevich Ryashentsev, president (as in the "Protocol...") of the Industry and Commerce Company Russian House. Apparently, it is not necessary to characterize this figure with a new resounding title. Indeed, he is the same Ryashentsev who headed the infamous ANT [Automation, Science, and Technology]. He gained notoriety due to the tank affair. It turned out later that ANT had intended to auction off to foreign clients revolvers, gold, silver, and strategic materials right up to nuclear fuel.

A lot has been written about these adventurist leanings and transactions which were concluded and brought to an end by the Soviet Government, the law-enforcement organs, and the Committee of Party Control; I am not going to enumerate them here. I will only note that, strange as it may be, lamentations on account of the ANT are suddenly being heard again now in the so-called "democratic" press, from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA to KOMMERSANT and VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA. Therefore, we will have to revisit the issue. Meanwhile, I will only dwell on the complete unsoundness of the main argument used by the advocates of the state-cooperative monster. They tried, both at the time and recently, to argue as forcefully as possible that there was some kind of altruism, "absolute selflessness of the ANT guys," their striving to do much good for the country. This, however, is nonsense!

In order not to speak without proof I will give the floor to documents sent from France and not published to date.

"ACCEPTANCE AND TRANSFER ACT. Representative of SDS Company, France, I. Prudhomme, turned over a personal computer manufactured by the Winners Company No 5 (1072...) to the Industrial State Cooperative Association ANT free of charge." "The computer from the SDS Company" was accepted by V. Ryashentsev, general director of the ANT Industrial State Cooperative Association. The signature was confirmed by his deputy, M. Tsarev."

Here is another "Act" showing that "the difference amounting to Soviet R7,000 was transferred to the board of the Industrial State Cooperative Association ANT to provide incentives to employees who took part in preparing and signing the general agreement and contracts between the Industrial State Cooperative Association ANT and the SDS Company (France). The above amount was officially accepted as funds of the Industrial State Cooperative Association ANT by accountant Ye.M. Mordakova in the presence of witnesses M.E. Tsarev, Ye.V. Shvaneva, and P.V. Shpyakin..."

It is worthwhile to note the date when the "Act" was signed—18 January 1989. That is to say, ANT personnel began to take from foreign partners in earnest, sometimes in Soviet rubles, and sometimes in kind (computers, that is) as early as **half a year** before their association was registered as a participant in foreign economic relations.

The assertions of the ANT advocates regarding the low commissions which it supposedly agreed to charge for engaging in transactions with foreign companies are likewise worthless.

"STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL." "Agreement between the SDS Financial Group (France) and the Industrial State Cooperative Association ANT (USSR)": "...in the course of delivering equipment, instruments, computer equipment, and other goods from the USSR to France and third countries for freely convertible currencies, the Industrial State Cooperative Association ANT will receive five percent of the total worth of contracts signed between the SDS Financial Group and Soviet organizations. The five percent of the total worth of the contracts signed will be transferred by the SDS to a bank account indicated by the Industrial State Cooperative Association ANT (in the USSR, France, or third countries) within 30 days of the completion of delivery and payment for the goods."

Why such generosity on the part of Western businessmen? It would suffice to look at **"Annex No 1 to Contract No 3..."**. It said in black and white: "Prices reduced by 25 to 45 percent will be set for goods exported by the Industrial State Cooperative Association ANT for the SDS Company..." In other words, cooperative members intended to sell off our national wealth for peanuts. Their appetites grew as foreign economic contacts developed. Ryashentsev demanded that a commission payment as high as 20 percent ($4.2 million) be deposited in his personal account in Monaco for a transaction involving aircraft engines worth more than $23 million (there is documentary evidence to this effect!).

We are left wondering **how and why** the government and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium let a state-cooperative "octopus" into Russian House. They did not just let the "octopus" in but also made him comfortable and were nice to him.

At present, I.S. Silayev terms "absurd" the "assertions" that the transactions, intentions, and projects involving astronomical sums in rubles and dollars were in some way connected to the "500 days" program and other steps by the government. However, let us agree that it would be at the very least imprudent to view manipulations with the billions in isolation, outside of time and space. For example, how can we fail to notice that the frantic aspiration to gain possession of gigantic foreign-exchange resources manifested itself in particular on the eve of privatizing anything and everything?

A draft law had not yet been considered by the Supreme Soviet, but as early as 3 December 1990 the RSFSR Council of Ministers adopted the resolution "On the Use of Soviet Ruble-Denominated Funds by Foreign Companies in RSFSR Territory." It said very definitively:

"The RSFSR Council of Ministers resolves: 1. To establish that foreign companies may use Soviet-ruble denominated funds in RSFSR territory for investments and the privatization of property in the sphere of consumer goods production, processing of agricultural products and raw materials, trade and public catering, consumer services to the populace, and other sectors of the national economy, as well as for the acquisition of buildings and structures under construction and creating new enterprises."

In the draft law submitted by the Council of Ministers, a minuscule restriction on capitalist sharks is envisaged: Foreign citizens and corporate persons cannot take part in auctions (bidding) only in cases when the initial price of a privatized establishment is under R50,000.

I think that if the essence of all these maneuvers is to be assessed it ought to be recalled that there are merely R136 billion in the pockets, wallets, and mattresses of the Soviet people. This is our joint ready cash. One does not have to a prophet to determine **who** will be privatizing **what** given such inequitable starting conditions.

I cannot but touch once again on the dubious and frequently used technique of intimidating the populace of Russia and painting a picture in which the discontinuation of the above "contracts," "projects," and "intentions" leaves us naked and barefoot and drives us to the brink of famine. Since I do not want to repeat previously used arguments I suggest that the readers themselves divide, for example, 7 billion in one case and 5 billion in the other case by the number of citizens of the Russian Federation. In one case, this will result in about $50, and in the other just over $30 per average Russian. One may buy a pair of jeans which are not exactly in vogue with the combined amount in a foreign-exchange shop, or else you could take the subway several dozen times in the United States. Count how much such pants and trips are going to cost us...

Now judge for yourself commitment to whose interests cannot be doubted...

Official Justifies Bill Exchange

914A0467B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 7, 20 Feb 91 p 6

[Interview with Yu. Balagurov, banker and head of the Board of Monetary Circulation of the USSR State Bank, by A. Krymova; place and date not given; under the general heading "Operation 'One Hundred Fifty'" subtitled "There Was a Secret, But There Were No Mysteries." This interview was published in conjunction with an article by academician S. Shatalin published in the 28 February Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 45, column two, under the headline "Shatalin Denounces Financial Policy."]

[Text] **Time has passed. The passions that raged three weeks ago around the exchange of the two largest bank notes have died down. The newspaper dedicated an entire page of print to those passions (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, No 4, 1991). Back then we promised to conduct and publish a deeper analysis of the operation that was conducted. We are fulfilling our promise.**

[Balagurov] The main task that the exchange of bank notes was to resolve was of a purely technical nature: It was necessary to begin printing money using more modern technology than at present. Until now we have used equipment from 1961. It has fallen out of date and, glancing to the future, we are faced with the question of how to protect our bank notes from possible improvements in equipment for forging them.

In my memory, over the last 20 years the British changed the appearance of their 10-pound bank note three times. That is to say, such a measure to protect the money is considered perfectly normal. But it is carried out, of course, under peaceful circumstances. The citizens cannot help but know that a process of exchange is underway. Bank notes are withdrawn from trade earnings and, ending up in the bank, they do not leave it. At the same time new bank notes are issued which enter circulation alongside the old ones (up to a designated deadline), and then someone says, "Stop!" The old bills are no longer used for trade. If citizens have not managed to change all their cash in hand, they can go to the bank and complete such an exchange at any time.

This goal—a change in technology—was like the trunk of a tree. Then two branches grew out of the trunk. A decision was made: Why not use the exchange to carry out the wish, and sometimes the demand, of people's deputies heard at many congresses and sessions to confiscate the millions that have been illegally obtained? This is how the second goal came about, and behind it appeared a third—to devalue that money which has been illegally taken abroad. Why do I insist on the word "illegally?" Because our law permits 30 rubles [R] to be taken abroad in three R10 notes, no more. Any R50 and R100 notes taken abroad are contraband. They are subject to confiscation.

The brief period for conducting the exchange, while quite inconvenient for everyone (including for bank employees, who did not sleep for days and carried out a volume of work equivalent to approximately six months) and the many negative emotions that existed were connected with the fulfillment of only the last two tasks—the attempt to cut off the illegal capital. What was the result?

According to preliminary calculations, approximately R7 billion were not presented to banks (according to verified data).

[Krymova] That is inside the country?

[Balagurov] All of it.

[Krymova] That is not much. How much of it remained outside the country?

[Balagurov] To be candid, I have always taken a very skeptical view of those figures relating to our money abroad. A more or less legitimate bank will never admit that it is holding illegally exported rubles.

To be brief, I cannot say precisely how much money is there. I am convinced that no one can. There is no evidence for any kind of expert opinion. But I believe that subsequently we will be able to get in touch with customs and find out how much money was confiscated at the border.

The exchange has practically ended, and that means that we can believe—we will start with the end—that we have carried out the third task (cutting off bank notes in the West). The first (technological) task has also been carried out, especially since we carried it out automatically. The replacement of notes has taken place, and now our only problem is how to get the new money to the local level in a timely fashion and in the necessary quantities so that it gradually enters circulation.

[Krymova] How soon will that take place?

[Balagurov] It is already taking place. But it is quite far from Moscow to the outlying districts. Some of the republics are sending their own aircraft and picking up the new notes from the central depository so that, I believe, they will go into circulation universally in the first half of 1991.

As for the second task, that is the most difficult one.

The cash remains of enterprises, organizations, institutions, and even banks in R100 and R50 notes have been withdrawn and are in the so-called account 904. In some instances these remains have been growing 100 times faster than usual, sometimes more. The issue of entering these remains on current accounts will be decided by special commissions. Banking, financial, and law enforcement organs will take part on the commissions. Nor do I exclude the possibility that criminal proceedings will be instituted in specific instances.

[Krymova] Have the enormous scale of our country and the differences in the manner of preserving money been taken into account in some fashion? In the republics of Central Asia, for example, they are not accustomed to keeping their money in savings banks.

[Balagurov] These things have, of course, been taken into account.

[Krymova] In what fashion?

[Balagurov] The commissions know their own local customs. This is why the rights of the commissions have not been limited in any fashion aside from the deadlines. No limits on exchange were established.

However, we have taken a firm position against attempts to extend the established deadline. Because that would be an invitation to all who are in illegal possession of the notes to travel to wherever an extension exists to continue exchanging there.

[Krymova] These R7 billion that have remained in people's hands, were they worth the expenditure of nervous energy that the speedy exchange required?

[Balagurov] Personally I do not quite believe that we have managed to "close down" the operators on the shadow economy. Capital should circulate. So no self-respecting operator would be holding his capital in cash.

[Krymova] But then it seems that all the measures might have been conducted peacefully and without panic.

[Balagurov] You are right. Nonetheless, we needed to keep it a secret in the first place and to conduct it quickly in the second. There were fewer people who knew it was being prepared and conducted than can be counted on one hand. I was not one of them, and I learned about everything only several hours before it was declared on the program "Vremya."

[Krymova] The question of trust arises. Trust in the new administration especially. When I was coming to interview you my associates at the editorial board were saying to me, "Why? After all, no one is going to believe anything. They (meaning you) cannot even tell the truth." This is also one of the results of the "exchange" operation.

[Balagurov] You are right to raise the question of trust. I believe that we have done quite a lot to warrant this trust in principle. At our proposal, for example, the state completely redeemed the state bonds issued in 1954-1956. It was very difficult for us to do that. The emission was very large, and we knew that a few bricks would be thrown at the State Bank as a result, but we nonetheless brought this proposal to the administration. The administration agreed. We viewed it as a small step toward reestablishing trust. Today everyone has forgotten that in 1971 Kosygin, the prime minister at that time, designated 1990 as the deadline of settling these bonds. We stayed within the deadline. But that has gone by unnoticed.

This is a good point to bring up another subject: Very often people try to resolve serious economic problems by purely monetary means. In my opinion that is impossible. The horse should be put in front of the cart, not behind it. In a strong economy it is possible to issue any kind of money and avoid regulating monetary circulation by uncivilized methods. But in the opposite situation—forget it. So I view today's measures as an attempt to take action of some sort. And only that.

[Krymova] And what is your view of another measure—freezing deposits?

[Balagurov] That is a measure in which everyone seeks some kind of secret design. And there is none. During the period of the exchange we simply wished to avoid something that happened anyway—the absence of bank notes in postal departments, savings banks, and institutes.

[Krymova] Then why the six-month time period?

[Balagurov] First and foremost we do not expect an exchange of R25 notes. If we were preparing to do that, then we would have done it right away.

I believe that someone is simply interested in seeing the situation heat up. Otherwise, why would there be such rumors? Like the situation with the devaluation of deposits over R3,000 that was supposed to take place. That is, they are harking back to 1947. The State Bank did not plan and is not planning any such thing.

[Krymova] And why have our wages been handed out everywhere only in R50 and R100 notes over recent months? Are we being specially forced to hold a month's wages worth of such notes in reserve?

[Balagurov] That requires explanation. We traditionally have an understated wage level by comparison with all the other countries of the world. What is happening now is a spontaneous process of a "catching-up" of wages. The sluices opened especially wide after the Supreme Soviet session that discussed a budget report which introduced a proposal that 50 percent of the funds existing at an enterprise be directed toward purchasing shares of labor collectives. At the enterprises it was immediately thought that this money was to be confiscated. And everything was handed out in wages. Over the first, second, and third quarters our income grew by 12-13 percent in comparison with last year; the fourth quarter gave us 25! Do you understand what this means? A 25 percent increase in wages in the face of a decline in labor productivity, volume of production, and all the other economic indicators. Naturally, we could not do without the printing press. And it would turn out to be much more expensive to print out R1 notes than R100 notes.

[Krymova] Summing up, can you say that the financial and banking operation as it was conceived is completely ended?

[Balagurov] Yes. Now a word for economists: We need to conduct measures to eliminate the deficit of the state budget and saturate the market with goods, in part through privatization.

As for pricing reform, I believe that sooner or later it should take place. In my opinion, for example, the sooner the better. I foresee a horrible end rather than a horror without end. We cannot keep the economy "on a hook," in a suspended state. But this is already outside the bounds of our conversation.

From the Editorial Board

These are two points of view. One person may point to the unnecessarily emotional position of one author, someone else to the too rational position of the other. The editorial office considers its task to be one of reflecting the entire spectrum of opinions existing in society concerning vitally important economic problems.

Krasnodar Gasoline Shortages Reported

PM1403123191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Mar 91 Union Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent A. Dergachev: "We Import and Export Gasoline"]

[Text] Krasnodar Kray—When in the fall of last year the first Greek tanker was unloaded at Tuapse port it was a sensation—fuel had always been exported only via this port and now—surprise!—Greek gasoline had reached us. The Kuban peasants were heartened: Perhaps now they would not have to stop the harvest... But their initial joy was brief—in just six weeks the generally cheap imported fuel (the cost of the first consignment was 50-100 percent more than our domestic price) suddenly increased in price... by a factor of three. But there was no way out—Soviet suppliers were still letting them down. The overpayment for imported fuel cost the Kuban 15 million rubles [R]. The loss incurred was mainly made good at the expense of the state budget.

But why not at the expense of the Soviet suppliers who were to blame by disrupting the shipments contract? Is it not from this elementary rule that we should begin the transition to market relations? Especially as the breakdown in contract deliveries is being created in part deliberately—under the conditions of the very acute shortage which has been artificially created it is far simpler to "extract" from a partner driven into a corner what is not envisaged by the contract.

One is led to these speculations by the fact that in September last year, when the bringing in of the very rich Kuban harvest was suspended for lack of fuel, the "well-wishers" who came in from Groznyy offered the following exchange: For a liter of "above-quota" gasoline they demanded three liters of milk. The peasants were beginning to waver when the "Greek" gasoline arrived like manna from heaven. Indeed, where would they have taken such a large quantity of "above-quota" milk if they needed 220,000 tonnes of fuel (it was made up by imports)?

And since to this day we do not practice the payment of a penalty for violating a treaty, the peasants, through their "Krasnodarkrayagropromsoyuz," are ensured in that they now conclude with their suppliers additional so-called interregional contracts whose thrust is absolutely clear: If you supply me with fuel on time, I shall supply you with milk and meat on schedule, but if you violate the agreement then don't get angry... But what is there left for the peasants to do if the spring sowing campaign is already imminent, when thousands of sowing machines will go out onto spring fields covering 2 million hectares, yet the stores are empty and all fuel is put to use immediately when it arrives?

Will the import of fuel, more accurate in terms of delivery dates, save the day? Hardly. It is not only unprestigious, it is also very expensive. The state budget will not help out now, so as before it will be impossible to deliver the "Greek" fuel to the gas stations—the private motorist can only be supplied with fuel at the state price. After all, the private motorist is not a peasant—he rebels: In January the owners of low-powered automobiles gathered on the square near the city soviet executive committee and cut off traffic for three hours along Krasnodar's main street: "All right, in the summer and fall everything is for the harvest, but in winter why do we stand in line for days at the gas pumps?" But how could the local authorities answer them if, with a market allocation requirement of 0.5 million tonnes a year only 290,000 tonnes have been earmarked for allocation and even that was essentially halved for production needs. No better a prospect awaits the owners of private vehicles this year when funds for fuel have been cut 15 percent compared with last year's very meager "level."

Sochi is already introducing coupons for gasoline. Other cities in Krasnodar Kray are inclining to the same idea. And against the background of all this cross shipments of fuel by sea look like a paradox. For instance last year some tankers brought in gasoline while others exported it through the selfsame Tuapse port. They exported twice as much... This year, according to available information, it is not 0.5 million tonnes, as in 1990, that will leave via Tuapse port but 50 percent more. It is true that this gasoline (bet) is called industrial gasoline but specialists know that with some processing it is possible to obtain from it A-76 gasoline, on which not only trucks but also "Zhiguli" automobiles can run now...

...So to all appearances we will not manage without imported gasoline this year either.